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ABSTRACT 
The European Union's foreign policy continues to perplex scholars and 
practitioners alike. Arguably the most controversial aspect of the European 
integration process, a single European foreign policy remains a distant prospect. 
The Union's persistent inability to translate its economic weight into effective 
political influence has frequently seen it marginalised on major international 
issues, and left searching for a role in the rapidly changing post-Cold War world. 
Yet more than ever it is expected to assume its share of global responsibilities and 
to take the lead in developing a new security order for Europe. 
In the absence of capabilities to undertake foreign policy strategies in the 
politico-security sphere, the EU has relied instead on its foreign economic policy 
to provide it with the instruments to secure a place for itself on the world stage. 
Through its long established control of access to lucrative European markets and 
I 
its substantial financial aid budget, the Union has acted as a magnetic force on the 
regions around it. With this influence have come expectations of the Union as a 
benevolent force for economic, political and social change. 
The Mediterranean basin represents a crucial test of the effectiveness of 
EU foreign policy. Faced with a region whose future stability is inextricably 
linked to European security, the Union's capacity to react to events matters far less 
than its ability to undertake forward looking and genuinely tranformative strategic 
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and Carol, have continued to help me financially and emotionally throughout my 
time in higher education, a huge sacrifice for which I cannot thank them enough. 
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION: EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY AND 
STRATEGIC ACTION 
This thesis is a study of the development of the European Union's external 
Mediterranean policy during the 1990s. The period has seen the EU's relations 
with the majority of non-member states of the Mediterranean littoral absorbed into 
an innovative policy 'framework' - the 'Euro-Mediterranean partnership' (EMP). 
The EMP is based on the negotiation of Euro-Mediteffanean Association 
Agreements, an upgraded form of previous agreements, and an ambitious and 
innovative multilateral political declaration and work programme. Over the same 
period, Mediterranean security has become an increasingly salient issue for the 
Union, testing both its crisis management capabilities and its long-term security 
strategy for the region. It is with the latter in particular that this thesis is 
concemed. 
The central claim of the thesis is that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
demonstrates the EU's capacity to undertake strategic foreign policy action in its 
own right. This capacity is principally located in the EU's first pillar (the 
European Communities), in traditionally been labelled 'external economic 
relations'. 1 Active, as opposed to merely reactive, foreign policy emanates from 
the EC acting as the 'agent' of the European Union. 2 While the Union has spent 
much of the 1990s attempting to develop a stronger common foreign and security 
policy-making mechanism, it is the Union's 'foreign economic policy" that 
consistently has the greatest, if not always a highly visible, impact on the outside 
world. 3 This argument rests on the idea that an inclusive and expansive view of 
I 
EU foreign policy should be adopted. Distinguishing external economic relations 
from foreign policy has become increasingly anachronistic in an international 
system in which trade and finance have become 'high politics. ' A broad view of 
EU Mediterranean policy is required if the policy - and its significance, 
achievements and difficulties are to be understood. 
A number of secondary hypotheses flow from this argument. First, we 
should expect the EU's strategic action to focus on so-called 'soft security' and 
6soft power', implying the eschewal of a traditional politico-military concerns in 
favour of the economic, societal and environmental aspects of security. 4 Conflict 
prevention rather than conflict resolution, is the Union's main strength in foreign 
policy. That is not to suggest that politico-military security is irrelevant for the 
EU; the brutal wars in the former Yugoslavia have vividly exposed its deficiencies 
in that realm. But what matters most are the EU's enduring qualities as a 
ficivilian power', deploying resources that derive from its status as a regional 
5 
economic power to secure its objectives. 
Second, the notion that economic policy instruments provide the 
foundation for strategic action suggests that there ought to be greater 'consistency' 
between pillars I and JI. 6 In other words, we should expect to find economic 
policy instruments being more effectively and systematically deployed in pursuit 
of the Union's political objectives, since that is where its real strengths as an 
international actor lie. 
Third, the emphasis on pillar I and external trade policy as the bases of 
strategic action has important implications for the way strategy is formulated and 
policy is made. The delegation Of Policy competence from the Member States to 
the Community in this area is one of the longest established and most highly 
developed features of European integration. 7 We should therefore expect a 
2 
significant degree of supranational autonomy in the policy process, with the 
Commission playing a key role in shaping policy and negotiating with third 
countries on behalf of the Union. By extension, we might also anticipate a 
stronger sense of common European interests in the development of policy. 
This introductory chapter examines the ontology of EU foreign policy, 
assesses the state of the art in EU foreign policy studies, and sets out a framework 
for the analysis of strategic action. Section I explores the complex nature of EU 
foreign policy and gives a brief overview of the Union's competencies in that area. 
In section 2, the theoretical problems associated with the study of EU foreign 
policy are examined from a variety of analytical perspectives. Section 3 sets out a 
framework for the analysis of EU strategic action, arguing that particular attention 
must be paid to the policy-making process in order to understand the transition 
from strategy as plan into strategy as policy. It moves on to outline the content of 
each chapter of the thesis. 
1. The Elusive Pursuit of EU Foreign Policy 
Making sense of EU foreign policy is far from straightforward. As Christopher 
Hill argues: 
apart from a very small group of diplomatic practitioners and specialist 
commentators, few Europeans (let alone those on the outside looking in) 
have a clear conception of the multiple layers and contradictions that go up 
to make what is often called "European foreign PoliCy,,. 8 
A first problem is the complex multi-institutional, multi-procedural nature of the 
EU foreign policy-making process. A bewildering array of treaty articles, 
European Court of Justice judgements and informal agreements among the 
institutions and member governments have shaped the EUs acquispolitique, the 
totality of the Union's competencies and output in the foreign Policy domain. 
3 
Institutional competencies for policy-making and external diplomatic activity vary 
with the issue in question and the treaty articles associated with it. In many cases, 
of which EU Mediterranean policy is a prime example, foreign policy strategies 
are composites of measures that emanate from several sources and are thus subject 
to wide range of decision-making rules and procedures. 
The diff-usion of authority in EU external policy-making has increased in 
line with the general transfer of policy-making power from Member State to 
Community level. Since the acceleration of the European integration process 
sparked by the Single Market initiative, the externalisation of Community policies 
has given most policy sectors an international dimension. 9 Trade negotiations, for 
instance, now routinely involve several Commission Directorates General, as well 
as a multitude of national ministries and non-governmental interests. In turn, the 
external dimension of the European integration process, most notably the impact 
of the Single Market initiative, generates demands from outsiders for membership, 
association agreements, trade agreements and other forms of formal relationships 
with the Union! 0 To illustrate the point, the EU negotiated around 25 different 
. P-- - free trade agreements (FTAs) in the 1990s with a range of partners, including 
Russia and Mercosur, as well as Mediteffanean states. " 
The externalisation of internal policy also creates pressure for the Union 
to 'speak with one voice', since it is directly to the Union that demands are 
addressed. Yet the lack of a clear institutional locus for external policy continues 
to handicap the Union, exemplified by its Union's uncertain status in international 
negotiations. On numerous occasions, third countries, and even the Member 
States themselves, have had to seek legal clarification of the Union9s powers. 12 
The EU had, for example, 'no clear policy on FTAs: they were mostly negotiated 
by Commissioners between whom the world was divided into regional 
4 
responsibilities ... [and were] 
defended as a means to strengthen the Union's hand 
in their "patch" of the globe. ' 13 
A second problem arises from the existence of multiple 'levels' of 
European foreign policy activity which are enmeshed with, and often analytically 
inseparable from, the Union's own foreign policy activities. The most significant 
of these remains the national level, expressed in the foreign policies of the 
Member States. Indeed, EU external policies are frequently specifically designed 
to complement, or be complemented by, national policies. Moreover, although the 
EU has acquired exclusive competence over many crucial areas of external 
economic relations, the Member States have stubbornly resisted a significant 
transfer of authority to the EU level over the traditional politico-security 
component of foreign policy. Admittedly, Article 5 of the EEC Treaty requires 
the Member States to abstain from any measure which could j eopardise the 
attainment of the EU's objectives. However, the ambiguity of the article leaves 
much scope for national foreign policies and national interests to act as a 
centrihgal force on the European foreign policy process. 
At another level, the EU has become increasingly dependent on outside 
organisations in both the design and implementation of its external policies. 
Although the memberships of the EU and these organisations may overlap, they 
are rarely identical. 14 The dependence of the EU on other organisations is ahnost 
total in the cases of defence and security policy. NATO continues to dominate 
European security and has arguably become an increasingly significant player 
15 
since it acquired the ability to act 'out-of-area'. The eastern enlargement 
strategy of the EU, and NATO's own strategy for expansion, are inextricably 
linked, and it is virtually unthinkable that one can proceed without the other. 16 In 
similar fashion, the use of NGOs to implement EU funded projects ranging from 
5 
support for democratisation to assistance for small businesses, has become 
standard practice. Policy might originate in the EU, but the implementation of it 
is often well outside its direct control. The recent scandal that emerged over the 
maladministration of EU funds, including programmes in the Mediterranean, 
exemplifies this control problem in external policy. 17 
The classification of the EU's external activities - has been facilitated by 
its separation into two (supposedly) distinct branches. 18 External economic 
relations formed the first branch. Its bases in the founding treaties were the 
Common Commercial Policy (Articles 131-5), relationships with the overseas 
territories of the Member States (Articles 3 00-3 10) and the potential to accept new 
members (Article 237 EEC Treaty). 19 It is primarily through these articles that the 
Union has been endowed with an extensive range of external policy instruments in 
pillar 1. Policy-making in this area has a strong 'supranational' element, with 
many decisions taken according to the 'Community method'. 20 
The literature on external economic relations has tended to treat them as 
'low politics', focusing either on the economic implications of agreements for 
relationships with third countries, or on the effect the agreements have on the 
EU's status as an international actor. 21 As Lodge argues, however, 'the Common 
Commercial Policy's scope is so wide that all manner of other issues fall into the 
22 
supposedly "low political" competence of the EC. The increased politicisation 
of trade, capital movements and money during the 1990s exposes the growing 
irrelevance of this distinction. 
European Political Cooperation, later superseded by the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP), has formed the second branch. Its creators saw EPC 
as part of the integration process, designed to foster coordination between the 
national foreign policies of the Member States and enable the Community to 
6 
collectively respond to the considerable external pressures that Western Europe 
23 faced at the start of the 1970s. The aim was to empower the Community in the 
realm of 'high politics. ' However, EPC was deliberately designed to run parallel 
to, rather than in conjunction with, the Community's external economic relations, 
and centred on informal consensus among the foreign ministries of the member 
states rather than on the Community's institutions. 24 
Despite being little more than a mechanism for the coordination of 
national foreign policies, EPC has attracted growing interest from the academic 
community. The assumption, seemingly corroborated by the gradual codification 
of EPC's procedures, a handful of high profile diplomatic initiatives, and its 
increasing reliance on Community policy instruments and resources, was that an 
effective common foreign policy capability required a politico-diplomatic 
dimension; some sort of collective capacity to deal with political, security and 
even military issues. Two decades of little more than well-intentioned political 
declarations exposed the limitations of EPC, but many scholars continued to 
regard it as the closest thing to real foreign policy machinery in the EU, even if 
what it produced could hardly be described as real foreign policy. 25 
The creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy - the second of 
Maastricht's three pillars - enshrined the foreign policy-external relations 
dichotomy in the treaties. Although the TEU (Article Q stressed the need for the 
Commission and Council to ensure 'horizontal' consistency between the EU's 
6external relations, security, economic and development policies', the treaty paid 
scant regard to how bridging the divide between the two pillars would actually be 
achieved. Nor did it address the issue of 'vertical' consistency between EU 
foreign policy and the foreign policies of the individual Member States. 26 A 
Declaration appended to the Treaty promised a review of the procedures for 
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consistency, but left the actual arrangements largely open ended. The suggestion 
prior to the IGCs that the two branches might be integrated in the single 
institutional framework had been ruled out by the sensitivity of some of the 
Member States to ceding control over one of the key attributes of the sovereign 
state, and by the caution of the Commission, which was wary of pushing the 
supranational cause too hard. 
The final package amounted to a codified version of EPC with some 
modest communitarisation of procedures, but was talked up both by EU policy- 
makers and the European media as heralding the dawn of a new age in European 
foreign PoliCY. 27 Initially, the academic community appeared to buy into the new 
policy, albeit with critical reservations about its likely effectiveness. The new 
Title V (Article J. 4) broached the taboo subject of EU defence policy for the first 
time,, tentatively setting up the WEU as the Union's defence arm. New decision- 
making procedures - common positions and joint actions (Article J. 2) - were 
created that potentially paved the way enable the Union to take collective 'action' 
in addition to issuing political declarations. However, the CFSP did not equip the 
Union with a new set of foreign policy instruments, while decisions about 
financing actions and the use of pillar I external policy instrwnents, were to be 
made on a case-specific basis rather than through any set formula. In this sense, 
the new mechanism singularly failed even to clarify the institutional division of 
labour in EU foreign policy. 28 What has been termed 'ad hocery' remained the 
stmd practice. 
29 
One of the key tasks mandated to the inter-governmental conferences that 
produced the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty was to 'endow the Union with a greater 
capacity for external action'. 30 Given the ineffectiveness of the CFSP in fostering 
agreement among the Member States, and with eastern enlargement looming, 
8 
procedural adaptation headed the wish list. 31 But a leap forward in the 
communitarisation of CFSP decision-making was never a realistic prospect. As 
Bobby McDonagh, an kish diplomat involved in the IGC negotiations put it: 
the simple fact is that, at the present stage of the Union's development, there 
is a limit to the extent to which any Member State is prepared to submerge a 
perceived important foreign policy interest within a single European 
position. 
32 
Rather than wholesale reform, the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty made only 
incremental changes to the CFSP. The Union's stubborn adherence to unamnuty 
as the basis for decision-making was mitigated by provision for the 'constructive 
abstention' of up to a third of the Member States and a limited extension of QMV 
to decisions that flow from common strategies and those that implement common 
positions and joint actions (Article 23 (ex J. 13). Member States retained the right 
to block decisions 'for important and stated reasons of national policy', thus 
preserving a defacto veto (Article 23.2). Two additional competencies were 
added to Article J. 2 - the definition of guidelines and the adoption of common 
strategies - that brought the Union into foreign policy-making process at an earlier 
stage (European Council). To complement this enhanced directional power, the 
creation of a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU) housed in the 
Council Secretariat gave the Union a capacity for the independent (of the Member 
States) analysis of foreign policy situations. The profile of the Union abroad was 
to be strengthened by the appointment of the Council's Secretary General as 'High 
Representative' of the CFSP. Although these developments promoted further 
'Brusselisation' of the CFSP, the Council was the principle beneficiary of change, 
a situation which leaves the member governments in control of the CFSp. 33 
By the end of the 1990s, it was clear from experience that the CFSP had 
not lived up to its billing. 34 The Union could point to only a handful of 
9 
successftil, high profile joint actions, among them support for the Middle East 
35 Peace Process and the Palestinian elections. On issues that ought to have 
elicited a strong collective political position from the Union, such as the crises in 
Algeria and the Balkans, a strong Union position was conspicuous by its absence. 
Like that of its predecessor, the CFSP's output was dominated by statements 
rather than concrete action. Any bridging between pillars I and H was driven by 
the imperative of the issue and the creativity of the Union, particularly the 
opportunism of the Commission, rather than by procedural advances brought by 
the TEU (or ones now in place via the Amsterdam treaty). 
Much of the literature on EU foreign policy caught the CFSP wave. Here, 
for the first time, appeared to be the bare bones of a European security and 
defence identity (ESDI) and a mechanism for common foreign policy-making in 
something approaching a constitutionalised form. Yet as Peterson and Sjursen 
argue, practice has shown the CFSP to be best conceived of as a process rather 
than a policy. 36 The disappointing record of the CFSP, which with a few 
exceptions has produced little more than carefully worded and politically tentative 
declarations, suggests that finding a position on which the Member States can 
actually agree - the coordination reflex - is a more important function than the 
PoliCY, S oUtpUt,. 
37 What the CFSP failed to do was significantly change the way 
the Member States perceived foreign policy. For most, it remained a bastion of 
sovereignty, and any meaningful transfer of authority to the EU was to be resisted. 
Nor could it induce the political conditions under which all the Member States 
would seek and subsequently adhere to genuinely common foreign policy 
positions as a matter of course. Indeed, the early years of the CFSP were notable 
for a resurgence of national interests. 38 Foreign policy continued to reflect the 
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uneasy tension between national foreign policy priorities and a faltering sense of a 
European interest. 39 
Faced with this institutional and procedural 'mixity', identifying the key 
actors and influences involved in the EU"s foreign policy process is always 
problematic, whether at the initiation, decision or implementation stage. 40 
However, as Hill argues, 'only by taking an overview of all the elements of what 
we optimistically call "European foreign policy"' can we identify a pattern of 
behaviour and assess the respective contributions of the various parts - positive 
and negative'. 41 Recognising the merit of an inclusive definition of EU foreign 
policy is also an essential step to understanding the Union's overall impact in the 
international system. After all, whenever Mediterranean third countries have 
sought to deepen their relationships with the EU, it has been the Union's trade and 
aid policies, rather than its defence and military capabilities that have really 
mattered. 
2. Theoretical Perspectives on EU Foreign Policy 
Scholars of the European Union face considerable ontological and epistemological 
problems when it comes to their subject area. We are still some way from 
consensus on what it is that we are studying, let alone how to study it. For those 
endeavouring to theorise about EU foreign policy, such difficulties are aggravated 
by the multi-level, multi-institutional characteristics of the EU's foreign policy- 
making system described above, by the obfuscating and ambiguous terminology in 
which EU foreign policy is frequently couched, and by the sui generis nature of 
the Union itself. 
42 
Not surprisingly perhaps, theoretical work on EU foreign policy has 
always lagged some way behind the burgeoning theoretical output on other aspects 
II 
of the European integration process. 43 This theoretical lacuna in European 
foreign policy studies is compounded by the relatively small number of detailed 
empirical case studies. Much of the literature on the subject tends to be 
descriptive or prescriptive, concerned with making sense of the procedural 
complexity of the Union's foreign policy-maldng mechanisms or offering 
corrective recipes for the EU's deficiencies as an international actor. This section 
argues that the building blocks of theory may be present, but assembling them into IQ7-- 
a comprehensible theoretical framework is entirely another matter. As 
Christopher Hill contends, 'the experience of "European foreign policy" over the 
last 20 years or so has been so unique that the search for one theory to explain its 
evolution is doomed to fail.... 44 
What, then, do the major theoretical perspectives on international relations 
and European integration have to say about EU foreign policy? Traditional 
realists by and large ignore the EU as an international actor . 
45 Since it is not a 
state, it cannot by definition possess a foreign policy. Henry Kissinger's recent 
tome on the history of diplomacy, for instance, barely mentions the diplomatic 
activity of the EU in international politics. 46 For classical realists, the incessant 
pursuit of power, primarily through military means, by states in an anarchic state 
system precludes international cooperation other than alliance diplomacy. 47 By 
extension, the European integration seemed a transitory phenomenon, destined to 
disintegrate in the chaotic post-Cold War world. 48 
Neo-realism (or structural realism), with its emphasis on systemic structure 
as the major determinant of the behaviour of states, does see the possibility of 
cooperation between states. States may occasionally choose to cooperate in order 
to avoid conflict, whether military or economic, but the anarchic nature of the 
international system, in which self-reliance is essential, weighs against it. 49 In any 
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case, inter-state bargaining always takes place with govemments' eyes fiffnly 
fixed on the relative gains from cooperation and the likely impact on the 
distribution of power. " Through this lens, the EU is viewed as a governmental 
forum in which states participate in order to further their own interests and power. 
In a rare neo-realist interpretation of EPC, Alfred PiJpers argues that 'the major 
policies and institutions of Europe's would-be foreign policy are the reflection of 
deliberate national preferences of the participating states. 51 
Neither realism nor neo-realism are compatible with the inclusive image of 
EU foreign policy presented above, based as they are on the assumptions that 
foreign policy is somehow the privileged domain of governmental elites, isolated 
. r_. - from domestic influences, and the exclusive preserve of the unitary state. VAiile 
the predominantly inter-governmental nature of EPC and the CFSP do lend some 
credibility to the state-centricity of the two approaches, they cannot satisfactorily 
account for the institutionalisation of foreign policy coordination, however fragile 
and limited it may be. 52 Nor can they account for the supranationalisation of 
national foreign economic policy in the Union. As Roy Ginsberg argues, 
neorealism: 
Ignores the role of supranational institutions in crafting and facilitating 
compromises and in overseeing and managing daily processes. It also 
ignores why, how and when national interests converge and to what extent 
they are shaped by domestic and international Politics and the ethos of 
Community membership. 53 
A more sophisticated version of state-centric analysis - liberal 
intergovernmentalism (LI) - also experiences difficulties coming to terms with the 
expansive definition of EU foreign policy. The basic claims of this perspective 
are that European integration is driven by the rational, calculated choices of 
governments to pool in or delegate sovereignty to international institutions in 
response to domestic economic interests and the need to offset the negative effects 
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of interdependence. 54 The decision to cooperate is made with a clear idea of the 
resultant costs and benefits. The creation of the Union's Common Commercial 
Policy (Articles 131-5), for instance, is explained as an essential extension to the 
55 Member States' preference for the liberalisation of trade amongst themselves. 
Cooperation in the realm of traditional foreign and security policy 
represents a bigger test for LI theory. Common foreign and security policy is a 
'cnon-socio-economic collective good' whose costs and benefits are diffuse and 
uncertain. As Andrew Moravcsik, the leading proponent of this approach, argues, 
'the reasoning used to justify policies tends to be symbolic and ideological, rather 
than calculated and concrete. 56 Here, geopolitical factors, concerns about 
sovereignty and the commitment of governments to the European project explain 
how the EU's competencies in this field have developed. 
Other variants of intergovernmental institutionalism offer similarly 
rationalist, instrumentalist interpretations of the EU. Robert Keohane and Stanley 
Hoffinann. see the EU as highly advanced form of regime, created by European 
governments for the purpose of managing the increasing levels of interdependence 
between them. 57 As the definition of security expanded after the end of the Cold 
War, the increased importance of the EU in managing trade and dealing with 
issues such as environmental protection seemed to validate this claim. However, 
intergovernmental. institutionalists too have comparatively little to say about the 
development of the EU as a foreign policy actor, citing the weakness of its defence 
and security capability as evidence of both the primacy of national interests and 
58 
the sui generis character of the organisation. Keohane and Hoffmann concede 
that in foreign economic policy, power has been transferred to a central, 
supranational authority distinct from the states, but see no such prospect in the 
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politico-security sphere. 59 Moreover, the policy process itself is dominated by 
govemments. 
Clearly, the parameters of EU foreign policy are largely determined by the 
Member States. Furthermore, as this thesis argues, the member governments' 
defence of domestic economic interests is frequently decisive at key stages of the 
policy process. However, intergovernmentalist theories suffer from a number of 
blind spots. First, the primary concern of these 
intergovemmentalist/institutionalist theories is to explain the major, formative 
decisions in the history of European integration rather than the regular policy 
process. They therefore have rather less utility as tools for policy analysis. 
Second, and relatedly, there is an inherent tendency in these theories to overlook 
or downplay the role of supranational agency; institutions being principally 
viewed as servants of the member governments. 60 Third, in downplaying the 
impact of geopolitics and systemic change on the bargains that states strike, LI in 
particular excludes important external stimuli that clearly influence the type of 
external policies that the EU pursues. Perceptions of a security 'threat' from the 
Mediterranean, for instance, were a key factor in determining the strategy that the 
Union subsequently pursued. 
More promising variations on the institutionalist theme are to be found in 
'historical' or 'new' institutionalist' theories, which emphasise the autonomy of 
6 
supranational mstitutions. 1 The chief merit of this school of thought is that it 
distinguishes distinct phases in the policy process. Governments may determine 
the basis and set the agenda for cooperation, but 'during later phases of the 
[policy] process, other actors, rules and EC procedures can exert their effects... '. 62 
External economic relations work from a long-established script in which the 
supranational agency and entrepreneurship of the Commission play a crucial role 
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in policy 'output'. The history of EU Mediterranean policy is one of contMiWity, 
with responsibility for negotiating and re-negotiating agreements with third 
countries- the central plank of policy - being vested in pillar I. 
What this brief distillation of theoretical perspectives shows is that, to 
varying degrees, all offer some insight into either the nature or the process of EU 
foreign policy. Intergovemmentalist approaches undoubtedly have a stronger 
claim to explaining EPC/CFSP where conflicting foreign policy positions among 
the Member States mean the EU has frequently failed to produce a unified stance 
on key issues. Supranationalist approaches must figure in theoretical explanations 
of the EU's foreign economic policy, where governmental domination is checked 
by the 'Community method' of decision-making. However, a macro-theory of EU 
foreign policy remains a distant prospect. If a general theory is possible, it is 
likely to be built from a synthesis of theoretical perspectives that take into account 
the multi-level character of the EU foreign policy-making system, the multiple 
outputs of EU external policy and the mixture of govenunental and supranational 
decision-making procedures and policy instruments that comprise the Union's 
acquispolitique. 63 
Dissatisfaction with what theory has to offer has led a number of EU 
foreign policy analysts to seek instead to conceptualise the impact on and roles of 
the EU in the international system. Concepts such as 'actorness', 'presence' and 
'influence' describe and explain the functions and status of the Union at the global 
or regional level, and contextualise its interaction with the outside world. 64 The 
common denominator running through this work is that the ambiguous status of 
the EU as a foreign policy actor and the complexity of its foreign policy-making 
system give it variable presence or actor capability in different 'issue areas'. 65 its 
impact is most tangible in the world political economy, where its capacity for 
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unified action is greatest. Conversely, where it lacks the capacity for unified 
action, on military and defence issues for example, its impact is marginal. 
Perhaps the most influential analysis of the EU's status and performance as 
an international actor is Christopher Hill's 'capabilities-expectations gap' thesis. 
Hill takes the argues that the balancing act between the foreign policy 'resources' 
at the Union's disposal - its economic and financial power, its policy instruments, 
and its cohesiveness - and the need to fulfil the growing list of external demands 
made of it determine its effectiveness as an international actor. In EU 
Mediterranean policy, the manifestation of the capabilities-expectations gap has 
centred on the issue of resource allocation issues, specifically on the level of 
financial assistance and market access for third countries. VAiile the Union has 
increased the level of resources it provides for the Mediterranean, so the Euro- 
Mediterranean Partnership has raised expectations about how far the Union will 
go in offering an economic helping hand to its poorer southern neighbours. 66 Tbe 
'capabilities-expectations gap' is perhaps most visible in the Union's relations 
with the United States and Central and Eastern European countries 67 , but it is an 
important part of the story of EU Mediterranean policy, too. The EU's habit of 
'talking up' its foreign policy may be less acute now than during the early 1990s, 
thus leading to a partial closing of the gap between the EU's capabilities and the 
outside world's expectations since then. 68 But the gap remains, and it mitigates 
against truly strategic action in EU external policy. 
3. Conceptualising Strategic Action 
Policy-makers and policy analysts may talk about EU foreign policy strategies, but 
the actual meaning of strategic action is rarely considered. In basic terms, strategy 
can be defined as 'a plan of action or policy', denoting pro-active, purposive rather 
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than reactive behaviour . 
69ThiS dynaMiC quality to strategic action is summarised 
by Keohane and Hoffinann: 
Strategy is essentially forward looking: beginning where history has left 
them, actors seek to take advantage of future trends. Their expectations 
shape their policies as much as does their actual situation. 70 
In turn, the notion of purposive, goal directed behaviour implies a decision to 
pursue more or less specified objectives, themselves a result of the 
identification, prioritisation and articulation of interests. 71 
At first sight, the application of this definition to the EU's external 
activities appears to be relatively straightforward. The Union has gradually built 
up a hierarchy of strategies towards individual third countries and regional 
organisations, and developed distinct and consistent 'lines' on a wide range of 
external issues. The Yaoundd and Lome conventions, and the so-called 'Global 
Mediterranean Policy', were among the first examples of external strategic 
actions, designed to establish 'frameworks' for relations with groups of third 
countries. More recent high profile examples include the Union's position in the 
Uruguay round of the GATT, its Agenda 2000 eastern accession strategy and the 
'New Transatlantic Agenda'. 
However, unpacking the concept of EU strategic action reveals two 
significant analytical problems. First, foreign policy analysis (FPA) as an 
academic discipline is inextricably bound up with the state and with the interest- 
driven behaviour of governments. 72 Besides the obvious fact that the EU is not a 
state, the lack of a central government and the prominence of the member 
governments in the policy-making process militates against using the standard box 
of analytical tools. How, for instance, should the analyst factor in the constant 
interplay between institutions, states and interests that determines EU policy? 
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Where does the fonnulation and execution of EU foreign policy strategies begin 
and end? 
One way around this problem is to view EU foreign policy as a system of 
external relations. 73 The system clearly has institutionalised procedures, what Ben 
Soetendorp describes as 'decision regimes', for defining objectives and designing 
actions to achieve them. 74 The creation of the Policy Planning and Early Warning 
Unit by the Amsterdam Treaty was explicitly intended to improve the Union's 
capabilities in this area. In the case of the ENT, both the Commission and 
individual Member States set an agenda for strategic action in the region and 
proposed measures to execute it. Taking the system metaphor a step further,, the 
system responds to 'inputs' both from within the Union (domestic economic and 
political interests, externalisation) and from its external environment (geo-political 
changes, specific demands from third countries). The outputs of EU foreign 
policy feed back into the system from the results of actions, making the whole 
system dynamic and self-sustaining. While EU foreign policy-making is certainly 
not as structured and tidy as the systems approach implies, it nevertheless provides 
a useful canvas on which to paint a picture of how strategic actions develop. 
The second problem relates to the existence of common European interests 
as the rationale for strategic action. For former Commission President Jacques 
Delors, an EU 'vision' for the world and the elaboration of specific common 
interests were essential pieces of the integration jigsaw. 75 But the sheer diversity 
of the EU's membership means that the opportunities for genuine commonality or 
even tight convergence of interests are few and far between. Where policies are 
couched in terms of European interests, internal differences are rarely far from the 
surface. Moreover, claims of a European interest are, to a significant extent, 
subjective, based on the perceptions, understandings and also interests of those 
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making the claim. If the EU is to be used to further the interests of a Member 
State or institution, then an appeal to the general interest can be an effective tactic. 
Again, however, this conceptual problem is rather less challenging than it 
first appears to be. A modem state's foreign policy interests can rarely, if ever, be 
described as unified. The realist image of the unitary state has long since given 
way to pluralist images that stress the disaggregated nature of government and the 
importance of competition between competing interests in policy-making. In a 
sense, the EU's external policy-making system is just a far more complex 
manifestation of the same phenomenon. Competition over interests may be fiercer 
and more protracted than is the case at national level, but the 'bargahiuing style' of 
EU decision-making allows for mediation between these interests. 76 Prior 
agreement over what constitutes the EU's interest on particular issues is clearly 
desirable, but not essential, and disagreement over interests need not be a barrier 
to strategic action. 
Furthermore, the EU itself has gone some way to narrowing down the 
loosely defined external interests set out in the treaties. 77 Indeed, the 1990s have 
seen gradual moves towards more specific statements of what are considered to be 
the Union's fundamental interests. After the creation of the CFSP, the 1992 
Lisbon European Council designated a number of geographical interest areas, 
among them the Middle East and Maghreb. The Amsterdam Treaty (Article 17) 
included a reference to the Western European Union's (WEU) Petersberg tasks, 
listing humanitarian and rescue operations, peacekeeping/peacemaking and crisis 
management as basic interests of the Union in the security and defence spheres. 
In sum, two of the prerequisites for strategic action - the institutional 
capacity to formulate and pursue strategic objectives and the possession of a set of 
interests - are present in the Union" s external policy system. As the Union has 
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increased in size and scope, so its range of interests has greatly expanded, but so 
too have demands for it to engage in long-term strategic action, both in the context 
of its evolving relationship with the former Soviet Bloc countries and its 
contribution to the wider international economic and political order. In many 
respects,, the strategic challenges facing the EU now exceed those faced by all but 
A. 1- - 
die biggest states. Further improvement of its capacity to engage in strategic 
behaviour is both likely and necessary. 
The next analytical step is to account for how the Union moves from 
strategy-as-plan to strategy-as-action. At this stage, the policy-making process 
must be the central focus, since it is here that a gap habitually appears between the 
Union's rhetoric and the reality of its action. A clear definition of interests, an 
imperative for action and the means to take action do not guarantee that the 
eventual Policy will be appropriate. The clichd 'economic giant, political pygmy' 
is testament to the Union's persistent inability to convert its enormous economic 
weight into effective political action. 78 Returning to the 'system' metaphor, we 
must open up the 'black box' that intervenes between inputs and OutputS. 
79 
The image of EU policy-making employed in this thesis follows Helen 
Wallace's lead, who argues that there is: 
.... no single or uniform Community policy process. The patterns of policy- 
making and the roles of member governments and Community institutions 
in the policy process vary considerably from sector to sector depending on 
the extent of Community involvement. 80 
Thus each policy area has its own logic, the mixture of institutional competencies, 
decision-making formulae and constellations of actors involved that translate 
proposals into policy outcomeS. 81 Again, the complexity of the EU policy process 
makes for equally complex logics. In the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
package, the end product comprises a raft of measures, some drawn from the 
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Union's established range of policy instruments (Association Agreements, 
financial aid, technical assistance), others tailor-made for which no established 
logics exist (the Barcelona process). 
Analytically, the implication of multiple logics is that as much attention 
must be paid to institutional politics as to govenunental politics. Where pillar I is 
. 0- - we locus for EU strategic action, the Commission exercises leadership in the 
fonnulation of strategy, plays a crucial role in negotiating the content of external 
policy instruments and is responsible for overseeing the implementation of aid 
programmes and the administration of Association Agreements. The European 
Parliament, though its involvement in external policy is very limited, nevertheless 
performs an important scrutiny function, has budgetary powers in the allocation of 
financial aid and must give its assent to Association Agreements with third 
countries. By the same token, the member governments also have considerable 
agenda setting power and the 'final say" over the substantive content of policies. 
An additional dimension of policy-making is 'politicisation', the process 
by which issues become infused with political significance. 82 For Michael Smith, 
it is the politicisation of economic issues in the modem international system that 
has made pillar I the core of EU foreign policy. 83 Its consequences are two fold. 
First, the degree of politicisation of an issue affects both strategic planning and 
policy outcomes. Highly politicised issues may be entirely excluded from a 
strategy if they are deemed to have the potential to hijack the broader objective. 
Govenunents are also apt to be less favourable to making concessions on sensitive 
issues at the decision-making stage, fearing a domestic backlash. Second, the 
politicisation of issues affects the level at which policy decisions are taken. In 
pillar I, for instance, many trade issues tend to be treated as 'technical9, increasing 
the Commission's influence over outcomes. If trade issues subsequently become 
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politicised, the final decision tends to shift upwards to mhuisterial level, placing 
the onus on governmental preferences in deciding outcomes. The more general 
point here is that, while politicisation has undoubtedly increased the significance 
of external economic relations, it is also a powerful constraint on supranational 
'-agency' and therefore on the EC's effectiveness as the conduit for EU strategic 
action. 
Much of the thesis focuses on negotiations, the dominant 'mode' of policy- 
making in EU Mediterranean policy. 84 The terms of Association Agreements, for 
instance, the EMP's main policy instrument, are largely detenrnined by 
negotiations between the Union and individual third countries and by negotiations 
within the Union that decide the concessions that each third country will be 
offered. The multilateral dimension of the Mediterranean strategy is also driven 
by ongoing negotiations between the participating governments. What confronts 
us resembles an 'inside-outside game', in which negotiations take place at two 
separate tables. 85 Inside the EU, the Member States and institutions engage in 
negotiations to determine strategic objectives, the policy instruments to be 
deployed and the Union's subsequent position in the policy process. 
Simultaneous negotiations take place with third countries to determine the final 
tenns of the policy package. The end result - the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
- amounts to the extension of a 'negotiated order' to the Mediterranean region . 
86 
Mediterranean policy is a particularly good case study of EU strategic 
action. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership employs virtually the full range of 
foreign policy tools available to the Union and unequivocally spans the divide 
between external economic relations and traditional politico-security foreign 
policy. What began as a disparate collection of commercial agreements has grown 
into a complex policy package embracing a vast range of issues and sectors. The 
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EU's relations with the Mediterranean partner countries provide a crucial test of 
both its capacity to act as a progressive force in the intemational order and of its 
ability to manage security in a region beset by conflicts. 
Chapter 2 traces the historical evolution of Euro-Mediterranean relations, 
identifying the main stages in the development of Mediterranean policy. It shows 
how the politicisation of agricultural trade, a key policy issue, began in the first 
round of negotiations between the Union and the Mediterranean third countries. 
Despite several 'rounds' of renegotiation,, and an attempt to create a single 
framework for relations, the first three decades of Mediterranean policy were 
notable for the Union's persistent failure to address the real concerns of the 
partner countries. 
Chapter 3 examines the factors that forced the EU to re-examine its 
Mediteffanean policy at the end of the 1980s. With the end of the Cold War, 
Mediterranean security suddenly assumed new-found salience for the Union. 
Faced with the rising popularity of radical Islarn in North Africa, states whose 
economic weakness and international indebtedness threatened to cause socio- 
economic breakdown and forecasts a dramatic rise in illegal immigration into 
Europe, the Union was for the first time forced to consider the long-term effects of 
its Mediterranean policy. The resultant policy changes - the Redirected 
Mediterranean Policy and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership - delivered an 
impressively comprehensive plan of action but little genuine reform of Euro- 
Mediterranean relations. 
Chapter 4 explores the multilateral component of the Union's 
Mediterranean policy - the Barcelona process - from its inception through to the 
early stages of its implementation. Sold as an innovative new multilateral forum 
that would underpin future international cooperation in the Mediterranean, the 
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Barcelona process quickly became hostage to developments in the Middle East 
Peace Process, exposing the continuing weakness of the EU as an international 
political actor. 
Chapter 5 presents an analytical synthesis of the theory and practice of 
Mediterranean policy. By first breaking down the EMP into distinct policy types, 
it sets up a framework for analysis of the politics that determined the fmal 
outcomes of the policy-making process. The chapter goes on to examine key 
decisions in the EMP in the light of both intergovemmentalist and institutionalist 
theories. 
Chapter 6 changes tack, offering the first of two case studies of EU 
diplomacy in the Mediterranean region, one broadly positive, the other almost 
entirely negative. The Union's role in the Middle East Peace Process, which has 
included a successful CFSP joint action to assist the establish the Palestinian 
Authority, is a prime example of how its economic weight can successfully be 
turned into political influence. It explores the reasons why the Union and its 
Member States were able to agree a collective position on an issue that had been 
so divisive during the 1970s and 1980s. 
In contrast, chapter 7 offers a downbeat analysis of the Union's persistent 
failure to adopt a strong position on the bloody conflict in Algeria. Almost a 
decade has passed since the annulment of the legislative elections by the military 
sparked a campaign of terrorism by the FIS in which both sides are guilty of 
terrible crimes against Algerian citizens. It shows that what amounts to a r-non- 
policy' on the crisis was a consequence of both the weakness of the CFSP when 
the member governments are reluctant to act, and powerful vested interests. In 
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Chapter 2 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF EU MEDITERRANEAN POLICY 
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership cannot be explained without first 
understanding the historical evolution of the EU's relations with the 
Mediterranean non-member countries. The Euro-Mediterranean agreements were 
essentially repackaged versions of agreements negotiated during the early years of 
EU Mediterranean policy. Issues that were politicised in the first rounds of 
negotiations have tended to remain politicised, leaving a 'shadow of the past' in 
which contemporary negotiators and policy-makers must operate. ' When policy 
change did taken place, it was through renegotiation rather than outright 
transformation. 2 The purpose of this chapter is to trace the main patterns of 
negotiation and associative diplomacy that shaped and re-shaped Mediteffanean 
policy over three decades. 
The effectiveness of Mediterranean policy has tended to be judged above 
all by its impact on trade between the EU and the Mediterranean third countries, 
and disputes over the terms offered by the Community became the recurring 
feature of each round of renegotiations. The distributive outcomes of trade 
concessions resulted in immediate, identifiable costs to be borne by domestic 
producers within the Member States, and a quantifiable and comparable 'deal' for 
each associate. With clear internal and external winners and losers from the 
agreements, attempts to build a comprehensive strategy for the region were 
consistently subordinated to the defence of domestic interests by individual 
Member States, as well as to the increasing limitations on concessionary 
diplomacy that stemmed from the externalisation of the CAP and other 
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Community policies. 3 The history of Mediterranean policy, as this chapter sets 
out to demonstrate,, is one of an absence of effective strategic action on the part of 
the EU. 
Section I outlines the fonnative phase of the EU's relations with the 
Mediterranean partners and the main determinants of the Community's choice of 
policy instruments. Section 2 evaluates the first major policy development in the 
1970s - the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) - examining the politics behind 
the Community's first serious attempt to develop a strategy for the region. Section 
3 assesses how the Community adapted its Mediterranean policy after the 
accession of Greece, Portugal and Spain during the 1980s. It argues that this third 
phase of Mediteffanean policy was more concerned with managing the impact of 
accession on EU policies and satisfying the interests of the Member States than 
with making the adjustments needed to offset the negative impact of enlargement 
on third countries. 
1. A Slow Start: The Treaty of Rome and the Patchwork of Associates 
The Treaty of Rome (195 7) contained no formal foreign policy provisions and 
offered little stimulus for the definition and pursuit of common external interests 
and objectives. The Community was equipped with a limited range of explicit 
powers, scattered throughout the founding treaties, to develop relations with the 
outside world. However, there were considerable uncertainties about the 
distribution of competencies between the institutions and Member States. On the 
one hand, key features of external policy that were to emerge later - including 
development policy and cooperation on politico-security matters - remained the 
responsibility of the Member States. On the other hand, the Community had 
responsibility for the regulation of external trade through the common commercial 
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policy (Article 133) harnessed to a Common External Tariff, the right to conclude 
*V. &I 
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treaties, and the power to manage the externalities of internal policies. It was left 
to political and economic exigencies, and the judgements of the ECJ, to 
incrementally define the parameters of Community external policy. 
The Community had several motives for seeking to draw the 
Mediterranean third countries towards it during the 1960s. The first of these was 
the strategic importance of the Mediterranean region to the Western camp in the 
context of the Cold War. For Habib Ben Yahia, a former Tunisian foreign 
minister, 'the north's interest in the southern shore has always been about 
security. 5 Attention focused on the north east Mediterranean; the Maghreb was 
seen more as a problem for the French than a military problem for the West, but 
both regions were sufficiently close to the Community to pose serious security 
problems were they to become hostile to the west. 6 
Commercial ties between the Six and the Mediterranean non-members 
linked to traditional imperial trading patterns were a second motive for a 
Community Mediterranean policy. In 1960, the Mediterranean non-member 
countries as a group (including Portugal and Spain) absorbed over 15 per cent of 
Community exports. In turr4 over 60 per cent of the exports of Mediterranean 
third countries exports went to the Community. The Maghreb countries were 
major suppliers of primary products to the Six, including petroleum from Algeria 
and Libya and phosphates from Morocco. Agricultural exports to the Community 
were a vital source of export revenues for Morocco and Tunisia. On the EC side, 
the Member States, particularly France and Italy, exported manufactured and 
capital goods to the Mediterranean countries. 
The prime mover on Mediterranean policy was France, which dominated 
Community trade in the region. In the early 1960s it accounted for 40 per cent of 
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exports to the Maghreb and received around 45 per cent of Maghrebi imports to 
the Community, and benefited from a strong commercial presence in the region 
through a mixture of private and public investment. ' Having carefully nurtured its 
sources of primary goods, De Gaulle's government clearly sought to protect them 
when responsibility for commercial policy shifted to the EEC. Moreover, rapid 
economic growth in the 1960s meant a growing demand for North African labour 
in France. Taking these economic factors together, it was clear that initially, 
policy would be driven by Paris. 
Lacking the instruments to pursue a comprehensive policy strategy in the 
region, the Community's relations with Mediterranean third countries instead 
evolved in what Stanley Henig accurately described as 'a doctrinal vacuum'. 
Since the Treaty of Rome gave only vague directions as to how relations with the 
Mediterranean third countries should evolve, it was relatively easy for the 
Community to avoid making substantive commitments. 9 As govenunents lined up 
to establish formal relations with the Community, it responded with a mixture of 
association agreements with Greece, Malta and Turkey, special preferential 
commercial arrangements for France's former colonies in North Africa, and a 
series of commercial accords with the remainder of the Mediterranean non- 
member countries. The result was a 'pyramid' of agreements based on 
differentiated commercial and political privileges. ' 0 The choice of one form of 
agreement over another and the emergence of a hierarchy of more and less 
favoured third countries reflected the political priorities of the Member States and, 
albeit in a limited and disparate way, the identification and pursuit of Community 
interests in the region. 
The most advanced policy instrument was full association, based on Article 
310. The provisions of Article 310 left open the goals, form and content of 
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agreements, stating only that association should involve 'reciProcal rights and 
obligations, common action and special procedures'. In theory, association was 
therefore flexible enough to accommodate both the demands of third countries and 
the numerous limitations imposed by the political and economic situation inside 
the Community, although finding a mutually acceptable balance was usually 
difficult. 12 Association agreements, and variants of them, were to become the 
instrument of choice in Mediterranean policy. 
The precise terms of association were a function of the strategic and 
commercial importance of the associate to the Community, and, arguably, to its 
cultural compatibility with Western Europe. At best, association was a 'stepping 
13 
stone to full membership; at worst, a poor relation to membership'. Greece and 
Turkey concluded Association Agreements in 1962 and 1963 respectively, as the 
Community made a transparent attempt to prevent the two countries from falling 
into the hands of the communist bloc. 14 Both the agreements, of unlimited 
duration, were to lead to full customs unions over transitional periods of between 
12 and 22 years, and both states had their eligibility for membership recognised. 15 
But Greece was offered a clear timetable for membership and considerably more 
generous commercial terms - including higher import quotas - than those offered 
to Turkey. The Community was also studiously imprecise about the timing and 
end-state of Turkey-EC integration. With its self-professed European vocation, 
small population and relatively small economy, Greek accession was both a more 
attractive and a less problematic proposition. 16 
The second kind of association, based on Articles 182-7 of the Treaty, was 
designed to safeguard the 'special' relationships of the Member States with their 
dependencies, principally the Francophone African countries. 17 These provisions 
gave rise to the 1963 Yaounde Convention which gave former colonies duty and 
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quota free access to the Community" s markets for a range of exports, and financial 
aid worth 800 Million ECUs. However, although the Article 182 provisions were 
dressed up in the rhetoric of economic development, their main purposes were to 
protect imports of cheap primary products and maintain the privileged position of 
colonial imports in home markets. 18 For non-members, preferential trading 
affangements offset the economic cost to them of the Community's customs 
union. 19 The chief advocate of Article 182 was France, which made special 
arrangements for its overseas territories a condition of its decision to sign the 
Treaty of Rome. 20 As Gobe argues, 'she [France] developed the idea of Euro- 
Africa, which allowed her to implement towards the old colonies a policy she 
could not work out herself '21 The multilateralisation of colonial economic 
relations spread the costs of continuing to support the territories - through 
Europeanising reduced tariffs on imports - among the six. 
The third policy instrument for the Mediterranean, earmarked for the 
independent countries of the franc area, was economic association. Although it 
was based on Article 3 10, this fonn of association did not include financial aid, 
technical assistance and provisions for the free movement of workers. In effect, it 
was a half-way house between a simple trade agreement and full association, 
lacking the political dimension of the latter. Having conceded to French pressure 
to include Article 182 in the Treaty of Rome, the other Member States were more 
circumspect about granting similarly special status to the Mediterranean non- 
member states. 22 The message was clear: for various reasons, these states were of 
secondary importance to the Community and would have to wait for their status to 
be upgraded. 
From the outset, the member states were in a strong position to determine 
the form, content and terms of associations. The decision-making procedure for 
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Article 3 10 gave the Council of Ministers the right of approbation with respect to 
the Commission's negotiating mandate, required unanimity in the Council to 
conclude agreements, and ratification of agreements by national parliaments. 23 
Furthermore, associations usually covered several subjects outside the 
Community's remit, requiring 'mixed' agreements in which both the Community 
and the Member States participated as legal parties. 24 Even where Community 
possessed exclusive competence to conclude agreements (Article 133), defacto 
use of unanimity to approve the Commission's negotiating mandates, and the 
oversight function of the Council, enabled the Member States to keep the 
Commission on a tight rein. 
25 
Morocco and Tunisia were the first Mediterranean states to take up the 
offer of economic association, opening negotiations with the Community in 1965. 
However, they quickly ran into opposition from Italy, which embarked on 'three 
year long filibuster' in defence of its agricultural industry. 26 Southern Italian 
agriculture, particularly its citrus fruit industry, was in a weak position in the mid 
1960s and faced direct competition from Moroccan and Tunisian imports of so- 
called 'Mediterranean products. 27 Concessions in this sector were therefore a 
highly sensitive issue for the Italian government. Crucially, France - the chief ally 
of the Maghreb states within the Community - chose 1965 to walk out of the 
Council. Much of the Council's business was suspended, and with its relatively 
low status on the EEC's hierarchy of priorities, Morocco and Tunisia found 
themselves sidelined during 1965 and 1966. When the talks resumed at the end of 
1966, lengthy internal negotiations were required to find a compromise 
satisfactory to the Italian government. A combination of compensatory measures 
for Italian farmers and intensive diplomacy by DGI officials and the Maghrebi 
ambassadors finally persuaded Italy to accept the agreements. 28 
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Internal negotiations were also necessary to reconcile differences in the 
foreign policy orientations of certain Member States towards Israel and the 
Maghreb. Following the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict, the Netherlands, backed by 
Germany, linked the continuation of the association negotiations to their demand 
for a similar deal for Israel. France, continued to press the case for the Maghreb. 
The Dutch government blocked the conclusion of the Maghreb associations in the 
Council, insisting that a mandate should also be prepared for a full association 
agreement with Israel . 
29A compromise formula, brokered by the Commission 
and the Maghrebi ambassadors, led to the removal of the non-commercial parts of 
the agreement. In the end, a partial, temporary agreement was deemed preferable 
to no agreement at all. 
Underlying the Member States' hesitancy over the Association 
Agreements were more fundamental differences over the Community's approach 
to economic development policy. In the protectionist camp, France advocated a 
regionalist approach to EC external relations, favouring privileged treatment for a 
restricted group of third countries which in turn safeguarded French commercial 
interests. 30 The Netherlands and West Gennany, by contrast, argued for a 'single 
international cooperative movement in line with the liberalising agenda of the 
GATT. 01 The Federal Republic adopted a global view of the Community's 
development policy befitting its lack of colonial ties and the relative lack of 
competition to its own agricultural sector from imports of Mediterranean 
products. 32 Subsequent enlargements of the Community would accentuate and 
polarise these divergent ideological approaches. 
Protectionists and regionalists undoubtedly held sway in the first phase of 
Mediterranean policy. The conclusion of preferential trading agreements 
provoked criticism from both non-associates and the USA. Non-associates 
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claimed that preferential terms of trade for associates discriminated against their 
exporters. The USA had sought the dismantling of imperial preferences since the 
end of World War 2.33 But the Community stood fmn and sought waivers where 
the agreements contravened GATT principles. 34 
On the external front, the Community" s key task was to obtain the 
ap roval of Morocco and Tunisia to a deal that fell short of their expectations. K-P 
Despite having resorted to the lowest-common denominator to win the assent of 
all the Member States to the accords, the Community could not ignore the fact that 
it had invited the two states to apply for full association. The solution was a 
clause in the agreements stating that they: 
appear clearly as a first step towards more global accords to be concluded 
later... do not preclude the maintenance of preferential commercial relations 
with France ... and are able to be rapidly implemented. 
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It is important, however, not to over-state either the politicisation of key 
issues in this first round of agreements, or indeed the political importance of 
Mediterranean policy in general. In a detailed study of the Maghreb negotiations, 
Glenda Rosenthal found 'little solid evidence of the effective exercise of public 
opinion and interest group pressures in the negotiation of the Maghreb 
treaties .... Primarily, the conclusion of the Maghreb agreements was a strictly 
EEC-Maghreb affair and involved almost no external pressures. 36 In the overall 
scheme of the European integration, Mediterranean policy was a low priority at 
this stage. 
The end product of the Community's first phase of associative diplomacy 
in the Mediterranean resembled a 'patchwork' rather than a coherent network. As 
Eberhard Rhein argues: 
The Community handled the association relationship as if it were a formal, 
rather superficial international agreement. It did not really care what was 
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going on behind the scenes, what economic and social policies were being 
pursued. 37 
Nevertheless, the agreements sparked a 'chain reaction' among other 
Mediterranean countries which sought to enter into new agreements, or upgrade 
38 
their existing relationships, with the Community. As the list of demandeurs 
grew, the Community was forced to rethink its approach. 
2. From Patchwork to Framework: The Global Mediterranean poliCY39 
If the Community's approach to the Mediterranean was piecemeal in the early 
years, the 1970s saw the first serious attempt to formulate a strategy for the region. 
It occurred during a period when the Community was making serious efforts to 
establish its credentials as an international actor. The 1969 Hague Summit saw 
EC member governments agreeing to improve the coordination of their individual 
foreign policies, which galvanised foreign ministers into more serious 
consideration of the Community's common external interests. In 1970, the launch 
of European Political Cooperation gave rise to the first inter-governniental 
meetings at which the member states set out to identify the Community's political 
interests and prepare the ground for future foreign policy positions. At the 1972 
Paris Summit, the Member States duly resolved to ensure 'an overall and balanced 
handling' of the Community's relations with the Mediterranean third countries, 
and instructed the Commission to look again at the Association Agreements. 40 
The Commission responded by submitting proposals to the Council for a 
new policy framework - the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) - centring on 
new 'cooperation agreements' that covered financial, technical and social matters 
and the expansion of the geographical scope of the associative network. 41 The 
long-tenn objective was the creation of a Mediterranean free-trade area. 42 To 
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increase competition in the region and boost exports, France proposed that the 
associates should open up their markets to Community exports. However, the 
Commission argued that the free-circulation of goods alone would not promote 
development in the region, and that the GMP should also include provisions on 
capital movements, technology transfers, technical cooperation, labour and 
enviromnental and financial cooperation. 43 
External events Played a much more prominent part in politicising 
Mediterranean policy during this period than had previously been the case. First, 
unity among the developing countries, expressed in demands by the G77 for a new 
and more benevolent international economic order, put the Community's relations 
with developing countries under the spotlight. 44 For third countries subject to 
Article 182 of the Treaty, the Community responded with the Lome convention in 
1975. In turn, greater equity was demanded between the level of commercial 
privileges granted to the African associates and those offered to the Community's 
other partners. 
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Second, the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and subsequent Arab oil embargo 
compelled the Community to look at the political dimension of its Mediterranean 
policy. Although these events occurred after the launch of the GMP, the OPEC 
embargo exposed the vulnerability of the Community's energy supplies and 
demanded rapid diplomatic action from the Member States. Their response - the 
Euro-Arab Dialogue - was the first explicitly political fonn of association . 
41 It 
established a forum in which discussions would take place between the 
Community and the Arab League at Ministerial as well as civil-servant level on 
issues ranging from the status of the PLO and Israeli foreign policy to cultural, 
social and technological collaboration. Even if the 'Dialogue' was essentially an 
example of gesture politics, it nevertheless signalled that the Community 
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recognised the increasing political salience of good relations with Mediterranean 
non-member states. 
The Arab-Israeli conflict presented the Community with a problem of a 
different order. The Community's commitment to negotiate agreements with any 
Mediterranean country that applied left it with a political balancing act between its 
policies towards the Arab states and its relationship with Israel. Condemnation of 
Israel's occupation of Gaza and the West Bank by the Member States in EPC 
clashed with the ongoing discussion of a new cooperation agreement with the 
Community. The lack of obvious linkage between the Community's criticism of 
Israel's policies and its 'routine' external economic relations with Israel 
exemplified the inherent inconsistency of Community foreign policy-making. 
Indeed, there is little to suggest that the possibility of halting the negotiations with 
Israel was even broached. 
Internally, several factors paved the way for a more comprehensive 
Mediterranean strategy. First, the Commission's growing assertiveness and self- 
confidence on external policy matters saw it take a more prominent role in setting 
the agenda on Mediterranean policy. It attempted to sell to the Member States the 
idea that the economic development of the Mediteffanean - the long term goal of 
the GMP - was 'a natural extension of European integration'. 
47 In doing so, the 
Commission stood to have its own powers as policy initiator and negotiator 
augmented, since the GMP called for Community level action in new policy 
areas. 48 The pay off for the Community would be improved coordination of 
policy, and a greater sense of direction, in the areas covered by the cooperation 
agreements. 
Second, the early 1970s witnessed a subtle but significant shift in French 
foreign policy. De Gaulle's resignation precipitated the gradual reform of 
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France's relations with its former colonies in North Africa, although it continued 
to claim special responsibility for the region. As far as Community Policy was 
concerned, France adopted a more favourable attitude to the multilateralisation of 
its own economic and political relations with Mediterranean third countries while 
seeking to retain its status as a policy leader. 49 Conditional acceptance by 
Pompidou's government of the principle of a regional free-trade zone, for 
instance, removed a significant obstacle to the re-negotiation of trading 
preferences. 
Third, the 1973 enlargement of the Community necessitated adjustments to 
the existing association agreements and, perhaps more importantly, tilted the 
ideological scales towards the northern liberalisers. Adaptation measures were 
attached to each agreement in order to extend the Mediterranean preference 
system to Denmark, Ireland and the UK . 
50 Despite being dressed up as 'technical' 
negotiations by the Commission, a number of Mediterranean associates used the 
talks to express their dissatisfaction with the terms of their agreements. 
Community imports of Moroccan oranges, for instance, had fallen by 8% between 
1970 and 1972, provoking complaints of protectionism from Moroccan diplomats 
in Brussels. 51 When Algeria began talks with the Community in September 1973, 
it raised similar concerns about the level of market access for its oil and wine 
exports. Non-associates argued that the implementation of preferential trade 
provisions by the new Member States would adversely affect their trade with those 
countries. This problem further strengthened the case for a uniform association 
system in the region. 
The accession of Demnark, the UK and Ireland brought three states into 
the Community which faced no significant competition from Mediteffanean 
imports and had comparatively fewer direct interests in Mediterranean policy than 
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France and Italy. 52 As Tovias argues, 'they did not share the Commission's desire 
to create a sphere of influence there, even questioning at times the need for a 
Mediterranean policy at all. 953 Moreover, West Gennany found in the UK a 
powerful ally for its campaign to open up the Community's markets to 
Mediterranean imports and allow the Mediterranean associates to safeguard 
domestic producers by retaining tariffs on imports from the Community. As a 
result, the progression of the GMP proposals through the Council was impeded by 
an increasingly bitter dispute between free-traders and protectionists. 54 
By June 1973, the Council had draft negotiating mandates for the 
cooperation agreements. The principal commitments of the GMP were are shown 
in table 1.1: 
Table 1.1 Main commitments of the GMP 
I "L. 
ii) Improved access to the C( 
'without endangering the leg 
time of year. 
agreement. This bilateral a 
eement in financial protocols attached to each 
would be supplemented by loans and grants from 
A cursory glance suggests that the GMP fulfilled many of the Community's 
promises. The agreements included provisions for cooperation in a variety of 
46 
fields, including the environment, industry, investment and science. On the 
particularly sensitive subject of labour policy, existing bilateral arrangements on 
the treatment and status of Maghrebi workers in the Community were 
supplemented by a new agreement on non-discrimination and the equal treatment 
of workers. 56 Pension rights were to be made transferable between EC countries, 
and remittances of pensions and other payments to countries of origin were to be 
allowed. The creation of the Cooperation Councils gave the agreements an 
institutional structure to facilitate ongoing political exchanges between the 
Community and associates and to deal with implementation problems when they 
arose. 
The enhanced scope of the agreements also met some of the Community's 
1". 
key strategic objectives. Most notably, the provisions for cooperation in the 
energy sector aimed to 'foster participation by Community fmns in programmes 
for the exploration production and processing of energy resources and to ensure 
that long ten'n contracts for the delivery of petroleum products are properly 
performed. ' 57 For the more economically advanced Mediterranean states, the 
GMP undoubtedly drew them closer to the Community. To varying degrees, 
Greece, Portugal and Spain, as well as Malta and Turkey, had their European 
vocations confim-led. 
58 
However, beneath the surface, the deep-rooted asymmetry of Euro- 
Mediterranean relations was barely addressed. The idea of free-trade foundered 
in the face of irreconcilable differences among the Member States about the 
Community's balance between preferential treatment and liberalisation. France, 
supported by Belgium, Italy and the Commission, favoured an '-active policy' (as 
opposed to a laissez-faire policy) and viewed reciprocity as a tough but necessary 
choice. 59 The UK and West Germany favoured across the board liberalisation. 
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The eventual compromise upheld the principle of reciprocity, but allowed 
differentiation among the Mediterranean associates on a case-by-case basis, 
removing any suggestion of uniformity in the GMP. 
Concessions on agricultural trade again required protracted internal 
negotiations before an offer could be made to the third countries. The Italian 
government, for instance, mounted a campaign in the Council for additional 
protection for its Producers before it would accept any new concessions to the 
Maghreb states. In the absence of progress, the Community had to resort to 
temporary agreements, since the first generation of accords expired in 1974. A 
second round of talks was held in October and November 1974, but the 
Community's revised offer on agricultural trade received a lukewarm response. 60 
Existing arrangements were extended as the talks laboriously progressed through 
the minutiae of concessions on citrus fruits, olive oil, tomato concentrates and 
wine. The introduction of the CAP had only served to increase the politicisation 
of agriculture and the Community had to negotiate from a position even less 
flexible than had been the case in the 1960s. 
Momentum was finally injected into the negotiating process in April 1975 
when the Council agreed a series of so-called 'market organisation measures' for 
the most contentious sectors, which subsequently freed the Commission to re- 
commence negotiations. 61 The new measures were essentially defensive, 
installing safeguard measures against imports of the so-called 'sensitive' 
products. 62 Tariff concessions ranged from 30-100% and covered 86-89% of 
agricultural exports, an average tariff reduction of 30-40% for Tunisian and 
Morocco imports over the 1969 accords. 63 But new quantitative restrictions were 
also applied to wines, tinned sardines, potatoes, oranges and tomatoes. Taken 
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collectively, these products ranked among the most valuable exports for the 
Mediterranean non-member countries. 
Beyond agricultural trade, quantitative import ceilings were introduced on 
refined petroleum products above which punitive duties would apply. The 
Community was anxious to guarantee uninterrupted supplies of oil and gas, but 
less keen to encourage the development of potentially competitive indigenous 
processing industries in the associate countries. Trade in textiles, a sector in 
which Morocco Egypt and Tunisia had a clear comparative advantage over 
Community manufacturers, was totally excluded from the agreements and subject 
to voluntary export restraints. 64 Effective lobbying by European textile 
manufacturers and the already stiff competition faced by the industry from 
external sources ruled out any possibility of preferential treatment for textile 
imports. 
The new agreements were undoubtedly more comprehensive than the 
earlier trade agreements, but the underlying pattern of the EC's relations with the 
Mediterranean non-members remained: qualified and limited assistance, with 
Member States insisting on derogations and protective measures where the 
interests of domestic producers were threatened . 
65 From the associates' point of 
view, the agreements largely failed to take into account the commercial, cultural 
and historical specificities of their relationships with the Community. 66 Put 
simply, the accords merely perpetuated economic dependence. 67 
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TABLE 1.2 The Mediterranean Network After the GMT 
Country Date of Agreement 
_Type 
of Agreement 
Greece November 1962 Association 
Turkey September 1963 Association 








Yugoslavia April 1970 Trade 
Malta December 1970 Association 
Cyprus December 1972 Association 
Israel March 1964 
May 1975 
Trade 
Free trade and cooperation* 
Algeria April 1976 Cooperation 




Jordan January 1977 Cooperation 
Syria January 1977 Cooperation 




* Israel's advanced state of economic development compared to the other Mediterranean 
associates put it on a different footing with the Community. Moves towards free trade between the 
two began in 1964, and accelerated with the free-trade agreement of 1975. 
Source: Khader, B. (1997) Le Partenariat Euro-Miditerraneen apr& la Conference de 
Barcelone, Paris: L'Harmattan, p. 3 1. 
Roy Ginsberg describes the GMP as 'the first successful attempt by the EC 
at a self styled foreign policy'. 68 Eberhard Rhein, a fonner Director General in the 
Commission's DGI, sees it as the 'first example of a coherent piece of 
Community foreign poliCy., 69 However, while the GMP undoubtedly brought a 
sense of structure to the Community's relations with the Mediterranean associates, 
it failed to change either the bilateral basis of the policy or the underlying 
asymmetry of economic relations. The limited scope of the GMP is thrown into 
sharp relief when compared to the 1963 Yaounde and 1975 Lome Conventions 
between the Community and the Member States' former colonies, which created 
an elaborate system of market access, a development fund of I billion ECUs 
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(Lom6) and an institutional structure that included a consultative assembly and a 
council of ministers. As the Community contemplated enlarging to the south, the 
inadequacies of the GMP became apparent. 
3. Southern Enlargement: Managing Internal Change 
The accession of Greece, Portugal and Spain to the Community marked a distinct 
phase of Mediterranean policy in its own right. On the economic front, southern 
enlargement had major implications for the Community"s internal market in 
Mediterranean-type agricultural products. With significant overlap between the 
production structures of the three new member states and those of the 
Mediterranean non-members, the potential and actual trade diversion effects of 
enlargement represented a further challenge to the developmental objectives of the 
GMP. On the political front, enlargement absorbed three states into the 
Community with an extensive range of commercial and political interests in the 
region. The inception of this Mediterranean lobby also promised to even up the 
balance of power between northern and southern Member States. 
The economies of many of the Mediterranean associates were in a parlous 
state by the turn of the decade. Rapid economic growth in the early-mid 1970s 
was followed by stagnation and rising external debt as import substitution 
strategies and indigenous economic development policies faltered. By 1979, the 
aggregate trade deficit of the Mediterranean third countries with the EC stood at 9 
billion ECUs compared with 4 billion ECUs in 1973 . 
70 Notwithstanding 
exogenous factors - the global oil price shocks, commodity price collapses and 
global recession, the cooperation agreements had manifestly failed to ameliorate 
economic conditions in the non-member countries.. 
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Even before enlargement, the margin of preference for the Mediterranean 
associates in relation to those states with no preferential trade deal from the 
Community had fallen by a third as a result of global tariff reductions in the 
Kennedy Round of the GATT. 71 Import volumes of tomatoes, Morocco's most 
important agricultural export, fell every year between 1978 and 1983, provoking 
protests from the Moroccan delegation in Brussels that subsidised Community 
production was putting its farmers out of business. 72 Heinz was forced to close a 
tomato concentrates factory in Morocco as the Community's defensive 'market 
73 
orgarasation measures' took effect. Employment opportunities for migrant 
workers were also hit by the recession, which diminished income from migrant 
workers' remittances. 
74 
The Community entered the 1980s apparently ill prepared for the effect 
southern enlargement would have on the GMP. Not until 1979 was a detailed 
study of its impact on the GMP produced . 
75The key finding of the report was that 
the Community's self-sufficiency ratio in most Mediterranean agricultural 
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products would rise from between 80-90% to a situation of surplus. Spanish 
accession alone was projected to raise Community vegetable production by 25%, 
fresh fruit by 48% and olive oil by 59%, threatening to displace Maghrebi imports 
of these products. 77 Morocco and Tunisia stood to lose the most. The Tunisian 
agricultural sector, for instance, was heavily dependent on exports of olive oil 
(50% of its total agricultural exports) but the entry of Greece and Spain threatened 
to devastate the industry. 78 The report also predicted that Cyprus, Malta, Israel 
and Turkey would suffer net falls in their trade with the EC. 79 
The associates demanded the renegotiation of certain clauses in the 
cooperation agreements that would increase import quotas in order to offset the 
displacement effects of free access to the Community market for Portuguese and 
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Spanish goods . 
80 France, still committed to preserving its special import regime 
for cheap Moroccan and Tunisian agricultural exports to the Community, offered 
strong support for revising the agreements so as to offset the trade displacement 
effects of enlargement . 
81 The Commission tried to deal with the protocols as a 
technical issue in order to depoliticise any trade concessions and give itself the 
maximum possible flexibility to put an acceptable package together. The 
proposed deal was based on two measures. First, in the event of changes in 
community agricultural production, the Community undertook to proportionately 
- 
J. 
adjust market access for the associates. Import volumes would therefore rise and 
fall with trends in internal production. At the same time, the Community pledged 
Community assistance to reduce the associates growing dependency on food 
imports, another consequence of the failure of economic self-reliance strategies. 
Second, the Community aimed to reduce customs duties and tariffs in a number of 
particularly sensitive sectors such as processed foodstuffs, petrochemicals and 
textiles. 
Yet again, however, the major battles over the terms of the protocols on 
agricultural trade were fought in the Council as Member States' interests collided. 
As Crouzatier argues, 'enlargement... brought home to the northern partners the 
specific difficulties of the Mediterranean economy,, and accentuated internal 
discord within the Community over the correct policy to pursue for the region. ' 82 
The Iberian member states quickly situated themselves in the protectionist camp. 
Spain, backed by Italy, put pressure on the Council to withhold its approval of the 
Commission's negotiating mandate until after the entry of the Iberians into the 
Community. This ad-hoc alliance ensured that the Mediterranean Member States 
as a group would carry extra weight to block additional trade concessions in the 
post-accession period. 
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The negotiations resulted in a compromise between the Spanish 
government and the Commission that restricted future imports of Mediterranean 
agricultural products to 'traditional exports', thus reducing the associates' scope 
for product diversification and limiting the potential for new competition with 
European producers. 83 Quotas were calculated based on 1980-84 levels, a period 
of severe drought in the Maghreb and therefore a atypically low production period. 
On a more positive note,, customs duties were gradually reduced over a transitional 
period of 10 years from 1986 in parallel with the transitional period for Portugal 
and Spain. Mandates for the Commission to negotiate protocols to the existing 
cooperation and accords were agreed by the Council in November 1985.84 Greek, 
Portuguese and Spanish tariffs on many products were phased out incrementally, 
and removed altogether by 1996. The CAP's reference price system for 
Mediterranean products, a measure which discriminated against lower priced 
imports, was also to be abolished by 1996. However, the reference price was 
simply replaced by a countervailing charge on exports above quota limits. This 
combination of factors prompted an angry reaction from Rabat and Tunis and 
85 demands for compensation in the form of fmancial aid. Extra funds were 
provided in the fourth financial protocols (1987-1991, see Appendix 2), but the 
total increase of 20 per cent for the whole region failed to appease the associates. 
The economies of the Mediterranean associates continued to weaken 
through the 1980s. Falling export revenues failed to deliver sufficient import 
coverage rates, trade deficits rose and external indebtedness grew exponentially, 
leading to increased pressure for unpopular reforms demanded by the JW. 86 
Perhaps the most visible sign of the growing dissatisfaction of the Mediterranean 
countries with their treatment by the EC was Morocco" s application for 
Community membership, made in July 1987.87 The failure of the GMP and the 
54 
apparent inability of the Community to reform its Mediterranean policy provoked 
88 Rabat into what was more a sign of frustration than a serious attempt to join. By 
the end of the decade, the case for wholesale policy reform was strong. 
Conclusions 
What this brief history of Mediterranean policy shows is the centrality of pillar I in 
the development of Euro-Mediterranean relations. From the outset, the foundation 
for the policy was the management of trade relations with Mediterranean third 
countries. To the extent that objectives existed, they were initially driven by the 
commercial interests of the Member States and, in the cases of Greece and Turkey, 
by Cold War strategic considerations. When the first set of agreements were 
absorbed into the GMP, the Union's ambitious rhetoric far exceeded the reality of 
the deal it offered the Mediterranean non-member countries. 
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the advancement of economic 
development in the Mediterranean was simply not a high priority for the 
Community, and that it was content to preserve the overall balance of its trade 
relations with the non-member states. Treaties, whether in the form of narrow 
associations or broader cooperation agreements, tended to preserve the 'North- 
South' character of relations between the Community and the Mediterranean non- 
members, preserving the economic status quo left by colonialism. This tendency 
prompted some commentators to conclude that the relationship had 'neo-colonial' 
qualities . 
89 Furthermore, the first generation of Association Agreements hardly 
justify the label 'Mediterranean policy', accomplishing little more than the 
codification of existing terms of trade. The relatively weak bargaining power of 
the Mediterranean third countries left them with little choice other than to accept 
what the Community offered. 
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The reasons for this conservatism lay in the defensive attitude adopted by 
the southern Member States, who clearly dominated the initial development of 
Mediterranean policy instruments. Of the key issues at stake, agriculture was 
repeatedly the most contentious, politicised from the outset by the Italian 
government. Recurring arguments about agricultural trade revealed reflected the 
similarity of the production structures of the southern Member Mediterranean 
Member States and the non-members. The Community was faced with conflict of 
interests between the need to safeguard the interests of European producers and 
the accepted view that market access for non-member countries had to be 
improved. It was a conflict that the Community never managed to fully resolve. 
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Chapter 3 
OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES? THE REDIRECTED 
MEDITERRANEAN POLICY AND THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN 
AGREEMENTS 
The end of the 1980s saw a clearer strategic direction begin to emerge in EU 
Mediterranean policy. Opinion among key actors within the EU, and in Western 
Europe more generally, converged around the view that the Mediterranean region 
posed immediate and longer-term security problems for Europe. The policy 
changes that resulted were initially low key but were rapidly followed by a more 
extensive repackaging exercise that led to the Euro-Mediterranean partnership 
(EMP) and a third generation of bilateral agreements (the Euro-Mediterranean 
Agreements). The Union's impressive sounding objective was to turn the 
Mediterranean into an area of 'peace, stability and prosperity. " 
This chapter charts the rise of Mediterranean policy up the EU's foreign 
policy agenda. Section one argues that the major stimuli for change were external, 
a combination of the weak economic, political and social situations of the 
Mediterranean non-members and the increased salience of Mediterranean security 
in the aftermath of the Cold War. Section 2 assesses the Redirected 
Mediterranean Policy (RMP), the ineffectual outcome of the Union's first attempt 
to repackage its relationship with the Mediterranean third countries. 2 Section 3 
discusses the origins of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the rationale that 
lay behind it. The final section examines the negotiation and content of the Euro- 
Mediterranean agreements, the principal policy instrument attached to the new 
Mediterranean strategy. 3 
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1. The Changing Definition of Mediterranean Security 
The sudden geo-political transformation of Europe in 1989 had a profound impact 
on both the EU's external environment and its internal order. Its instinctive 
reaction was to turn to its eastern boundary and begin considering ways to bring 
back the CEECs into the European fold. 4 Although the Union initially failed to 
come up with a coherent eastern strategy, it did take the lead in starting the 
process of economic and political transition in the region. At the same time, 
5 however, awareness was growing of the vulnerability of the EU's southern flank. 
With the uneasy balancing effect of US-Soviet competition in the region removed, 
the challenges and complexities of Mediterranean security became increasingly 
apparent. In this dramatically different geo-strategic context, the Union was 
expected to assume a much bigger share of the responsibility for security in its 
own back yard. 6 
For Mediterranean third countries, the end of the Cold War reinforced their 
sense of marginalisation in the international economic and political order. 
Fearing, that they would be overlooked in East-West rapprochement, a number of 
the poorer Mediterranean countries warned of instability and future conflicts if the 
widening prosperity gap between North and South was not addressed. 7 States 
already under severe economic strain were faced with the prospect of being 
crowded out in the allocation of aid, investment and other developmental 
resources to Central and Eastern Europe. The message to Western Europe was 
simple but powerful: benign neglect of Mediterranean security was no longer 
sustainable. 
At the root of the Mediterranean security challenge was a constellation of 
interrelated economic, political and social factors. By 1989, the economic 
positions of several Mediterranean associates had deteriorated to the point of 
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crisis. External debts rose throughout the decade on the back of dramatic falls in 
oil revenues, the global collapse of commodity prices and the failure of domestic 
economic policieS. 8 In 1989, the total external debt of the Maghreb states stood at 
41 billion ECUs, while that of the Mashreq countries stood at 53 billion ECUs, 
figures that represented between 18 and 40 per cent of GNP. 9 For Algeria, debt 
repayments amounted to 70 per cent of export receipts; for Morocco 45 per cent. 










Maghreb 47.2 74.9 150.1 237.9 
Ma 52.0 102.7 110.0 229.3 
Cyprus 25.0 47.0 49.0 82.0 
Malta 8.8 20.7 9.1 24.3 
Turkey 34.3 53.8 332.9 189.8 
Earnings from exports of goods and services. 
No figures quoted for Israel. Debt stood at 19 billion ECUs in 1989. 
Sources: World Debt Tables, World Bank, 1996; Ayari, C. (1992) Enjeux Miditerraneens: Pour 
Une Coopiration Euro-Arabe, Paris: CNRS, p. 199. 
The Mediterranean debt crisis had a number of implications for EU policy. 
First, violent mass demonstrations in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia during 1987 
and 1988, a reaction to austerity measures imposed by the IMF, served as an 
uncomfortable reminder of the fragility of the democratisation and liberalisation 
processes underway in the region. 10 This tangible demonstration of the link 
between economic and political stability forced the Union to consider the 
effectiveness of its support for moves towards pluralism. Second, EU Member 
States and private banks in Western Europe were collectively the biggest creditors 
of Mediterranean third countries, accounting for 50 per cent of the region's total 
debt. 11 A case therefore existed for improved coordination among European 
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creditors, and the EU was one possible option. Italy, for instance, argued that a 
Mediterranean financial institution should be established to channel macro- 
12 
economic assistance to third countries. 
The Union's trade policy in the Mediterranean was an obvious target for 
criticism. Despite the Association and Cooperation agreements, trade with the EU 
had failed to act as the motor for economic growth in most of the associate 
countries. The non-members' share of total Community imports declined from II 
per cent in 1980 to 8.2 per cent by 1988 as trade with the Asia gained ground. As 
table 3.2 shows, the EU's trade surplus with the Mediterranean non-members 
decreased only marginally - from 3.2 billion ECUs in 1980 to 2.8 billion ECUs in 
1989. As European economies slipped into recession in 1990, a further 
contraction of trade was expected, and the old issue of improving market access 
assumed even greater significance. 
Table 3.2 Trade with the EU (Million ECUs) (1980-1989) 
Country Imports 1980 Imports 1989 Exports 1980 Exports 1989, 
Algeria 4435 5848 5093 4715 
Cyprus 269 524 601 1438 
Egypt 2385 2441 3397 3764 
Israel 1660 3197 17191 5101 
Jordan 21 102 760 905 
Lebanon 45 101 1139 829 
Libya* 7478 6304 4530 2911 
Malta 253 568 503 1064 
Morocco 1356 2674 1764 3226 
Syria 969 775 1400 780 
Tunisia 1380 1980 1684 2531 
Turkey 
- 
1053 5536 1917 5609 
ITOTALS 1 21304 1 300501 24507 _ 32873 
* Libya, though not an associate, is included because of the sizeable volume of its trade with the 
Community. No figures available for trade with the Palestinian territories. 
Source: Data extrapolated from Eurostat, various publications. 
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The stagnation of Euro-Mediterranean trade was exacerbated by the finther 
erosion of the Community's preferential external trading system through 
liberalisation measures agreed in the Uruguay Round of the GATT. As Regnault 
puts it, 'when we prefer the whole world, we no longer prefer anyone. " 13 
Projections from the Uruguay Round suggested that Mediterranean third countries 
stood to lose 5 10 million ECUs worth of trade once the Round was completed. 14 
Coupled with the rigours of domestic liberalisation programmes, the pace of 
global economic change was outstripping the capacity of Mediterranean 
governments to implement the reforms it necessitated. They looked to the EU for 
targeted assistance, including help with economic restructuring, small business 
and fmancial market development, and the modernisation of production 
facilities. 15 Conversely, if the Union was to protect its dominant economic 
position in the area, some sort of 'deepened regionalism' seemed to be the most 
appropnate method of binding Mediterranean countries to it. 16 
The consequences of the Single Market project also had to be factored into 
the Mediterranean economic equation. For the Community's Mediterranean 
trading partners, the potential trade creation benefits of the 1992 project were 
likely to be outweighed by its diversionary effects on trade and investment. 17 
Moreover, studies suggested that any expansion of imports resulting from the 
single market initiative would centre on manufactured goods rather than primary 
commodities. ' 18 There was widespread concern that the single market project 
would generate new import barriers, lead to a further diminution of the 
preferential market access regime, create disincentives to already slow rates of 
inward FDI, and lead to the imposition of tighter and more strictly policed rules of 
19 
ongin. The Union thus felt it necessary to give assurances that they would not be 
marginalised. Commissioner Abel Matutes, who took on the Mediterranean 
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policy brief during 1989, claimed that: 'we have a vital interest in being open to 
imports and being able to export to the rest of the world. The risks of the 
Community being closed to the rest of the world when it completes the single 
market in 1992 are non-existent. 920 Nevertheless, the possibility of an economic 
'fortress Europe' was viewed with some apprehension. 21 
It was the potential political and social fallout of economic failure that 
raised fears of a future security 'threat' from the Mediterranean. Since the 1960s, 
economic growth had lagged far behind rapid population expansion in the 
Maghreb, Mashreq and Turkey, resulting in a significant drop in per capita GDP 
from 1974-1 990.22 With economies (and governments) unable to generate 
sufficient employment to keep up with the demand for work from burgeoning 
young populations, pressure built up behind a number of safety valves, of which 
migration and the possible overthrow of western-friendly incumbent governments 
had the most far reaching implications. 23 As a former Moroccan ambassador to 
the UK put it, 'If we want to keep people in our country, we have to find a way to 
give them jobs. 24 Empirical analyses identified the potential for a large-scale 
expansion of immigration, particularly from the Maghreb and South East 
Europe. 25 
A more immediate concern for the EU, and for Mediterranean 
governments themselves, was the growing appeal of political Islam across the 
region. France, for instance, identified the rise of Islarn as one of its key foreign 
policy challenges of the 1990S. 
26 The burgeoning number of young unemployed 
people were increasingly turning to Islamic social movements and political parties 
with their roots in rapidly expanding urban poor. The paring back of traditionally 
patemalistic states and disillusiomnent with the lost ideals of the post- 
independence period provided fertile ground for radical alternatives. 
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The Union's response to Islamisation had to be carefully measured. On 
A- - Ene one hand, sizeable populations of Muslims in Belgium, France, Germany and 
the UK made relations with the Islamic world as much an internal issue as an 
external one. 27 Considerable latent hostility existed towards a 'West' which 
proclaimed its support for democratisation while at the same time using its 
influence to try and prevent Islamic parties coming to power. On the other hand, 
discredited regimes in North Africa and the Middle East often enjoyed overt 
support, or at least tacit approval, from EU Member States and the West in 
general, which were anxious to safeguard their commercial and political interests 
in those countries. Furthermore, as Cold War armoury started to be dispersed in 
the former Soviet Union, it was feared that Islamic governments and groups 
hostile to the West might illicitly acquire chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. 
Anti-govemment violence might easily spill over into Western Europe, with 
Islamic activists exploiting links between groups from both sides of the 
Mediteffanean. 
This combination of destabilising economic and political factors in the 
Mediterranean pointed to the need for a multi-dimensional, holistic approach to 
regional security, in line with a broader trend, evident in the security studies 
community, towards re-defining the concept of security itself. 28 Policies would 
have to begin to encompass, inter alia, cultural, economic, environmental and 
social issues - reflecting the interdependency of the factors influencing modem 
29 
security. For instance, economic underdevelopment and poverty were likely to 
provoke social problems which in turn threatened the stability of weak states. 30 
Weak, insecure states were more inclined to resort to violence in the face of 
perceived or real threats, and therefore a challenge to peaceful international order. 
At the institutional level, this shift of emphasis from traditional politico-military 
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security towards 'soft security' implied a more prominent role for organisations 
with very broad remits, such as the EU, the OSCE and the United Nations, and a 
general increase in international cooperation. 
The Mediterranean of the late 1980s appeared to be an ideal test for this 
new thinking. From the point of view of the EU and its Member States, the socio- 
economic signals emanating from the region were providing a stream of largely 
negative policy feedback, creating a strong imperative for policy change. 31 But 
the policy discourse that developed around the Mediterranean security problem 
tended to be long on rhetoric and short on substance. Terminology like 'co- 
development', 'cooperation' and 'dialogue' abounded without any clear sense of 
how such concepts might be operationalised. In the end, events dictated the pace 
ofchange. 
2. The Redirected Mediterranean Policy: Rhetoric and Reality 
As a self-proclaimed progressive force in the international order, the EU seemed 
well-placed to lead the development of innovative security policy in Europe. The 
diminishing relevance of traditional balance of power politics and military 
capability after 1989 brought renewed interest in the notion of the Union as a 
benevolent 'civilian superpower', contributing its largesse and its functional 
expertise to the construction of a new model of international relations in which 
economic success would be of paramount importance. Narrowing the massive gap 
in prosperity between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean was 
essential. In 1990, per capita GDP in the EU stood at 16500 ECUs, while in the 
Maghreb and Mashreq countries it stood at less than 1500 ECUs. 32 However, the 
extent to which the Union was capable of performing this role as benefactor again 
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hinged on the ability of the Member States to set aside short term political 
expediency for long-tenn change. 
With a former Spanish MP - Abel Matutes - in charge of EU- 
Mediterranean relations, the subsequent re-evaluation of Mediterranean policy 
was very much Commission-led. 33 Matutes initial task was to convince the 
Member States that Europe's security was inseparable from the prosperity and 
stability of the wider Mediterranean region. 34 Exploratory proposals for an 
upgraded policy were presented to the heads of government at the Strasbourg 
summit in 1989. The paper acknowledged the poor economic performance of the 
majority of Mediterranean associates and highlighted their failure to meet the 
demand for jobs as a major threat to social stability. 35 The deteriorating quality of 
the Mediterranean enviromnent, growing food shortages and chronic balance of 
payments deficits were also identified as problems that Mediterranean had to 
address. 
36 
The European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee (ESC) 
joined in the debate in late 1989, calling for 'joint economic development', 
'institutionalised economic integration' and more effective management and 
distribution of EU financial resources. 37 The ESC was especially critical, taking 
the Member States to task for 'protectionist practices' and arguing that the most 
damage had been done by 'the inherent limits and contradictions of the 
Community's general Mediterranean strategy, and by outstanding problems within 
the Community itself 938 It singled out the failure of the Member States to open 
up their agricultural markets, pointing out that those governments with the most 
interest in Mediterranean security also tended to be the most protectionist. 39 
The Matutes document came before the Council at an opportune time. 
Spain and France held the Council gavel in 1989, while Italy took over in the 
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second half of 1990, giving the EU"s agenda a distinctly Mediterranean flavour. 
As De Vasconcelos argues, the region had become a "common foreign policy 
priority' for France, Italy and Spain, whose foreign mhuistries had established a 
mechanism for regular consultations between political directors. 40 In 1989, Italian 
Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis demanded a wholesale rebalancing in the 
distribution of EC resources to the Central and Eastern European countries and the 
south, arguing that the EC should 'combine its aid policy to Eastern and to 
Mediterranean countries, with each member country dedicating 0.25 per cent of its 
GNP to these two areas. Al In 1990, Spanish Foreign Minister Femdndez Ordofi-ez 
called for a new regional security system, arguing that it should be based on 
economic development and inter-cultural dialogue. Together, this Mediterranean 
lobby ensure that the Commission's proposals were not lost in the EU's crowded 
agenda at this time. 
The outcome of Matutes' policy review was the Redirected Mediterranean 
Policy (RMP), a mixture of promises to improve the terms of the bilateral 
agreements, additional funding and new financial instruments (See Figure 3.1). 42 
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Figure 3.1 Main Commitments of the Redirected Mediterranean Policy 
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The decision to supplement the bilateral financial protocols with a new 
budget line for regional integration projects served a number of purposes. First, 
the low level of trade between the Mediterranean associates themselves was 
widely regarded as an impediment to economic growth and the liberalisation 
process. 44 By offering financial incentives, the Union sought to kick-start cross- 
border economic activity. From its own point of view, a more favourable intra- 
regional trading enviroment would help cement the positions of European 
companies in the associates' markets and facilitate European investments in the 
growing network of transnational energy projects in the Western Mediterranean. 
Second, regional political integration, a predicted spin-off from economic 
integration, was seen as a positive development in the security context. As 
Regelsberger argues, 'such developments are judged as stabilising factors in world 
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politics, particularly where such trends are accompanied by internal political 
reforms in third countries centred on democratic values. 45 In 1989, the five 
Maghreb states had launched their own regional organisation - the Arab Maghreb 
Union - modelled on the EU with joint decision making bodies and an agenda for 
functional cooperation on a wide range of issues. 46 Although the Union provided 
no direct financial assistance to the fledgling organisation, the regional integration 
funds were intended to help buttress cross-border activity in the Maghreb. 47 
Third, with the third financial protocols up for re-negotiation and 
substantial claims on the EC budget from Central and Eastern Europe, the 
Commission had to make a watertight case in the Council to secure extra money 
for the Mediterranean. That the RMP earmarked financial aid for internal 
economic reforms persuaded sceptical northern Member States, particularly 
Germany, to endorse the package, albeit with a 35 per cent cut in the figure 
48 
originally requested . 
However, the new financial instrument also had a number of limitations. 
The allocation of the funding was to be decided on a project by project basis, 
rather than as part of a pre-determined programme. Not only did this procedure 
slow the approval of the projects by the Commission, it also subjected projects to 
the vagaries of decision-making in many of the Mediterranean associates' 
bureaucracies. The take up rate of EC funding proved to be a persistent problem 
for the Commission, with funds rarely being fully committed . 
49 Finally, 
promoting cooperation between Mediterranean NGOs - the civil society 
dimension of the RMP - relied on projects bypassing governments who were 
traditionally suspicious of political activities outside the control of the state. 
The Commission's suggestion that debt policy should be coordinated by 
the EU fell on deaf ears. 50 Member States were reluctant to stray from the 
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prevailing order dominated by the multilateral financial institutions and collective 
management among the biggest creditor states in the G7/GIO. Despite gestures by 
a number of Member States to unilaterally reduce the debt servicing burden for 
Mediterranean countries, the Council chose to link any assistance with debt 
servicing to the implementation of structural adjustment programmes and 
economic reforms imposed by the Bretton Woods institutions. The segment of aid 
designated for structural adjustment and macro-economic reforms was made 
conditional upon adherence to IMF programmes. The Union's only concession 
over this issue was its offer to link projects to 'sectors particularly affected by 
structural adjustment 9.51 
On the trade front, the RMP inevitably ran into obstacles in the Council. 
Looming recession in Western Europe made the southern Member States 
particularly sensitive to the suggestion of increased competition. Access for 
agricultural produce was only marginally improved by an agreement to bring 
forward by three years the tariff reductions promised after the end of Portugal and 
Spain's transitional periods. Morocco's Ambassador to the EU delivered a strong 
rebuke to Brussels, deploring the 'timidity' of the Council's decisions. 52 
Relaxation of the Union's textile import regime, another key sector for 
Mediterranean third countries, was forced on it by the Uruguay Round of the 
GATT rather than by any altruistic intentions. A Council decision of December 
1990 to eliminate quantitative limits on textile imports simply pre-empted the 
abolition of the Multi-Fibre Agreement. 53 
In hindsight, the RMP did little more than act as a legitimating device for 
increased aid to the Mediterranean. As a strategy, it was afflicted with the same 
faults that imPaired the GMP: the gap between the Commission's policy 
prescriptions and what the Member States would sanction, the ineffectiveness of 
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policy in addressing the structural asymmetry of Euro-Mediterranean economic 
relations, and the reliance on existing policy instruments that were clearly failing 
to stimulate trade. But the RMP at least ensured that Mediterranean policy stayed 
on the EU's external relations agenda during the 1990s, at a time when it was 
preoccupied with its own internal development and with the rapidly evolving 
situation in eastern Europe. In a very limited way, the regional integration 
element also demonstrated a practical application by the EU of the concept of 'soft 
security'. This regionalisation of Mediterranean policy was to provide the 
foundations for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. 
3. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
The turning point in the development of the Union's Mediterranean strategy came 
with the 1991 Gulf War, which left 'a gaping hole between the North and South' 
and put the limitations of the RMP, and the Union's powerlessness in the politico- 
security sphere, into sharp relief. 54 The economic, political and socio-cultural 
disruption caused by the conflict lent new urgency to the search for cooperative 
security structures in the region, something on which the EU was expected to take 
55 the lead. 
However, as Christopher Piening argues, 'the Gulf crisis was of the sort 
that the EU was least able to deal with', demanding a rapid political response to 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait as well as a nuanced position that took into account the 
politico-cultural sensitivities of Euro-Arab relations. 56 Anti-war and anti-west 
demonstrations throughout the Arab world and in European capitals alarmed 
European governments, who feared a backlash against their commercial interests 
in the region and hostility from Muslim citizens in Europe. 57 The burning of 
French flags during protests in Rabat had a particularly profound psychological 
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effect, prompting some commentators asking whether France had finally 'lost the 
Maghreb. ' 58 One French deputj even called for a 'Marshall Plan for the 
Mediterranean'. 59 The Union's failure to project a unified political position on the 
conflict and to take into account the cultural implications of European 
involvement in the US-led coalition undoubtedly damaged its credibility in the 
eyes of the Arab world, and made the RMP appear largely irrelevant. 60 
Only in the aftermath of the Gulf conflict did the Union's external 
relations machinery grind into gear. The immediate challenge was to 'desensitise' 
relations with the Arab countries, a task entrusted to the Troika (Italy, 
Luxembourg, The Netherlands) which embarked on a conciliatory tour of the 
region. 61 The Ministers involved noted 'real bitterness' from the Arab states and 
returned to Brussels with requests for substantial financial assistance to offset the 
loss of trade that resulted the conflict. 62 However, the Union had already 
contributed 1.5 billion ECUs in balance of payments support to the 'front line' 
states in the conflict in August 1990, and the only additional assistance it was 
prepared to offer was loan capital of 250 million ECUs to Israel and the 
Palestinian Territories to help rebuild communications and other infrastructural. 
networks. 63 The overriding impression left by the Union's behaviour during this 
period was of an irresolute organisation, unsure of how best to contribute to the 
restoration of order in the region. 
In the absence of an EU initiative, it was left to the big three southern EU 
Member States - France, Italy Spain and Italy - to explore other avenues for 
regional cooperation. By far the most ambitious of these was a Spanish/Italian 
proposal for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean 
(CSCM), unveiled at a CSCE summit in Palma during September 1990. The idea 
appeared to have timeliness in its favour. Modelled on the Helsinki agreement, 
76 
the CSCM was to have the same wide-ranging remit as the CSCE, bringing 
together Mediterranean Arab states, Gulf states and EU Member States. 64 Spain 
and Italy saw the CSCM primarily as a conflict prevention mechanism and as a 
vehicle for multilateral 'dialogue' between the Islamic world and the West. 
However, the USA, which was left off the list of prospective CSCM members, 
dismissed the initiative, viewing it as a thinly veiled attempt by the Europeans to 
replace it as the lynchpin of international security in the region . 
65 By mid- 1992, 
the proposal had quietly dropped off the CSCE agenda, replaced instead by a 
vague sounding offer to 'exchange infonnation' with Mediterranean states. 66 
An alternative route was taken by France, which favoured a less ambitious 
sub-regional approach centred on the Western Mediterranean. In December 1990, 
it launched an initiative to instigate political dialogue between five northern 
Mediterranean states and the five states of the AMU. The '5+5' process was 
formally launched at a conference of Foreign Ministers in Rome. The agreement 
provided for annual meetings between foreign ministers, and established several 
working groups to cover issues such as development, food self-sufficiency and 
enviromnental issues. As was the case with the CSCM, the 5+5 dialogue quickly 
foundered when differences surfaced among the participating states. 67 The 
European states refused to sit at the same table as Libya, which had recently been 
officially condemned by the EU for refusing to release the suspects in the 
Lockerbie bombing for trial. Its death knell was sounded by the military coup in 
Algeria in January 1992. 
The failure of these attempts to create new regional intergovernmental 
forums re-focused attention on EU Mediteffanean policy. At the start of 1992, 
Spain was given the task of producing a report on how relations between the 
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Union and the Maghreb states could be improved . Working closely with 
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Commissioner Matutes, the Gonzalez government suggested a 'partnership' with 
the Maghreb states that would include a free-trade area and an extensive agenda 
for cooperation on everything from the common management of natural resources 
and energy to supplies of food. The paper also called for the institutionalisation of 
meetings between the Union and the Arab Maghreb Union at both the 
governmental and parliamentary levels. 69 The tone of the report was strongly neo- 
liberal, arguing that free-trade, increased private investment and macro-economic 
reform were the most effective route to socio-economic development and 
modernisation, and that the Association Agreements and EU financial aid should 
be used in support of these objectives . 
70 On the basis of the Spanish paper, the 
Commission was tasked with preparing firm proposals for action. 
This latest round of reform of Mediterranean policy benefited from 
political momentum injected by the creation of the CFSP. One effect of the CFSP 
had been to galvanise the member governments, into more thorough consideration 
of their common foreign policy interests, and the post-Gulf war Mediterranean 
was widely regarded as a priority area for common foreign policy actions. A 
report on the CFSP presented at the 1992 Lisbon European Council divided the 
Mediterranean into two geographical areas for strategic actions in favour of 
economic development, security and stability: the Maghreb and the Middle East. 71 
While the definition of these common interests was imprecise, the Lisbon text 
nevertheless listed the broad objectives that the Union should pursue. For EU- 
Maghreb relations, the heads of goverment called for 'upgraded partnership' and 
an eclectic 'constructive dialogue' covering immigration, drug trafficking, Islamic 
fundamentalism, population growth and terrorism. It was a direct endorsement of 
the joint Commission- Spanish proposals and for the Commission's exploratory 
communication on the subject presented at the SUMMit. 
72 For the Middle East, the 
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text called for the Union's 'full involvement' in the Peace Process and for efforts 
to persuade Israel to change its policy in the Palestinian territories. The Lisbon 
European Council effectively laid the foundations for the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership. 
The transition to the CFSP also had a positive impact on the institutional 
balance in Mediterranean policy. As Forster and Wallace put it, 'for the European 
Commission external relations and foreign policy had now become one of its most 
important fields of operation. 73 VAiile its considerable powers in the external 
economic relations sphere had been carefully nurtured by the Commission, Article 
J. 8 (Title V, Maastricht Treaty) gave the Commission a right to submit proposals 
to the Council on CFSP matters. To try to make the most of its new powers, the 
Commission re-structured itself. Directorate General IB was given responsibility 
for the Southern Mediterranean and the Middle East, while DG IA acquired a 
CFSP directorate. The Commission duly benefited by virtue of its permanency in 
both the EC and CFSP structures, a division of labour that promised to improve 
the coherence of EU strategic action by starting to bridge the divide between 
pillars I and II. 
Consistent with the Lisbon text, the Commission initially continued to 
focus on the Maghreb. 74 By the end of 1992, several months of exchanges 
between the Commission and the Moroccan and Tunisian governments had 
established the need for new agreements with the EU based on three distinct lines 
of action. First, both sides agreed to further renegotiation of the temis of trade in 
the agreements, with Morocco and Tunisia pressing for full free-trade in all 
sectors. 75 Second, provisions would be included in each agreement covering 
rights of establishment, rules on the movement of services and capital, technical 
cooperation and the possibility ofjoint research and development projects. Third, 
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the new agreements would include provisions for 'social cooperation', essentially 
ministerial dialogue on issues such as migration and living and working 
conditions for Maghrebi citizens in the EU. At a meeting of EU foreign ministers 
in December 1992, the Commission's recommendations were given the green 
light by the Member States, and work began on mandates for the Commission to 
begin negotiations. 
However, in view of the rapidly evolving Peace Process in the Middle 
East, DG IB saw the partnership as a means to stimulate 'post-conflict' economic 
cooperation between the Arabs and Israelis. 76 There was also a sense among the 
other Mediterranean third countries that too much of the EU's attention was being 
devoted to the Maghreb. At a meeting of the EU-Egypt Cooperation Council in 
July 1992, an Egyptian official had urged the Union to 'embrace the 
Mediterranean region as a single entity'. 77 When it appeared during 1993 that 
Israel and the PLO might be on the verge of permanent peace,, the partnership 
proposals were duly extended to embrace the Machrek and take in the Union's 
relationships with Cyprus, Malta and Turkey. 78 By 1994, the EU's relationships 
with the Mediterranean non-member countries had been subsumed under a single 
policy framework: the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. 79 
The basis of the upgraded agreements - the main po icy instrument 
attached to the new strategy - was the gradual liberalisation of trade over a 
transitional period of up to 12 years . 
80 Some sectors - most notably trade in 
services - were excluded, and the Council ruled out the unconditional 
liberalisation of agricultural trade, although the Union promised to review the 
market situation for Mediterranean agricultural products by the end of the I 990s 
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after strong political pressure from the Maghrebi governments. Nevertheless, 
the scope of the agreements was far wider than previous agreements, and 
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incorporated the vast majority of the proposals made by the joint Commission- 
Spanish paper. 82 All the new agreements were to include provisions for 
cooperation on issues such as energy policy, crime and immigration. Formalised 
political dialogue, superseding the system of Cooperation Councils and 
Committees gave the agreements a stronger institutional structure. Regular 
dialogue would take place at levels ranging from Ministerial to senior foreign 
office officials. 
The precise provisions of the trade component of the Euro-Mediterranean 
agreements varied from one partner country to another but contained certain 
common features, set out in Figure 3.2: 
Figure 3.2 Common Provisions of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreements 
e The extension of trade preferences based ( the pre-existing arrangements 
end more limited preferences to 
after 1 January 2000. 
The Euro-Mediterranean agreements were essential to the long-term 
success of the EMP. The economic centrepiece of the EU's Mediterranean 
strategy -a free-trade area - implied the complete removal of barriers to trade 
across all sectors. For the majority of the Mediterranean partners, their 
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commitment to the EMP turned on them seeing tangible economic benefits well 
before the 2010 deadline for the completion of the FTA. Free-trade was a high 
stake game for states which had few resources at their disposal to alleviate the 
negative effects of increased competition on domestic producers. In the event, the 
Union was to prove disappointingly defensive. 
4. Negotiating the Euro-Mediterranean Agreements 
When negotiations opened - initially with Tunisia and Morocco in 1994 - it 
quickly became clear that the Member States' would yet again hold sway over the 
final terms of the agreements. The Council attached footnotes to each of the 
Commission's negotiating mandates stipulating that traditional trade flows should 
be the guiding principle and the upper limit of trade concessions. 83 In addition to 
keeping to these targets, the Commission was 'asked to avoid proposing additional 
concessions which could worsen the situation of the EU market for sensitive 
products. ' 84 A sense of dija vu pervaded the atmosphere in which negotiators 
were operating. 
Full liberalisation of trade in industrial products posed few problems for 
negotiators. The Mediterranean partner countries accepted that their markets 
would have to be fully opened to European manufactured goods, while the 
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Member States saw little danger of competition from full liberalisation. But the 
Union's firm line on traditional trade flows in agriculture left little scope for 
increases, even where the partners demonstrated that they had the production 
capacity to take up their full quotas. 86 Having been promised free-trade, the 
Mediterranean partners' demands were generally far in excess of existing import 
quota levels. Egypt's wish-list (in the early stages of its negotiations) exemplified 
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the gulf between the demands of the partners and the offers the Union was 
prepared to make. 
Figure 3.3 EU-Egypt Negotiating Positions 
Product EU offer (tonnes per annum) Egypt's request (tonnes per 
annum) 
Potatoes 220,000 450,000 
Oranges 1,000 3009000 (170,000)* 
Cut flowers 500 30,000 (10,000)** 
Rice 32,000 200,000 
Egypt's average annual exports of citrus fruits amounted to 13000 tonnes. 
** Egyptian negotiators were prepared to accept parity with Morocco for cut flower imports (5000 
tonnes) 
Figures in brackets show the reduction in demands over the course of two years. 
Source: Unofficial document obtained from Embassy of partner country. 
Even allowing for 'over-asking and under offering', standard bargaining 
techniques, negotiating with such apparently irreconcilable demands on the table 
pointed to lengthy, hard-fought and highly political bargaining. 87 
The Commission consequently found itself in a difficult, though familiar, 
position in the negotiations as the pivot between the Member States and the third 
countries. Switching between parallel negotiations - internally with the Member 
States, externally with the partner countries - the Commission had to ensure that it 
could sell concessions and measures included in the agreements to the Council 
while at the same time maximising concessions from the member governments. 
At the heart of the internal negotiating process was an ever-present tension 
between the Commission and the Member States. A Commission official 
described the Commission-Council relationship in these simplified terms: 
The Commission informs constantly the Council on the negotiating process. 
When the Commission considers that the negotiations are over, the 
Commission goes to the Council and says that "ten per Cent of the mandate 
is not fulfilled because our partners didn't accept this and this". The 
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Council says "try and try again", and the Commission says "fliat's all, now 
you decide. 48 
Despite being the Union's sole negotiator in the process, the Commission 
consistently found its hands tied by the Council . 
89As was the case in previous 
rounds of negotiations, it proved unable to contain the talks at a 'technical level', 
where diplomats from the agriculture, foreign and trade ministries of the partner 
countries travelled to Brussels to decide on quota levels for individual products in 
the agreements. Instead, discussions over the most sensitive products for both the 
Member States and the partner countries repeatedly became politicised to such a 
degree that the direct intervention of heads of government was sometimes 
required. During the negotiations with Egypt in 1998, for instance, Commission 
President Jacques Santer met with President Hosni Mubarak in an attempt to find 
a solution to disputes over oranges, rice, cut flowers, rules of origin and the thorny 
question of a clause in the agreement requiring Egypt to readmit citizens who had 
tried to enter the EU illegally. 90 Santer's statement that 'we will not let a few 
oranges stop the negotiations' had a hollow ring to it. 91 
On occasions, however, the Commission was prepared to push its 
autonomy to the limit in order to secure what it judged to be an effective deal. 
When it offered the Morocco an increase in its import quota for tomato paste that 
exceeded the figure stipulated in the negotiating mandate, it was publicly rebuked 
by the Portuguese government for tending to 'negotiate free-wheel and to 
substitute itself in the role of political organs that represent sovereign states". 92 On 
another occasion, it was criticised for having negotiated, without the approval of 
COREPER, a revision clause in the agreement with Jordan that allowed for re- 
negotiation of quotas within three years of the ageement entering into force. 93 At 
times, the Commission appeared to be faced with a no-win situation. On one 
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occasion, for instance, COREPER rejected a request from the hish Council 
Presidency for it to intervene during the negotiations with Egypt on the grounds 
that the Commission alone should be acting on behalf of the Union. 
As far as the Member States were concerned, the negotiations saw them 
divide into a northern, liberalising tendency and the protectionist, producer- 
oriented southern camp. As a Commission negotiator complained, the 'Northern 
Member States couldn't care less about this .... they are frustrated. 994 TMs 
sentiment was echoed by a Scandinavian diplomat: 
We have tried quite hard to make things as liberal as possible. But it is an 
uphill struggle. In the EU, it is a producers market - their interests are 
valued much more highly than consumers' interests. I'm not sure how 
Sweden can influence this in the best way. We're almost seen as a 
marginalised, extremist country when it comes to free trade. 95 
The likely impact of this division had been flagged by the EU's Economic and 
Social Committee well before the negotiations began. Its argument was a 
prescient one: 
Until these two positions are superseded by new thinking which combines 
trade policy with economic and financial policy, as part of a joint 
development policy - of mutual, Euro-Mediterranean interest - the only 
common ground will remain the purely negative position of not 
strengthening Community Mediterranean policy, leaving the bulk of 
cooperation work in the Mediterranean Basin to the Member States. 96 
Yet the Euro-Mediterranean agreements were also notable for a marked 
escalation in the politicisation of concessions on products even for the northern 
group. Govenunents that had not previously had cause to block negotiations 
suddenly found themselves under pressure to safeguard domestic interests over 
apparently small quota increases. The dispute over cut flowers in the Moroccan 
agreement was a case in point. Germany and the Netherlands questioned the 
Commission's offer of on cut flowers (5000 tonnes per annum), arguing that the it 
had exceeded its mandate. 97 The Germans' claim that the tonnage offered would 
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harm their domestic industry is was a puzzling one, given its strong preference for 
trade liberalisation. Under the agreement, Germany would only receive 700 
tonnes of flowers per annum with a market value I million ECU, a tiny percentage 
of its total production. The Netherlands adopted a similar line. As a Dutch 
negotiator put it, the dilemma was: 
not about competition, it [was] a matter of fairness. We are producers but 
also traders in cut flowers via Amsterdam. There [was] discussion and 
debate in the Netherlands on what we do in this case. Trade is bigger than 
production, but the point is that it is a traditional industry. You can't retrain 
flower growers overnight. 98 
A measure of Dutch sensitivities on this issue was their decision to negotiate with 
the Moroccan government themselves. 99 
Several diplomats explained their governments' opposition to higher 
import quota concessions in terms of their potential cumulative effect. 100 
According to a Portuguese diplomat: 
The problem was the market situation for the Council ... There is always a 
tendency for the Mediterranean partners to feel that we minimise their 
demands when Commission proposals get to the Council table. But 
Ministers always think in terms of global concessions, and of overlap into 
the ACP, It is very difficult to explain that there is a tie between the 
problems. 101 
A Commission official offered a similar analysis, acknowledging the limitations 
imposed by the CAP: 'I would say that although our position is more restricted 
than it should be, the fact is that the future is not in a major expansion of 
avicultural exports. ' 
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They key problem facing the Member States, and a major reason for their 
obstructive behaviour in the negotiations, was the need to return to their respective 
capitals with deals that would be ratified by national parliaments. With the EU's 
agricultural markets already over-saturated with European products, it was 
politically inexpedient for governments to be seen to be signing up to agreements, 
86 
in the name of EU Mediterranean policy, whose net effect would be to increase 
competition. Farm lobbies were extremely powerful domestic constituencies in 
the southern Member States, using formal channels to national ministries as well 
as blockades and demonstrations to exert pressure on their governments. In at 
least two cases - the negotiations with Morocco and Tunisia - protests by farmers 
which included the destruction of imported produce led to discussions temporarily 
being halted. 103 
'Resolving these internal disputes at the EU level tended to be a last minute 
affair, calling for both political creativity and flexibility on the Union's part. In 
the negotiations with Morocco and Tunisia, the French and Spanish Council 
Presidencies used their position in the chair to put additional political pressure on 
governments to conclude the accords. Spanish Foreign Minister Javier Solana, for 
instance, repeatedly stressed that the value of the trade concessions at stake 
amounted to only 20 million ECUs. 104 French ministers showed considerable 
solidarity with the Spanish, regularly criticising any sign of intransigence on the 
part of the other Member States. 
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Use of issue-linkage and side payments also helped pave the way for 
agreements to be concluded. The Guterres socialist government in Portugal had 
just taken office when it found itself facing increased imports of Moroccan tomato 
concentrates and canned sardines; products which form the dominant share of the 
Portuguese food processing industry. 106 Fanners and fishennen were the 
traditional constituents of the opposition parties. Anticipating hostility at home to 
the Morocco agreement and the possibility of an embarrassing row as it passed 
through the parliament, the government rounded on the Commission. The 
Portuguese government blocked negotiations until the Commission promised 
extra funding (from the EU's Structural Funds) to modernise the canning industry 
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and new controls on the marketing of Moroccan imports. 107 Such face-saving 
compromises were a typical feature of the negotiations. 
Despite the 'partnership' label on the new Mediterranean policy, the 
Mediterranean third countries were little more than bit players in the negotiations. 
Only Morocco, which possessed the bargaining chip of access to its lucrative 
fishing grounds, was able to hold out for additional concessions and extra funding 
P-- - from the EU, securing financial compensation for its fishing fleets in return for 
improved access for its tomatoes. Others, such as Egypt, bemoaned the Union's 
inflexibility but stuck to their demands. As an Egyptian diplomat put it: 
Come 2010, our markets will be open 100 per cent for European industrial 
products and what we are asking for is equal treatment in agriculture. We 
are being practical and realistic. We know that there are big problems in the 
CAP. We said ok, we will not ask for equal treatment at this point. At least 
at this point we would like to increase our exports to the EU and have some 
privileges. 108 
By 1999, Euro-Mediterranean agreements had only been formally 
concluded with Morocco, the Palestinian Authority and Tunisia. The Union was 
forced to admit that the completion date for the free-trade area would be pushed 
back five years to 2015.109 Even that looked optimistic. Most intractable of all 
were the negotiations with Egypt, which stalled in 1996 over the quota offered on 
potatoes and failed to move for over a year. A corollary of Egypt's refusal to 
concede on its demands was a halt to negotiations with Syria and Lebanon. Both 
refused to resume bargaining until it became clear what Egypt would be 
offered. " 0 At the time of writing, the Mediterranean free-trade area, the centre- 
piece of the new Mediterranean policy, is a distant prospect. 
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Figure 3.4 Status of Negotiations with Partner Countries, January 1999 




Tunisia 1993 July 1995 March 1998 
Jordan 1996 November 1997 
Egypt 1996 Negotiations Ongoing - 
Palestinian Authority 1996 February 1997 July 1997 
Algeria 1997 Negotiations Ongoing - 
Lebanon 1997 Negotiations Ongoing 
Syria 
- 6- 
1998 Negotiations Ongoing 
Source: European Commission, DG IB (1998) Progress offegotiations on Euro-Mediterranean 
Association Agreements, April, ((http: //www. euromed. net/)) 
Conclusions 
To a considerable extent, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was simply 'old 
wine in new bottles'. The basic structure of Euro-Mediterranean relations was 
retained, with cooperation across an extensive range of functional issues being 
built into a modified form of Association Agreement. While there was a clearer 
definition of the Union's strategic objectives in the region, neither the Redirected 
Mediterranean Policy nor the Partnership seriously addressed the 'big' questions: 
the inherent asymmetry in trade relations and the debt crisis. Under pressure to 
respond expeditiously and effectively to events in the Gulf and the re-launch of 
the Middle East Peace Process, the partnership strategy was above all an 
ambitious declaration of intent that the Union would engage with the partner 
countries on a much more systematic basis. 
Beyond the partnership rhetoric, however, the Union once again proved 
stubbornly protectionist on the issues that really mattered to the partner countries. 
As a Swedish diplomat put it, it is sad to see how much political mileage there is 
out of I tonne of cut flowers. But [EU] politics works like that - very short- 
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sighted. "" A corollary of the EUs protectionism is that the Euro-Mediterranean 
agreements are likely to have a minimal impact on the economies of the C7- 
Mediteffanean partners, thus undennining a central plank of the Union" s 'soft 
security' strategy. The Commission inevitably found itself caught between its role 
as a servant of the Member States, its responsibility for regulating EU markets, 
and the need to reach deals with the Mediterranean partner countries that 
represented a quantitative improvement in access for their imports. 
However, the outcome of the negotiations of the Euro-Mediterranean 
agreements was not entirely negative. Assuming that the preferred outcome for 
many producers within the EU would have been the status quo or even a 
contraction of imports from the partner countries, then the fact that 
concessions were made might be regarded as a small sign of progress. Moreover, 
the Mediterranean states were hardly alone in finding the EU a tough and 
defensive negotiator. The 1990s saw the EU embroiled in protracted rows over 
the agricultural trade in the Uruguay Round of the GATT. Its 'Europe 
Agreements' with the Central and Eastern European countries were notable for the 
numerous protocols and annexes attached to the accords that allowed for trade 
barriers to be re-imposed if EU producers faced unacceptable competitive pressure 
. C-- from imports. In the final analysis, the EU had at least put in place a framework 
for action and begun the slow process of policy reform. 
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Chapter 4 
THE BARCELONA PROCESS: FOREIGN POLICY BY 
MULTILATERAL MEANS? 
If the Euro-Mediterranean agreements represented 'more of the same', then the 
Barcelona conference marked a genuine break with the past. This innovative, 
multilateral dimension of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, based on a 
comprehensive Declaration and Work Programme, secured the approval of 27 
governments and spawned a rolling programme of functional cooperation among 
both governments and non-governmental actors across an extensive range of policy 
sectors. ' Politically, the Declaration laid the foundations for a regional diplomatic 
network to deal with highly sensitive subjects such as arms control, democratic 
reforms and human rights in a fonnat that resembled the Organisation for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe. The participation of Israel, Lebanon, the Palestinian 
Authority, and Syria on an equal basis gave the Barcelona process a unique status 
in the region as the only forum where these traditional enemies would routinely sit 
at the same table. 
This chapter assesses the Barcelona process as part of the EU's 
Mediterranean strategy and considers its broader implications for EU foreign 
policy. Section one examines the rationale behind the EU's decision to convene 
the conference. Section two analyses the preparation of the Conference, arguing 
that navigation by the French and Spanish Council Presidencies during 1995 was 
instrumental in producing mutually acceptable texts that also met the Union's 
own policy objectives. The third section focuses on the context of the Barcelona 
Declaration and the progress made in the early stages of its implementation. 
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Section four shows how the institutional and procedural modalities of the 
Barcelona process have boosted, albeit modestly, the EU's foreign policy 
capabilities. 
1. The Road to the Barcelona Conference 
The seeds of the Barcelona process germinated in the vacant ground left by the 
aborted CSCM and '5+5' projects. The attempt to create the two regional forums 
had demonstrated the high level of support around the Mediterranean for multi- 
dimensional functional cooperation underpinned by strong institutional 
architecture. The keyword was 'interdependence', the recognition that common 
Mediterranean problems ranging from crime to environmental pollution should 
be managed at regional level. There seemed no reason why the success of the 
OSCE should not be miffored in some form in the Mediteffanean. The 
arguments of Guido de Marco, Malta's Foreign Minister and a leading 
protagonist of multilateralism, were typical: 
We cannot close an eye to regional flash points that must be contained and 
possibly diffused, if our own security is not to be put in jeopardy .... we 
should all try to create the facilities to involve all the parties concerned in a 2 dialogue. 
De Marco's assumption, shared in particular by Italian foreign minister Gianni 
de Michelis and Spain's Fernando Ordon-ez,, was that regular ministerial 
'dialogue' - simply getting as many governments as possible together at the same 
table - would be an essential element in long-term conflict prevention. Such 
dialogue gave the political impetus to inter-govemmental cooperation on a broad 
range of common Mediterranean problems. 3 
The failure to take off of many of these initiatives left the way open for 
the EU to launch its own multilateral forum, a challenge initially taken up by the 
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Commission. Consistent with its own long-established advocacy of enhanced 
regional organisation, the Commission's 1992 proposals for a Euro-Maghreb 
partnership called for the bilateral track of the EU's new Mediterranean strategy 
to be complemented by dialogue on 'all matters of common interest' between the 
EC and Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. 4 By 1993, the Community had 
participated constructively in the multilateral track of the Middle East Peace 
Process for several years, following the 1991 Madrid Conference. DG IB became 
convinced that the EMP should be extended to Israel and the Mashreq countries. ' 
Such a move would provide another channel for the normalisation of 
governmental relations between the Arabs and Israelis, as well as providing the 
basis for region-wide strategic action. In a follow-up communication to the 
Council, the Commission argued that multi-sectoral, functional cooperation 
between govenunents and private actors was essential to the consolidation of the 
Peace Process in the long-term, and mentioned the possibility of establishing 
4 joint institutions. 96 
The idea of convening a conference was first openly mooted at the Corfu 
Summit in June 1994 after Spain offered to host the event at the end of its 
Council Presidency in 1995.7 However, the real watershed for the Barcelona 
process was the Essen Summit in December 1994. Regardless of the underlying 
strength of their commitment to it, the heads of government gave unanimously 
endorsed the Commission's strategy in what amounted to affmnation that the 
EMP was a foreign policy interest of all the Member States. 8 
However, the agreement to hold the conference fonned part of a inter- 
governmental package deal in which the Mediterranean Member States accepted 
that eastern enlargement of the EU had to be the Union's number one priority in 
exchange for a clear signal that the Union would make a significant gesture 
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towards the south. 9 With Germany about to assume the Presidency and shift the 
EU's attention back towards the East, it took a combination of political pressure 
from the Commission and Spain, and the intervention of German Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl, to find a satisfactory compromise in Essen. 
Alongside the Commission, the prime movers in the upgrading of EU 
Mediterranean policy were France, Italy and Spain, the big three southern 
Member States. The precise extent to which the three governments, actually 
collaborated over the EMP is unclear, but there was sufficient convergence 
between their positions on regional security and the EU's role in it to generate the 
necessary political momentwn behind the EMP. 10 According to a Spanish 
foreign ministry official: 
There was no institutional coordination on Mediterranean issues, no contact 
group .... but events in the EU provoked cooperation among France, Italy and Spain. 11 
In a similar vein, a Portuguese official described the relationship between the 
Mediterranean Member States as 'intuitive', relying more on their 'proximity of 
interests' than any deliberate effort to adopt joint positions. 12 
The most active member of this informal Mediterranean caucus was 
Spain, which had frequently been at the forefront of moves to multilateralise 
Mediterranean security. Indeed, since its accession to the Community, the 
Spanish govenunent had increasingly sought to 'Europeanise' its foreign 
policy. 13 The centrality of aid and trade in post-Cold War security strategies 
persuaded the government that delegating responsibility to the EU for such a 
crucial of its foreign EU was both necessary and practical. 14 From 1989 
onwards, the Gonzalez government conspicuously committed itself to the CSCE, 
rather than NATO, as the most appropriate European and Mediterranean security 
orgamsation. 15 When it became clear that the Ordofiez-De Michelis sponsored 
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CSCM project was destined to fail, Spain turned its attention to promoting EU 
policy. Its subsequent offer to host the conference was the culmination of several 
years of quiet yet effective Spanish diplomacy in the region and confirmation of 
its increasing importance as an international power in the Mediterranean. 16 
In the context of the EU's Mediterranean strategy, a multilateral 
conference served a number of purposes. First, it offered the EU a high profile 
platform from which to 'sell' the EMP to the partners and to the wider world. It 
was the kind of grand political gesture called for by Jacques Delors, who argued 
that the Union needed to send 'powerful messages to its neighbours' in the east 
and south. 17 Second, given the economic disruption likely to arise from the Euro- 
Med free-trade initiative, the conference also amounted to a form of political 
compensation. It would create a fagade of diplomatic equality and elevated 
political status for the partners vis-a-vis the EU, at least in the short term. Third, 
it was also expected that the conference would help kick start the negotiation of 
the Euro-Mediterranean agreements with Morocco and Tunisia, which stalled 
during 1994. The assumption was that all parties would want to conclude the 
negotiations before the event as a sign that the EMP was making tangible 
progyess. 
18 
However, even leaving aside its utility as a political signal, the conference 
also presented the EU with an opportunity to set out the principles of the ENT in 
a multilateral framework that was expected to generate foreign policy actions in 
its own right. As a Spanish diplomat put it, 'the Barcelona conference was the 
way to maintain a long-term relationship with the Mediterranean countries and to 
give attention to very specific issues. '19 The multilateralisation of Mediterranean 
policy would equip the EU with an additional foreign policy tool, designed to 
facilitate the 'boundary management' objectives of its Mediterranean policy by 
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drawing together the various functional cooperation Programmes under a single 
heading. 20 Given the anticipated Participation of the vast majority of the 
Mediterranean littoral states, the conference would be a step forward in the 
Union 
4) 
s attempt to construct a regional identity to underpin the EMP. 
That said, the significance of the conference initiative can be exaggerated. 
As a German official commented, the Member States had agreed to hold the 
event 'without an idea as to what it should initiate', although it was clear that the 
conference was not intended to produce a legally binding international treaty. 21 
The Commission's initial communication on the subject was instructive, being 
long on rhetoric and short on substance: 
The conference should reach agreement on a series of economic and 
political guidelines for Euro-Mediterranean policy into the next century, 
which could be set out in a new Charter..... The Conference should thereby 
contribute to creating a larger awareness, among political and business 
leaders throughout the world of the Mediterranean being ready to embark on 
a courageous j ourney which will progressively transform it into a region of 
stability and peace, rapid economic development, social change and, last but 
not least, political pluralism. 22 
2. Negotiating the Barcelona Conference 
From the outset, the Barcelona conference was, as Esther Barbe argues, a 
6genuinely European project. 23 The decision to hold the conference was the 
EU's alone, and was effectively presented to the partners as afait accompli. As 
the agenda setting phase of the conference was to show, it also turned into a 
conspicuously governmental project, shaped by the foreign policy interests and of 
the participating governments. In procedural terms, the EU's preparations for the 
conference were conducted along the lines of a CFSP action, with the Troika 
undertaking the bulk of the diplomatic legwork. The adoption of this format 
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resulted from the anticipated inclusion of pillar II and pillar III issues in the 
Declaration, subject to inter-governmental. decision making within the EU. 
Work on the Barcelona Declaration commenced under the French Council 
Presidency at the start of 1995.24 The Balladur government made Mediterranean 
policy a central plank of its six month programme for the EU, setting out to 
impose its own vision of the EMP on the conference. According to a Council 
Secretariat official, the French 'worked very much on their own' in the early 
stages. 25 Exploratory discussions took place in the relevant Council working- 
groups with the tabling of a large number offiches submitted by individual 
French ministries. This French bid to influence the implementation of the 
Barcelona process met with a lukewarm response from the other Member States, 
who regarded its proposals as too detailed and too ambitious to be practical. 26 
The Commission spent the period after Essen working on its own 
proposals to implement the EMP. Its ensuing communication to the Council, 
timed to coincide with the Member States' first formal discussion of the draft 
Declaration, reinforced its case for extra funding. 27 The document incorporated a 
breakdown of prospective spending commitments, an analysis of the EMP's 
strategic aims and objectives, and guidelines for EU follow-up actions in each 
policy area. Such thoroughness was intended to reassure sceptical northern 
Member States, particularly Germany, that the distribution of EU funds would be 
28 
tightly controlled and strategically targeted. At the same time, the Commission 
argued that the proposals 'could serve as a useful basis for the Barcelona 
Conference', in a ploy by Commissioner Marm' to counter the Council's 
domination of the exercise. 
On April 10 1995, a discussion document setting out the initial position of 
the Union was put to the General Affairs Council. According to Alain Juppe, the 
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report was prepared 'by the Council, and more precisely by Coreper' implying a 
collective effort by the Member States. 29 According to the Council Secretariat, 
much of the paper was in fact drafted by the French foreign ministry. 30 
Nevertheless, along with the Commission's Communication,, the report was 
approved by EU Foreign Ministers and served as the basis for consultations 
between the Troika and the Mediterranean partners, the first time the latter had 
been approached for their input. 
The feedback from the twelve partners was broadly positive, although 
there were general concerns about the overall direction of the EMP and some 
very specific concerns about the Conference itself For several non-member 
governments, multilateralism threatened to water down their 'special' bilateral 
relationships with the EU and with individual Member States. A North African 
diplomat argued: 
You cannot come up with a policy devised in Brussels and say this will 
apply all the way to Egypt or Israel. You cannot simply think of any policy 
that would be fit for all these countries and serve all their interests at the 
same time, and not be detrimental to a major extent to one group or 
another. 31 
A Mashreqi official complained that: 
There was no prior consultation between the EU and the Mediterranean 
states on what were the real needs.... The concept of specificity is important. 
No structure can be adapted to countries with very different cultural 
heritages and social cleavages. 32 
The point here is that the geographical expansion of EU Mediterranean was not 
wholeheartedly endorsed by the Mediterranean partners, who viewed it as an 
artificial construction which failed to take into account the diversity of the 
region's economies and political systems. 
Concern was also expressed about the EU's over-emphasis on the 
politico-security dimension of the EMP, and a corresponding under-emphasis 
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of socio-cultural cooperation. The Maghreb countries, for instance, pointed out 
that issues such as the status of migrant workers in the Union had been left out 
of the draft document. On the sensitive issues of democratisation and human 
rights, the partners voiced reservations about the perceived imposition of 
European cultural nonns and the possibility of political conditions being 
applied to EU aid. 
Specific concerns focused on two issues. First, the partner countries 
highlighted the Union's indecision over the level of financial aid attached to the 
EMP. A protracted row over the budget in the run up to the Cannes Summit 
(June 1995) threatened to leave the EMP without the financial resources to 
support it. Second, Lebanon and Syria would not commit themselves to 
attending the conference, a result of their refusal to take part in any 
33 
international meeting alongside Israel. The prospect of their absence 
jeopardised one of the EMP's basic purposes: fully inclusive regional 
integration. 
By the end of the French Presidency in June, an essentially unaltered 
framework document had been adopted by the Foreign Ministers, which 
incorporated the results of the troika's consultations with the partners. 
34 One 
notable change was the addition of a passage stating that the Euro-Mediterranean 
agreements would 'safeguard the specificity' of the partners' bilateral relations 
with the Union. 35 The Cannes Summit (June 1995) subsequently approved the 
document, whose mainlines were: 
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Figure 4.1 Draft Programme for the Barcelona Conference 
1) A political and security chapter, comprising, inter alia, measures designe 
It is worth noting that this early draft of the Barcelona Declaration closely 
followed the broad guidelines proposed by the Commission in 1994.37 The 
Cannes Summit also saw the resolution of the budget problem, with the Member 
States agreeing to increase aid to 4.7 billion ECUs, matched by an almost 
identical amount in ElB grants and loans. 
At the start of the Spanish Presidency, the first fortnal draft of the Joint 
Declaration - essentially a summary of the EU's own position - was prepared by 
the Council Secretariat. 38 The contents of this paper were trimmed back by the 
Council Secretariat in order to 'a manageable summary' and subsequently 
forwarded to the Spaniards. 39 When discussion resumed in September 1995, the 
Spanish government had 'put back a lot of what had been left OUt., 
40 They felt 
that drafting the paper was 'the responsibility of the Presidency' and that 'the 
Secretariat's role should be limited. 94 1 The re-drafted paper was much closer to 
the Cannes document than the Secretariat's summary, underlining the ultimate 
control by govermuents of the preparatory phase. 
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But the wrangling over the paper also exposed substantive differences 
between France and Spain. 42 At issue was the balance between the three chapters 
of the Declaration. Having successfully co-sponsored the Stability Pact for 
Central and Eastern Europe, Balladur's government regarded a similar initiative 
for the Mediterranean as a means to boost the Union's profile in the Middle East 
by promoting it as an alternative interlocutor to the USA. 43 French diplomats 
sought to put the Political and Security chapter on the 'front page", proposing that 
a Mediterranean stability pact should be the centrepiece of the political and 
security partnership. 44 
However, the Spanish govemment felt that no single chapter should 
dominate, and that any attempt to establish new codes of conduct for 
international relations in the Mediterranean region could interfere with the 
Middle East Peace Process. 45 Asserting its own credentials as 'honest broker', 
Spain took a more guarded position on the EU's involvement in the Middle East 
Peace Process, believing that step-by-step confidence building and careful, 
relatively neutral diplomacy would produce better results in the long run than a 
high profile political initiative. As the Declaration passed through the Council's 
working groups again, Spanish representatives persuaded their counterparts to 
heed Commissioner Man'n's warning that the Barcelona process should be kept 
distinct from the Peace Process. 46 
Closer to the Conference itself, several problems surfaced which again 
exposed the lack of unity among the EU Member States. The first concerned a 
request by eight Arab-Mediterranean countries, led by Algeria, to allow Libya to 
attend . 
47 The exclusion of Libya from the EMP left a gaping geo-political hole in 
the regional construction. Moreover, as a major supplier of oil to Italy, and a 
perceived security 'threat', Libya's presence in Barcelona could only benefit the 
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EMP. Spanish Foreign Minister Javier Solana hinted that Libya might be 
allowed to participate, stating that 'it has not been ruled out that observers may 
be attending in one form or another. A8 However, Commissioner Manin was 
unsympathetic, arguing that Libya had not entered into 'contractual relations' 
with the EU, an unwritten prerequisite of participation. 49 Moreover, in view of 
A- - the continuing impasse over the Lockerbie and UTA bombings, the prospect of 
British and French foreign ministers sitting alongside Libyan leaders was always 
50 
unlikely. In the end, the problem was resolved when Colonel Gadhaffi's 
51 
retracted his government's request to attend. 
A second problem concerned requests by the Arab League, Russia and the 
USA to attend the conference as official observers. The traditional security 
interests of the superpowers in Mediterranean, and the involvement of Egypt, 
Israel, Jordan and Syria in the EMP, elevated the status of the event. France and 
Spain were especially guarded about the USA's presence. As a French foreign 
ministry spokesperson put it, 'the Barcelona Conference is only for Europeans 
and Mediterraneans, and the USA is neither. 52 In the Spanish press, the USA 
stood accused of trying to 'get in by the back door. ' 53 Ultimately, the EU stuck to 
its guns over the exclusivity of Barcelona, and the 'outsiders' were only invited 
to observe the opening plenary session. 
A host of problems arose with the text of the Declaration during the 
month before the conference, forcing several re-drafts of the document. In 
particular, the wording of the Political and Security chapter drew strong 
objections from a number of Middle Eastern countries. Syria, backed by the 
Palestinians, questioned sections on self-determination and the fight against 
terrorism, arguing that armed conflicts over occupied territories should not be 
defined as terrorism, but as 'legitimate struggles'. 
54 Egypt, along with Syria, also 
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attempted to use the Barcelona Declaration to force Israel to sign up to the 
nuclear non-proliferation treaty. 55 
Decisions about the institutional format for implementing the Barcelona 
process started taken in October 1995, after lengthy arguments in Coreper about 
how the EU itself should be represented. A 'Senior Officials Committee' 
comprising Ambassadors and other high-ranking foreign ministry personnel was 
established to oversee the political and security partnership. In an attempt to 
preserve the sanctity of the Union's institutional procedures, Belgium and 
Luxembourg argued that only the Troika should represent the Union. 56 France, 
however, concerned that its input into the Barcelona process would be 
diminished after it left the Troika, argued for the full participation of all the 
Member States. The eventual compromise stipulated that the Troika would 
represent the Union, but that the other Member States could attend meetings and 
intervene if the chair permitted it. 57 
The other two chapters were to be overseen by the 'Euro-Med 
Committee' in which the Member States were represented only by the Troika. 
The Commission, as well as all twelve partners, were represented in both 
Committees. For the Commission, these formulae confumed its position as 
manager of the Barcelona process. Only as the implementation process get 
underway did the political and practical implications of this institutional 
architecture become clear. 
3. The Barcelona Process 
It was hard to avoid being swept along by the tide of euphoria generated by the 
Barcelona conference. Pictures of Israeli, Lebanese, Palestinian and Syrian 
representatives standing together in the Catalan sunshine captured the very 
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essence of the so-called 'Barcelona spirit'. One commentator likened it to the 
1955 Messina conference. 58 As Bichara Khader observes, 'those who dared to 
express scepticism about the project of "partnership" were described as 
"Cassandras"'. 59 The diplomatic momentum started by the conference initially 
seemed to be sustained when the Council Presidency passed to Italy. Detailed 
schedules for follow-up meetings covering much of the Work Programme were 
drawn up by the Italians, under the energetic chairmanship of Ambassador 
Antonio Badini. 60 
However, the euphoria proved short-lived as the limitations of the process 
and the highly sensitive nature of much of its subject matter became clear. 
Crucially, the Middle East Peace Process broke down early in 1997, effectively 
ending the rapprochement between the Arabs and Israelis. Expectations that the 
participants would set aside political differences in the interest of functional 
cooperation proved optimistic as the policy output of the EMP dwindled. 
Progress became little more than a matter of ensuring that the partners continued 
to come to the negotiating table. The second and third ministerial meetings in 
Malta (April 1997) and Palermo (June 1998), beset by arguments between the 
Israelis and Palestinians, produced little more than a balance sheet of the EMP. 
This section offers a chapter-by-chapter assessment of the Barcelona process. 
Political and Security Chapter 
The language of the political and security chapter was ambitious, committing the 
signatories to 'establishing a common area of peace and stability' and to 
upholding principles of human rights and fundamental freedoms, self- 
determination,, and territorial integrity. Drawing on principles from the CSCE, 
LN and other international agreements, the Political and Security Chapter was 
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intended to subject Mediterranean security to internationally, though not 
universally, accepted standards and rules of inter-state conduct. The signatories 
agreed to promote confidence and security building measures, to ensure the non- 
proliferation of nuclear weapons and to cooperate in the fight against terrorism. 
An undertaking was also made to examine the possibility of a stability pact, 
though it was expressly identified in the text as a long-term goal. 
Notwithstanding the ambiguity of terms like 'Peace' and 'stability' as 
policy objectives, the substance of the Political and Security Partnership clearly 
touched raw nerves. Both the Israeli and Syrian delegations reiterated their 
objections to its contents at post-Conference press briefings . 
61 Beyondthe 
semantic arguments,, issues such as terrorism, self-determination and territorial 
integrity were at the heart of conflicts in the region at both the inter-state and 
intra-state levels. Without any legal basis for the Declaration, there was little 
sense of how the first chapter would generate policy actions. As a Commission 
official conceded: 
We don't know how we are going to proceed. Do we start big discussions 
on human rights in the Mediterranean? I don't know. 62 
A stark contrast materialised between the maximalist rhetoric of the Declaration 
and the minimal measures proposed during the follow-up process. 
The fate of the stability pact initiative exemplified the contrasting 
preferences of the signatories on politico-security issues, as well as the difficulty 
of making the transition from dialogue to action. During the conference, France 
and Malta - the co-sponsors of the stability pact - pressed 
for it to be adopted as a 
priority measure in the follow-up to Barcelona. 
63 However, France's 
counterparts in the EU were rather less enthusiastic. Most preferred a cautious, 
incremental approach, fearing that formal multilateral commitments over security 
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might rebound on the Union given the unravelling of the Oslo peace accords. 64 
Despite the direct intervention of President Jacques Chirac's office, the French 
were forced to lower their sights, conceding that the charter should simply be 
4 something to help relations between all the Mediterranean countries. 965 At the 
Malta summit, the participants agreed to put their work on the pact on the back 
burner, to be resumed 'when political circumstances allow[ed]. 966 
The stalling effect of political developments in the Middle East masked a 
more fundamental reason for the lack of headway in the first chapter. The lack of 
appetite for new formal security arrangements was symptomatic of the EU's 
uneasiness about its identity in the politico-security sphere. Critics of the 
Barcelona process singled out the failure of the EU to its channel its input into 
the first chapter through the CFSp. 67 The European Parliament, for instance, 
argued that the political and security chapter affected the security of the Union as 
a whole, and that any initiatives taken should therefore be treated as CFSP 
actions. 68 It was a familiar claim: the EU stood a much better chance of 
achieving its objectives if it spoke with a single voice. However, even in the 
unlikely event of Member States unanimously agreeing specific common 
positions or joint actions on Mediterranean security measures, the EU possessed 
no independent defence/military capability to back such measures up. 
Mediterranean security experts concurred on the essential role of 'outsiders' - 
principally the USA, but also increasingly NATO - in the region . 
69 Bearing in 
mind the deeply entrenched differences between the member governments over 
the EU-NATO-WEU triangle, and the presence of the neutral EU Member 
States, the Barcelona process appeared ill-suited to pro-active, 'hard' security 
policy-making. 
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From the point of view of the Arab participants, the idea of a security 
4pact" was an unwelcome reminder of European colonialism in the Middle East, 
1 70 
stirring memories oe notorious Baghdad pact. They also doubted its 
relevance in the absence of progress in the Middle East Peace Process, seen as 
the major barrier to regional integration. An Egyptian official expressed the Arab 
position thus: 
We believe that it is premature at this time to talk about a stability pact. 
How can you talk about a stability pact when conflicts are still rampant in 
the Mediterranean? 71 
For most of the partners, the stability pact was also further evidence of the 
European side's excessive emphasis on the security strand in the EMP, to the 
detriment of the economic and human chapters. 72 A Maghrebi diplomat called 
for 
A greater balance between the three pillars. Of course, there are problems 
which occupy Southern Europe ... terrorism... drugs, but the security aspect 
shouldn't dominate. 73 
Almost by default, the leitmotif of the first chapter became low-level 
confidence-building, a generic label for any action that increased the regularity 
and transparency of inter-governmental contact on security matters. Work in the 
Senior Officials Committee was divided into six sectors: strengthening of 
democracy, preventive diplomacy, confidence and security building measures, 
disarmament and organised crime. Gradually, a list of operational measures was 
assembled, funded and coordinated by the EU. They included: 
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Figure 4.2 Programme for the first chapter of the Barcelona Process 
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None of these measures could be described as ground-breaking, but they 
did serve a useful function by creating a network of security experts comprising 
of academics, diplomats, and even military personnel. 75 Frequent conferences, 
seminars, training sessions and the exchange of information on a variety of 
security-related subjects, if nothing else, built confidence and promoted 
awareness of the EMP among an influential group of actors. At the same time, 
though, there was a sense that the network was merely covering old ground, 
albeit in a more systematic way. A member of Euromesco suggested that: 
Euromesco is preparing many studies on topics already known. In a way, 
the EU is just spending money to duplicate research that has been done 1000 
times. 76 
For the participating govenu-nents, the chief merit of the political and 
security chapter was that it offered them a low-visibility talking shop. The 
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ie---- liarity bred by the process was important, since it allowed dialogue to ami 
continue even when a number Of Participants were refusing to meet each other 
outside. As Spencer argues, 
the utility of CBMs is perceived to derive from their gradual creation of an 
atmosphere of mutual trust, transparency and predictability - in slow and 
incremental steps, if need be - in order to provide alternatives to 
confrontation and conflict where differences between states recur or have 
been enflamed, or where new points of contention have arisen. 77 
In view of the Barcelona Declaration" s commitment to non-interference with 
existing conflict resolution initiatives,, expectations of what the first chapter 
might accomplish inevitably had to be lowered. 
The Economic and Financial Partnership 
The economic and financial chapter was the centrepiece of the Barcelona process, 
and the 'engine' of the EMP, committing the signatories to establishing one of 
the world's largest free trade zones by 2010; a potential market of 800 million 
people. The measures set out in the Barcelona Work Programme were designed 
to complement the Euro-Mediterranean agreements by stimulating regional 
economic integration, inward investment and infrastructural development, and by 
setting out guidelines for the management of common resources (environment, 
water). As one official put it, 'Barcelona [was] a launching pad. It provide[d] 
the value-added at the multilateral level to support the bilateral. -)78 
As an integral component of the EU's long-term strategy, the second 
chapter laid down the methodology by which a framework of economic 
governance would be extended to the region, and underscored the neo-liberal 
orthodoxy inherent in the EMP . 
79 The Work Programme earmarked the 
harmonisation of import/export procedures, rules and standards as the priority for 
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the implementation process. Provisions relating to the extension of existing co- 
operation in fields such as energy, rural development,, technology transfer, 
technical assistance for business co-operation and investment were all directed 
towards readying the partners for the shock of a rapid transition to free trade. 
Laced with a heavy dose of the EU's own self- interest, the second 
chapter was premised on a highly selective externalisation of the EU's single 
market model utilising a methodology already employed in the Union's eastern 
enlargement strategy. The Work Programme added-up to a wish-list of issues on 
which the Union's objectives could best be met through multilateral action. For 
instance, the rapidly expanding presence of European investors in North Africa's 
gas industry would clearly benefit from the extra protection afforded by 
international agreements. At a relatively low cost to the Union - grants and EIB 
loans, more 'dialogue', the exchange of technical expertise - it could 'buy' 
security of supply and a more conducive economic climate for investors. 
For the Mediterranean partners, the economic and financial partnership 
was the main attraction of the Barcelona process, promising further 
improvements in their access to the EU's markets, increased financial aid and the 
EU's assistance and expertise in restructuring their economies. Governments 
willingly bought the economists' argument that a multilateral economic 
relationship with the EU would 'lock-in' the credibility of domestic reform 
programmes, enabling them to reap the benefits of the free-trade initiative . 
80 A 
Mashreqi official's view was typical: 
Our national industry will suffer very much from the FTA. We have a very 
strong lobby against this agreement. Can you imagine competing with the 
giants in Europe? But we know there's no other way to liberalise. 81 
In reality, however, the peripheral role of the Mediterranean partners in 
the preparation phase, coupled with their relatively weak bargaining power vis-a- 
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vis the EU, left them little alternative other than to accept what was a flawed 
package from their point of view. Most criticisms from the partners were 
targeted at areas left out of the Declaration and Work Programme, and at the use 
of bilateral negotiations to set the terms of the free trade area, a method that 
enabled the EU to deal with each partner individually and rule out any possibility 
of collective bargaining. 82 Capital and goods would move increasingly freely 
throughout the region, labour would not. The Declaration made a brief reference 
to the liberalisation of trade in services, but no provisions for it were included in 
the Work Programme. 83 On foreign investment, regarded as a crucial 
determinant of the EMP's success, the Work Programme included only an 
unsubstantial pledge to 'help create a climate favourable to the removal of 
obstacles to investment, by giving greater though to the defmition of such 
obstacles. ' 
84 
The inconsistencies and paradoxes of the Barcelona process did not take 
long to surface. Three problems raised questions about the credibility of the 
Union's strategy. First, the Declaration made only a vague reference to the debt 
problem, stating that: 
The partners acknowledge the difficulties that the question of debt can 
create ... They agree, in view of the importance of their relations to continue 
the dialogue in order to achieve progress in the competent fora. 
By implication, the debt issue would continue to be handled by individual 
Member States in the London and Paris clubs, forums better known for their 
cautious conservatism than their forward thinking. An Algerian commentator 
summed up the partners' feelings on the subject: 'Can a partnership, in the equal 
benefit of both parties, be built between a "heavy" creditor and his debtor? 85 
Second, the EU's defensive stance in the bilateral negotiations with the 
individual partners sharply contrasted with the expansive language on free-trade 
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in the Barcelona process. Xavier Prats, Commissioner Marin"s cabinet 
spokesman on the Mediterranean, put the issue bluntly: 'the EU is selfish, but 
then so is everyone. The question is, who gets the better deal? -)86 only Morocco 
and Tunisia concluded their Euro-Mediterranean agreements before the 
Barcelona Conference, leading to a growing sense of the bilateral and multilateral 
tracks being out of synch. At the same time as the trade and industry ministers 
were meeting around the Mediterranean to discuss cooperation on industial and 
investment policies, so agriculture ministers were engaged in protracted battles 
over orange,, potato and rice quotas. 
A third problem arose out from the Member States' wrangling over the 
'MEDA' financial regulation. Having already fought a very public battle over the 
Mediterranean financial aid budget at the Cannes Summit, the Member States 
then proceeded to spend months engaged in disputes about the decision-making 
procedures attached to it. 87 In November 1995, progress of the MEDA 
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Ivegulation through Council stalled, according to one participant, 'because of a 
theological dispute between the UK and the other 15 over the voting mechanism 
used to suspend ftmding in the event of a human rights problem. 88 The UK 
demanded unanimity in Council on a Commission proposal to suspend funding, 
while the 14 favoured qualified majority voting. Occurring in the same month as 
the Barcelona Conference, it was hardly an encouraging signal for the partners. 
Following a compromise that postponed a decision until 1997, a ftirther dispute 
arose when Greece, along with the European Parliament, raised objections to the 
89 
application of MEDA to Turkey. Meanwhile, the disbursement of the funds 
was blocked. 
As in the first chapter, the implementation of the economic and financial. 
chapter started with meetings to agree 'common sectoral principles as the basis 
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for the alignment of policies in the sectors concerned. '90 Follow-up conferences 
were organised in a bewildering range of sectors,, many of which simply led to 
finiher meetings. (See Appendix 2). 
As was the case with the first chapter, the principal benefit of the second 
chapter was its construction of networks of actors - principally businesses and 
consultancies - from all the partner countries. Getting private business interests 
on board was essential to the free-trade initiative. The Mediterranean region 
accounted for only two per cent of total overseas investment by EU businesses, 
limiting the assumed stabilising effect of economic integration. Much of the 
work undertaken after Barcelona therefore focused on increasing incentives for 
capital investment. Investors guides, funded by the Commission, were compiled 
for each of the partners. Networks of chambers of commerce and economic 
institutes were mandated to improve the flow of business information and 
increase awareness of investment opportunities. MEDA funds were provided for 
European consultancies to advise small and medium-sized enterprises in the 
partner countries, and to oversee the implementation ofjoint projects between 
EU and third country businesses. While there were some problems starting up 
business development projects in partner countries with underdeveloped 
investment regimes, the emergence of an ethos ofjoint participation was 
nevertheless a sign of progress. 
The Social, Cultural and Human Affairs Chapter 
The third chapter of the Barcelona Declaration was intended to integrate 'civil 
society' into the process and instigate 'cultural dialogue' and 'exchanges at 
human, scientific and technological level. ' The range of subjects covered in the 
Declaration and Work Programme was impressive, identifying numerous new 
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avenues of cooperation in areas such as education, human health, democratic 
practices, migration, terrorism, drug trafficking, international crime, corruption 
and racism. Such issues were an essential element in the new thinking on 
secun 
On the face of it, the incorporation of a socio-cultural dimension in the 
EMP was a laudable objective, and one lacking in previous incarnations of EU 
Mediterranean policy. At the same time, however, it was fraught with 
difficulties, opening up the EU to accusations of neo-colonialism and of a 
6continued proclivity for imposing its cultural and social values on the 
developing world. '91 Moreover, as Colas argues, 'the invocation of civil society 
at inter-governmental. conferences like the one held at Barcelona has been mainly 
rhetorical. -)92 The Work Programme struck an uneasy balance between 
progressive language on cultural and social issues, and tough passages on crime, 
drug trafficking, migration and terrorism that were arguably the Union's real 
pnon les. 
The biggest shortcoming of the third chapter was its failure to recognise 
that civil society needed to be given a free rein by governments if the principles 
of the Declaration were to be implemented. Given the authoritarian nature of 
governments in a number of the Mediterranean partner countries, the latitude of 
action for non-govermnental organisations was invariably narrow. Cooption of 
certain approved organisations and social movements, and suppression of 
opposition, was the norm in the Maghreb. Thus, social movements and NGOs 
which bought into the agenda set by states were actually limiting the possibilities 
of extending transnational links among civil societies operating on both shores of 
the Mediterranean. 93 Perhaps the best example of the inherent paradoxes in the 
third chapter arose during preparations for the Helsinki Ministerial Conference on 
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the Environment in November 1997. Several Arab-Mediterranean governments 
demanded that NGOs originating from their states should receive official 
accreditation before being allowed to participate. 94 As one official argued, we 
have to find a place for NGOs, but in most of these countries NGOs represent the 
opposition. 05 
The principal benefits of the third chapter were arguably felt outside the 
Barcelona process itself. On the fringes of the Conference, a Euro-Med Civil 
Forum was established, organised and funded by the Catalun-ya's Communidad 
Autonoma, the European Commission, the EU's Economic and Social 
Committee, the Spanish Foreign Ministry and UNESCO. Around 1200 
representatives from 700 social bodies participated in the first forum which 
discussed issues ranging from cooperation between SMEs to religious dialogue 
and inter-cultural exchanges. Less visible, though potentially more politically 
significant, was the 'Alternative Mediterranean Conference' attended by 2000 
delegates from 300 associations including anti-racist movements, trade unions 
and NGOs. It challenged the state-led nature of the Barcelona process, singling 
out the dominance of trade liberalisation and the involvement in the process of 
authoritarian governments. 96 
By the time of the Malta summit, the number of initiatives underway in 
the third chapter had mushroomed. At the second meeting of the Euro-Med 
Forum one participant summarised progress thus: 
Many events, fora, workshops and new networks have cropped up all over 
the Mediterranean. The difficulty of drawing up a report of activities and 
initiatives is evident and discriminatory. At the time of the Malta meeting, 
We are unfortunately unable to establish a complete inventory of all the 
activities and their development. 97 
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The fact that appraising the third chapter was so difficult suggests that at least 
one of the aims of the exercise - to stimulate de-centralised cooperation between 
non-govemmental actors was well underway. 
4. The Impact of the Barcelona Process on EU Foreign Policy 
For Eberhard Rhein, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership 'underscored the 
ambition of the EU to speak for the whole of Europe. ' 98 Certainly, the Barcelona 
process was dominated from start to finish by the Union at both the agenda 
setting and implementation phases. As Rhein goes on to argue, 'those countries 
still staying outside the EU have hardly any other option but to follow, at least 
implicitly, the lines decided by the EU. '99 The close adherence by the Member 
States to the Commission's 1994 proposals on the EMP demonstrated the high 
degree of commitment to the European Union as the most appropriate level at 
which to pursue a proactive Mediterranean policy. That their political investment 
in the Mediterranean was backed by a substantial financial commitment further 
strengthened the strategic coherence of the EMP. 
As far as the EMP's impact on EU foreign policy was concerned, the 
principal gains were derived from the institutional architecture attached to the 
Barcelona process. For instance, one of the main concerns of the Mediterranean 
EU Presidencies responsible for drafting the Barcelona agenda was the fact that 
the chairmanship of the two implementation committees would pass successively 
to smaller, non-Mediterranean Member States. The assumption was that for the 
small Presidencies, sustaining the momentum generated by France, Spain and 
Italy would be a problem. 100 Yet there was no evidence to suggest that the 
subsequent Irish and Dutch Presidencies allowed the process to slow down. The 
two ensured a full schedule of meetings and managed to hold the process together 
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when the ailing Middle East Peace Process threatened to blow it apart. The 
impressive performance of the Irish and Dutch owed much to the skilful 
diplomacy of their respective foreign ministries. However, it must also be 
attributed to an effective balance having been struck between the roles of the 
Council and Commission. 
The Commission was arguably the major beneficiary from the Barcelona 
process. DGIB was granted responsibility for coordinating the follow-up process 
in all three chapters, alongside the Council Presidency. From the outset, the 
Commission used its power judiciously, deliberately proposing several actions in 
the first chapter which required funds from the MEDA budget. In doing so, it 
exploited a backdoor route to circumventing the arbitrary distinction made 
between pillars I and II of the Maastricht treaty. Politico-security policy was 
being made, funded and administered by the Community, rather than by purely 
inter-governmental agreements among the Member States. 
The willingness of the Member States to accept this formula resulted, 
firstly, from the interdependent nature of the various elements in the Barcelona 
programme. Put simply, the Member States had no other option. Secondly, 
separating the political from the economic had become increasingly impractical 
in the context of the EU. Articles J. 5 and J. 9, Title V of the Treaty on European 
Union provided for the participation of the Commission in matters relating to the 
CFSP, and included the possibility of policy initiation in certain circumstances. 
The Commission was part of the EU's delegation to the Senior Officials 
Committee. All could agree that the ability of it and the Council Secretariat to 
ensure effective co-ordination between first and second pillar matters was crucial 
to the programme's success. 
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The multilateral nature of the Barcelona process made Mediterranean 
security a joint undertaking. Essentially a rolling political dialogue, the EU's 
objectives for Mediterranean security could be pursued in an environment where 
agreements would be reached among 27 governments. One effect of this 
inclusive approach was to remove some of the potential for antagonism which 
tended to hamper unilateral political action by the EU. In this sense, the 
Barcelona process has also perhaps given the EU the capacity for proactive 
security policy-making by another means. More generally, the innovative 
an roach to decision-making in the Barcelona process, and in particular the Up 
Member States' willingness to accept the new arrangements in the interests of a 
coherent strategy, may significantly improve the EU's capabilities in the sphere 
of foreign policy. 
Conclusions 
The EU's new Mediterranean policy may fairly be described as 'nothing but a 
political deal with Europe offering its advice, its moral presence, its vast political 
and economic experience and, of course, sizeable financial cooperation to those 
determined to tackle their problems effectively. '101 Perhaps the most telling 
observation about the Barcelona process is that it concerns 'the management, 
rather than the transformation, of [EU-Mediterranean] relations. ' 
102 Excessive 
expectations about the Barcelona process are probably unwise, especially given 
persistmg impasse between the Arabs and Israelis. But the idea behind it - 
functional cooperation - is a realistic and arguably laudable one. 
The gradual 
extension of a negotiated order in the Mediterranean, beginning with the 
establishment of cooperative networks and moving towards multilateral 
agreements is undoubtedly laying the foundations for future regional integration, 
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something all the participants recognise as a necessary and positive development. 
Whether or not political 'spillover' - the creation of a culture of regional 
cooperation at all levels of government - follows remains to be seen. 
Much depends on the maintenance of momentum by the EU and on the 
commitment of all sides to make the follow-up process effective. In this respect, 
whether or not the Mediterranean retains its current salience for the Member 
States will be crucial, since the effectiveness of this multilateral track of the 
Union's strategy is unlikely to become clear until well into the next millennium. 
With eastern enlargement looming, there is a danger that the Barcelona process 
may fade into the background as the Union's financial and political resources are 
diverted to the task of integrating the CEECs. 
Although still far from being the finished article, the Barcelona process 
has given EU Mediterranean policy a much clearer structure and coverage of a far 
wider range of issues than had previously been the case. Moreover, there is now 
a clearer strategic direction to the policy, with a specific final objective, a free 
trade area, and a more or less precise target date for achieving it. If the 
Europeans can rise to the challenge they have set themselves and undertake 
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Chapter 5 
THE POLITICS OF MEDITERRANEAN POLICY: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 
This chapter attempts to conceptually 'unpack' EU Mediterranean policy, 
employing different theoretical perspectives to explain the policy process that took 
the EMP from a plan of action to substantive policy outputs. Section I considers 
the characteristics of the EMP as policy area, comparing it with eastern 
enlargement and setting it in the wider context of Euro-Mediterranean relations. 
Adapting Theodore Lowi's classic taxonomy of policy types, it takes up the 
argument that every policy area should first be categorised before having theory 
applied to it. ' It breaks down the EMP into four more or less discrete categories: 
distributive, redistributive, constituent and regulatory. Each category is subject to 
different 'logics' or dynamics that govern. how decisions are made and to specific 
patterns of bargaining and negotiation. The relative influence of actors involved 
in the policy-making process, both governmental and supranational, also varies 
with the policy t)Te. 2 
This argument that 'policy matters' is linked in section 2 to an analysis of 
3 the impact of intergovernmental Politics on the EMP. It contends that the EMP 
was not simply a product of the self-interested behaviour of the Member States, 
and that negotiating outcomes on specific issues were not effectively pre- 
determined by the preferences and power of govermnents, as intergovernmentalist 
theories tend to assume. 4 While Member States' economic interests were 
certainly decisive at given points, policy also developed in ways which cannot be 
understood by looking at govermnental Preferences in isolation. Ideas, geo- 
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politics and ideology, factors that are not easily accounted for by rational choice, 
interest-based theories, must also figure in an explanation of the EMP. 
Section 3 engages with the institutionalist claim that institutions have a 
significant role in determining policy outcomes, and have policy 'preferences' in 
5 
their own right. The parts played by the EU's institutions in the EMP varied 
according to their formal, treaty-bound competencies, to the negotiating and 
decision making procedures that applied on given issues, and to the unique 
features of the Barcelona process. The focus here is on the roles of the 
Commission, the Council Presidency and Secretariat and the European Parliament 
in the policy process. 
1. Conceptualising the EMP 
What are the salient features of the EU's Mediterranean strategy for the way 
policy subsequently developed? The first feature is a self-evident one: 
Mediterranean policy is unequivocally external policy. With the exceptions of 
Cyprus and Malta (and arguably Turkey), the Mediterranean partners are not 
eligible for membership of the Union, and are not being prepared for future 
membership. The range of instruments available is therefore restricted to 
(accession substitutes', limiting the potential for genuinely innovative policy. 6 
The 'templates' of accession substitutes and the rules governing their use are 
deeply entrenched in the EU's acquis politique, set down in the treaty articles 
which stipulate the legal bases and decision-making procedures for negotiating 
with third countries. Trade and Association Agreements have become the Union's 
modus operandi in external economic relations, leading to what Paul Pierson 
labels '-accumulated policy constraints. " 7 Admittedly, there is still sufficient 
flexibility in the EU's external policy system to allow for innovation dic 
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Barcelona process is an obvious example - and for these standard policy 
instruments to be incrementally modified - exemplified by the change from Trade 
and Cooperation agreements to Euro-Mediterranean Agreements. But the history 
of EU external relations has been consistently conservative and defensive of the 
status quo. Mediterranean policy is, to a considerable extent, 'path dependent. 
To understand the significance of using '-accession substitutes' as the basis 
for policy, it is worth briefly comparing the EU's relations with the CEECs and 
the Mediterranean non-members. Both regions are of fundamental geo-political 
importance to the EU. Both represented key tests for EU foreign policy in the 
early 1990s. However, the Union's relationships with the CEECs quickly became 
an internal issue when the Union decided to offer the Visegyad four membership. 9 
Accession presents the Union with a policy challenge of a fundamentally higher 
order than association. As Friis observes, the accession process forces the 
Member States 'to embark on a major internal renegotiation' with long-term 
implications for the Union's existence. 10 Enlargement is also highly politicised, 
provoking often bitter and protracted debate among the Member States about how 
the financial burden of integrating economies in transition should be shared. The 
economic and political costs and benefits associated with enlargement in terms of 
its impact on individual economic sectors, EU policies and the Member States 
themselves are usually more or less precisely established before accession actually 
takes place, providing a clear indication of who stands to gain and who stands to 
lose from the process. 
By contrast, the EU's Mediterranean strategy required comparatively 
minor internal adjustments and little substantive renegotiation of the existing 
tenns of EU-MNC relations. Since trade with the Mediterranean partners had 
long been regulated by the EU, the potential costs of any proposed changes to 
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import quotas were readily available prior to negotiations. That is not to say that 
Mediterranean policy was apolitical. Specific issues such as agricultural import 
quotas, the MEDA budget and the immigration clauses in the Euro-Mediterranean 
agreements were highly politicised. But the point here is that the EU's 
Mediterranean strategy was largely concerned with reorganising the management 
of relations with the partner countries. Eastern enlargement aims to -transform 
the 
candidates in the short-run, and has huge transformative implications for both the 
EU's policies and its institutions. 
A second feature of the Mediterranean strategy was its focus on long-tenn 
change, which had a number of implications for policy development. The 
emphasis was on addressing a problem - Mediterranean security - which all the 
Member States accepted, to varying degrees, as a common problem. " Bargaining 
between the Member States over the Union's strategic objectives in the 
Mediteffanean, though certainly relevant, was not decisive in the early stages of 
the EMP. 12 Defining a 'Mediteffanean strategy' was the Commission's 
responsibility, backed by the agenda-setting advocacy of the southern Member 
States. 13 
This distinction between problem solving and bargaining in the EU policy 
14 
process, originally identified by Fritz Scharpf, is an important one. Problem 
solving involves a search for the most efficient and effective solution to a common 
problem. Rather than simply trying to minimise costs to themselves and protect 
national interests, characteristics of a bargaining approach, Member States assess 
the 'common utility' of policy. 15 While there is scant evidence that the Member 
States carefully calculated the utility of pursuing the EMP, they undoubtedly saw 
long-term benefits in it. Where bargaining did periodically play a decisive part in 
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shaping the EMP was in the negotiation of specific Policy measures (see Section 
2). 
A third feature of the EMP is that it represents only one level in an 
expanding network of regional and sub-regional governance, which includes 
organisations such as the Arab Maghreb Union, the Middle East and North Africa 
economic summits, nascent economic integration projects in the Middle East, and 
a host of NGOs dedicated to functional cooperation in areas such as 
envirom, nental protection of the Mediterranean sea. 16 To this list must be added 
the multilateral financial institutions - the IMF and World Bank - and creditor 
groups such as the Paris Club which virtually control socio-economic 
development strategies in many of the partner countries. 
The most important of the alternative channels remains bilateral relations 
between EU Member States and the partner countries. In policy areas where 
neither the EU nor the EMP are mandated to act, or where concurrent 
competencies operate, member governments retain 4 privileged bilateral rights' to 
pursue their own commercial and political objectives and deploy their own set of 
policy instruments. 17 When Algeria opened up its natural gas industry to foreign 
investors, the southern EU govenunents were swift to put together attractive 
credit packages to support the investment activities of national companies. The 
Italian government's decision to sign a 'friendship' accord with Libya in July 
1998, part of a subtle campaign to bring that notable absentee into the Euro- 
Mediterranean fold, potentially set it against the UK, France and the official EU 
line. 18 The point here is that, regardless of the existence of the EMP, traditional, 
inter-state diplomacy and national foreign policies continue to exercise 
considerable influence over international relations in the region. 
19 In signing up to 
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the EMP, the Member States were not transferring new foreign Policy powers to 
the EU. 
To summarise, the EMP did not herald sweeping changes to the EUIs 
internal order. Although the strategy promised greater depth in the Union's 
economic and political relations with the partner countries, it simply did not 
irrevocably affect the Union's future. Seen in the broader context of international 
order in the region, it was only one channel for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, 
and only one vehicle to promote soft security. We would therefore expec the 
Mediterranean strategy to have been agreed without a great deal of political 
controversy, implying a strong role for the Commission and weaker role for 
governmental interests in policy development. That the EU had agreed on how to 
approach the Mediterranean security problem, mattered far less than the deal it 
was ultimately prepared to offer the partner countries. 
Understanding how flesh was put on the bones of the Mediterranean 
strategy requires analysis of the policy types that comprised the EMP package, and 
specifically to the negotiating processes associated with each of these types. 
While the 'path dependency' of the Euro-Mediterranean agreements limited the 
potential for terms of trade to be changed by hard bargaining, negotiations within 
the EU and between the EU and individual partner countries nevertheless 
determined outcomes on all the key issues. Likewise, the funds available for the 
MEDA budget were largely pre-determined by previous budgetary agreements, but 
the precise figure was set by negotiation. The Barcelona Declaration was almost 
entirely the product of intergovenunental negotiations. 
As Likke Friis argues, 'any issue area negotiations can probably [italics in 
onginal] only be understood by conceptualising the various issue area logics 
which are at play. 20 The notion of multiple logics is an especially apposite one in 
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the context of the EMP since each of its components was subject to distinct 
negotiation and decision-making procedures. The Euro-Mediterranean 
agreements were negotiated on the basis of Articles 3 00 and 3 10 of the EU Treaty, 
giving the Commission responsibility for conducting the negotiations, the Council 
the duty to conclude the agreement by unanimous endorsement of the Member 
States and the Parliament the right to be consulted during the negotiations and to 
give its assent. A different logic operated for the Barcelona process, the content 
of which was prepared by the Member States in collaboration with the 
Commission and the partner countries. The negotiating process was a mixture of 
standard agenda setting by the Union's Council Presidency, ad hoc consultations 
between the participating governments, and the drafting of a series of documents 
leading to the Barcelona Declaration and Work Programme. After the Barcelona 
conference, the process switched to a typical multilateral format, permitting any 
participant to propose measures, and requiring unanimous agreement for measures 
to be implemented. The MEDA budget also had its own distinct logic, with the 
Commission proposing projects, the Member States giving their approval in a 
regulatory committee, and the allocation of funds being open to competitive 
tendering among private organisations. 
One way of making sense of these multiple logics is to break down the 
EMP into Theodore Lowi's four-fold taxonomy of policy types: distributive, re- 
distributive, constituent and regulatory. 21 The essence of Lowi's argument is that 
'policies determine politics'. 22 Each type is subject to different decision-making 
procedures, involves different constellations of actors in the policy-making 
process and has type-specific costs and benefits associated with it. 
23 A corollary 
of this differentiation is that the degree of politicisation varies according to the 
policy category and to the individual issue at stake. Many aspects of distributive 
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policy, for instance, may well be treated as 'technical' issues at the bureaucratic 
level (by the Commission) while redistributive issues tend to be resolved at the 
political level (Council). 24 
That said, predicting how politicised a particular issue will be, and the 
likely outcome of negotiations, is an uncertain business. As William Wallace 
argues: 
The art of policy-making is partly a matter of correctly assessing the 
broadness or narrowness, the political sensitivity or technical complexity, of 
successive issues. The definition of and redefinition of issues is thus a 
subjective process, with plenty of room for political intervention and 
redirection. 25 
The Union had considerable experience of negotiating with the partner countries, 
and many of the issues at stake in the EMP were familiar from previous 
negotiating rounds, but neither side entered into the substantive stage of the EMP 
with a clear idea of the specific problems that would arise. Twenty seven 
governments were involved, with an attendantly diverse range of demands, 
expectations and interests. Negotiations extended to fluid issues such as the 
changing market situation within the Union, assessments of the individual 
financial needs of each partner country and the identification of the priorities for 
cooperation. Moreover, negotiators effectively operated at three levels, searching 
for agreements that satisfied domestic interests, were mutually acceptable to the 
EU and to the partner countries and fulfilled the objectives of the partnership 
strategy. 26 Much, therefore, remained to be settled in the normal course of 
intergovermnental and institutional politicking. 
Distributive politics in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership centred on 
sharing the costs of renegotiating trade concessions in the association agreements, 
in allocating MEDA funds to the partner countries, and apportioning public 
4 goods' such as technical assistance. Two factors militated against politicisation 
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of the distributive dimension of the EMP. First, trade concessions in the Euro- 
Mediterranean agreements were to be negotiated against the background of 
patterns of imports and exports, a constraint accepted by the Commission, 
Member States and partner countries. Second, there was no suggestion that the 
existing apportiomnent of financial resources aniong the partner countries would 
change. 
Nevertheless, it was easy to predict that several distributive issues would 
prove highly disputatious. Even a cursory glance at the history of EU 
Mediterranean policy would point to problems over agricultural import quotas. 
Given the diversity of the partner states" trade with the Union, the range of 
contentious issues inevitably varied from negotiation to negotiation. Each partner 
govenunent had certain products for which they sought substantial new 
concessions from the Union. Similarly, certain products also presented particular 
difficulties for individual Member States. Finding solutions to the more 
politicised distributive issues was largely dependent on what the Union was 
prepared to offer. In other words, outcomes were determined by internal needs not 
external demands. 
The redistributive politics of the EMP revolved around the question of 
how the additional funding eannarked for the Mediterranean would affect other 
priorities for the Union's external spending, principally the European 
Development Fund (EDF) and aid to the CEECs. This dimension of policy 
revolved to an even greater extent around negotiations within the EU. The partner 
governments might have pressed for increased aid, but the decision over resource 
allocation was the EU's alone. Although Mediterranean policy briefly became 
highly politicised in the run up to the 1995 Cannes Summit, once the funding 
decision was taken, redistributive politics slipped into the background. 
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The constituent (or constitutive) aspect of the EMP emerged in the 
institutional architecture created to serve the Barcelona process. Constitutive 
politics refers to a situation 'whereby the Member States [in the EMP's case, the 
27 participants] adopt a series of decision rules, and in some cases create new 
institutions, for subsequent policy-making. 27 The EMP was internally 
constitutive in that new institutional structures and procedures, such as the Euro- 
Mediterranean Committee, the Senior Officials Committee and the MEDA budget 
line, had to be devised. The EMP was externally constitutive in that it gave rise to 
the Barcelona Declaration and spawned a plethora of new multilateral forums. 
Given the consensual multilateralism of the Barcelona process, it might be 
expected that the partners would have been more closely in designing the EMP's 
institutional architecture. However, the EU patently had the upper hand in 
devising the Barcelona framework and European initiatives dominated the agenda 
of the follow-up process. 
28 
The regulatory dimension of the EMP - Lowi's fourth policy type - 
manifested itself in the legislative changes forced on the Mediterranean partners 
by the need to adapt their import and export regimes to the requirements of Euro- 
Mediterranean agreements (customs duties, tariff systems) and by administrative 
changes agreed in the context of the Barcelona process. As the Commission's 
dispute with Israel during 1998 over the abuse of rules of origin showed, this 
aspect of Mediterranean policy could occasionally become highly politicised. 
However, such examples were rare, since many of the partners were already in the 
process of implementing comprehensive economic reforms as part of INff 
structural adjustment programmes and moving towards trade liberalisation in the 
context of the GATT agreements. 29 
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Pigeon-holing the components of the EMP into these discrete categories 
does not cover every angle of the POlicY-making process. Several decisions, 
including NEDA, could be placed in more than one category, and there was 
always a strong element of subjectivity in the way issues were def 30 ined. 
Furthermore, the renegotiated aspects of the ENT unzipped old issues and created 
the potential for their politicisation or re-politicisation. But it does offer a neat 
framework for policy analysis. The next task is to integrate intergovernmental and 
institutional politics. 
2. Governments, Interests and the Policy Process 
The preferences (interests) that Member States advanced and defended in the 
Mediterranean policy process clearly mattered. There was patently demand, 
chiefly expressed by the southern EU Member States, for 'more' Mediterranean 
policy. France, Italy, Spain and Greece could each legitimately claim to have real 
and wide-ranging, if not vital, domestic interests in the elaboration of a more 
comprehensive EU policy. All the Member States had a commercial presence of 
some sort in the partner countries' markets. Even those states without obvious 
security interests in the Mediterranean were persuaded that policy change was in 
the Union's general interest. In narrower terms, governmental preferences were 
undeniably critical in the final stages of negotiations on the Euro-Mediterranean 
agreements and in the MEDA budget decision. 
At first sight, the most appropriate theoretical tools for understanding the 
relationship between governmental preferences, negotiation and outcomes in the 
formulation and negotiation of the EMP are to be found in interest-based analyses. 
A strong case exists for the utilisation of theories that capture the 
interplay 
between domestic interests and the behaviour of governments in the EU policy- 
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making process. 31 Diplomats and politicians not only bargain with each other, 
they must also ensure that any agreement reached is acceptable to their domestic 
constituencies. An especially relevant example of this interactive process was the 
negotiation of Morocco's Euro-Mediterranean agreement, during which the 
French, Portuguese and Spanish governments faced vociferous lobbying and 
protests from farmers and other producers at home over concessions on tornatoes,, 
sardines and oranges. Simultaneously they faced pressure from the Commission, 
other Member States and the Moroccan government to reach an acceptable 
agreement. 
Arguably the most complete and compelling theoretical tool on offer is 
Andrew Moravcsik's 'liberal-intergovemmentalism', which explains European 
integration as the product of preference-based negotiations between govermnents. 
32 Moravcsik's central claim is that the EU's 'grand bargains' - treaty negotiations 
- and resultant policies such as the CAP, EMU and the single market - proceed in 
a causal sequence that sees governments rationally formulating preferences based 
primarily on dominant domestic economic interests, bargaining with other EU 
governments to secure the benefits of policy cooperation, then pooling or 
delegating sovereignty in the EU in order to 'lock in' commitments to 
cooper ion. 
33 
Through this intergovernmentalist lens, the EMP might be explained as the 
product of the Member States need to cooperate in order to maximise the 
commercial advantages of producers in Mediterranean markets and to improve the 
34 
management of economic relationships with the partner countries. Qualified 
trade liberalisation in the Euro-Mediterranean agreements undoubtedly served the 
interests of EU manufacturers and suppliers of capital goods. The exclusion of 
agricultural trade from the free-trade initiative also fits Moravcsik's analysis: 'The 
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greater the competitiveness of third country producers, the greater the pressure for 
external protection. 05 Furthermore, much of the work in the second chapter of 
the Barcelona process was intended to create an economic environment more 
amenable to trade and investment, with European businesses being the principal 
beneficiaries. 
Yet an intergovernmentalist approach goes only part of the way to 
accounting for the development of the EMP. First, as section I showed, the EMP 
cannot be regarded as the result of a grand bargain or history-making decision. 
Intergovemmentalist theory in general tends to be concerned with explaining the 
motives for inter-state cooperation and the establishment of international 
institutions rather than with the policy analysis. Mediterranean policy 'existed' 
well before the EMP, the Union's primary aims being effective modification and 
re-packaging rather than dramatic reform. There is therefore little to indicate that 
the development of the EMP followed the neat sequence described above. 
Second, rational choice theories, of which liberal intergovernmentalism is 
one, are ill-suited to explaining a policy in which ideas, rhetoric and symbolism 
often appeared to matter as much, if not more, than concrete interests. 36 Asked to 
explain his government's interests in relation to the EMP, this diplomat's response 
was typical: 
It is a good thing to aim at a stable situation in the partner countries, a big 
advantage to have a stable socio-economic and political environment. So 
partnership is important. The Mediterranean could threaten the EU. 
37 
It is hard to conceive of governments rationally configuring their preferences 
towards the kind of abstract strategic objectives that underpin the EMP. Regional 
peace, stability and prosperity are not the stuff of orderly, systematic governmental 
responses to domestic interests. 
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Third, the prominence of 'security' as a rationale for the EMP points 
towards a rather more substantive role for geopolitical factors than Moravcsik 
appears to favour. His argument is that only where the costs and benefits of 
cooperation are 'uncertain, balanced , or weak' do 'security externalities' really 
count. 38 Security interests might be cited as motives ex post, but they are almost 
always secondary to commercial interests. 39 Granted, definitions of the Union's 
geo-strategic interests in the Mediterranean tended to be ambiguous, but the rise in 
illegal immigration into southern Europe in the early 1990s, and the violence in 
Algeria that spilled over into France during 1995, were very real security 
problems. The point is not that Moravcsik dismisses security externalities. 
Rather, it is that his definition of how geopolitics and security influence 
governmental choices is perhaps too narrow, rooted in Cold War thinking on the 
subjects. 
Fourth, an intergovernmentalist approach manifestly fails to capture the 
complexity, fluidity and plurality of the process of negotiating a multi-faceted 
policy package like the EMP. As the negotiation of the Euro-Mediterranean 
agreements and implementation of the Barcelona process showed, the 
Commission possessed significant capacity for autonomous action in its own right 
(see Section 3). Other EU institutions also played important roles in the policy 
process. Add to the equation the interests of the 12 partner governments and the 
excessive parsimony of the kind of systematic game theoretic analysis on which 
intergovenunentalist theory is predicated is exposed. 
How should governmental preferences be factored into an explanation of 
the EMP? Clearly, in a manner that acknowledges that the weight of preferences 
vanes with the salience of the issue at stake, with the policy type, with the 
decision-making procedures that apply and with the wider context in which each 
144 
decision is made. The remainder of this section examines the broader cleavages 
in the Member States preferences towards the EMP, and assesses the impact of 
these preferences based on selected evidence from the Euro-Mediterranean 
agreement negotiations and the MEDA budget decision. 
A key cleavage in intergovermnental bargaining over the EMP was an 
outgrowth of the 'trade versus aid' debate, a traditional fault-line in the Union's 
external trade policy. 40 As a German diplomat explained: 
This discussion took place in the preparations for Barcelona. We, as others, 
the UK, the Netherlands, the Scandinavians, took the view that more 
influence should be given to the framework for private investment and less 
to public assistance. 41 
The 'trade versus aid' debate set those Member States with a liberal, laissez-faire 
prescription for economic development in the Mediterranean region against a 
group favouring a strategy that balanced trade liberalisation with a substantial aid 
component. The issue roughly divided the Member States across an east-west 
axis. Northern Member States (Denmark, Germany, the UK, Sweden and the 
Benelux states) firmly positioned themselves in the free-traders camp, while 
France, Spain and Italy tended to press for higher levels of aid and the 
maintenance of preferential trading arrangements. 
The reasons for this division appear self-evident. Southern Member States 
had more intense economic and security interests in the region than their northern, 
non-Mediterranean counterparts. It was, therefore, a matter of self-interest for 
them to persuade their counterparts to increase the EU's budget for the region in 
order to supplement (and in arguably substitute for) their own 'investment' in 
regional security, in the form of bilateral aid programmes and national 
defence/security policies. Consistent with this division, France and Spain were 
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the prime movers in pressing for a comprehensive and generous EU 
Mediteffanean policy. 
Returning briefly to intergovernmentalist theory, the southern group might 
reasonably have been expected to 'go the extra mile' on trade concessions, since 
A. 1- - 
uacy clearly stood to lose the most if satisfactory agreements were not reached 
with the partner countries. However, the Mediterranean Member States were 
caught between two stools on this issue. On the one hand, France, Italy and Spain 
expended much diplomatic effort during their respective Council Presidencies 
pushing the Union and the partners towards agreement. On the other hand, 
domestic interests in those countries were openly antagonistic towards Maghrebi 
importers, restricting their respective governments' room for manoeuvre in the 
Council. 
Here, liberal intergovernmentalism predicts 'side payments' in the form of 
financial compensation and other support for domestic producers adversely 
affected by the EMP, and the trading off of issues in package deals to balance 
losses with gains. The financial aid awarded to Portugal's sardine canning 
industry as compensation for concessions on Morocco's sardine import quota is a 
good example of a financial side-payment. Similarly, Morocco's successful ploy 
of linking its demands on tomato iMPort quotas to the renegotiation of a fishing 
agreement with the EU, of which Spanish fishermen were the main beneficiaries, 
provides a clear example of issue linkage. 
By contrast, the preferences of the northern Member States on import 
concessions ought to have been both more disposed to liberalisation and less 
intense than those of their southern counterparts. Yet both German and Dutch 
negotiators came under similarly concerted pressure from domestic producers 
(flower-growers) to stand their ground on quotas. As a Dutch diplomat observed: 
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We were always saying better trade than aid. But when it comes to 
agriculture, we are also protectionist. The Ministries of Economy and 
Finance, they are all for trade. The Ministry, they say "no", not one cut 
flower we can have. In the end though, trade is always better than aid. 42 
This ever present tension between ideological orientation and domestic 
political expediency lies at the heart of the often schizophrenic character of EU 
trade PoliCY. 
43 It also appears to confirm a basic assumption of Moravcsik's 
A- - theory: that governments will favour agreements whose net effect is to boost 
exports except where politically powerful, non-competitive producers stand to 
lose. 44 The broader pattern of negotiation in the EMP - liberalisation on non- 
sensitive issues, continued protection on sensitive issues - also appears to 
coffoborate this assumption. 
Nevertheless, there were instances of govenunental. concessions on 
politicised issues without obvious side-payments and issue linkage. The reason 
offered by a German official for his government's eventual decision to 
compromise over cut flowers suggests ideological motives: 
We conceded more than we intended on cut flowers. As usually in the final 
phase of negotiations, in the end it is excluded for us to block negotiations 
with any country. It is about our positive attitude to European integration. 
In the end, at least on this issue we got agreement. 45 
In similar vein, a British official argued: 
We do have agricultural interests as well, but Malcom Rifkind made it clear 
during the negotiations with Egypt and we are making it clear with Jordan 
that the development of trade and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership must 
be the priority. 46 
The point here is that the Union"s long-term strategic objectives, the 'greater 
good' of European integration and the imperative of concluding the agreements 
often outweighed very intense domestic pressures. 
A secondq broad cleavage divided the Member States into two camps 
according to their preference for deepening the EU's relationship with Central and 
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Eastern Europe or the Mediterranean, a division which at times harmed the 
internal cohesion of the COMMUnity. 47 Again, however, competition for resources 
between east and south was not a zero-sum game, and membership of either 
4camp' was not exclusive. France, under Edouard Balladur's premiership, sought 
to be an influential player in both directions, sponsoring the EU's stability pact 
initiative in Central and Eastern Europe, while at the same time calling for the 
Union to devote more resources to the Mediterranean. Germany is a major trading 
partner of the Mediterranean partners,, particularly Algeria and Egypt, and is also 
one of the top three aid donors to the region among the Member States. The fact 
that preferences on this issue were mutable was to play a crucial part in bargaining 
on the MEDA budget. 
The MEDA budget -a product of distributive, redistributive and 
constitutive decisions - was 'fought over tooth and nail' by the Member States. 48 
The decision was made against a background of several constraints that actually 
reduced the leverage of the member governments. First, any changes in funding 
had to comply with the EU"s total projected budget agreed at the Edinburgh 
European Council in 1992 (for the period 1993-9). Second, the Mediterranean 
faced stiff competition for funds from other regions, including the Central and 
Eastern European countries and Latin America. Third, the responsibility for 
deciding how much of the budget to bid for lay with the Commission. Fourth, the 
Mediterranean was not the EU's number one external budgetary priority at that 
time. A row over increased contributions to the European Development Fund for 
the Lomd countries topped the agenda, followed by pre-accession measures for the 
CEECs. 
The key players in the MEDA deal were the Commission, France, 
Gennany and Spain. Both the French and Spanish governments supported 
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Commissioner Manuel Marin's proposal of 5.5 billion ECUs, although the 
Spanish expressed concern that budgetary provisions for Latin America should not 
be adversely affected by any increase. 49 The Gennan government, by contrast, 
argued that, since most of the Mediterranean partners were not potential members 
of the EU, the existing balance in the distribution of resources, skewed in favour 
of the CEECs, should be preserved. 50 Its was an unequivocal attempt to maximise 
the budgetary allocation for its own back yard. Meanwhile, Finance Minister 
Theo Waigel was pressuring Chancellor Kohl to negotiate a reduction in 
Gennany's overall contribution to the EU budget. 51 COREPER proved unable to 
find a solution, leaving ministers to thrash out a deal at the Luxembourg General 
Affairs Council and subsequently at the Cannes European Council in June 1995.52 
The final deal in Cannes reduced the Commission's indicative figure to 4.7 
billion ECUs (1995-1999). A proportionate reduction from 7.1 billion ECUs to 
6.7 billion ECUs was agreed in the financial provision for the CEECs. Both 
regions lost out as a result of a compromise negotiated between the French, 
German and Spanish governments which increased contributions to the European 
Development Fund for Lome at the expense of other areas. 53 However, vigorous 
diplomacy by the Spanish delegation at Cannes convinced their German 
colleagues to accept that the original ratio of funds proposed by the Commission 
for the East and South should be retained. 54 
Up to a point, the : ftmction of govenunental preferences in the EMP does 
confonn to intergovemmentalist theory. Negotiators from the Member States 
clearly had to reconcile domestic interests with the need to reach agreement with 
the partner countries. Preferences varied according to the issue on the table and to 
its salience to governments, with predictably hard bargaining over agricultural 
quotas and finances. Outcomes on the most politicised issues were 
decided at a 
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political level, involving compromises and trade-offs. But intergovernmentalist 
theory can offer only a snapshot of the policy process, explaiming specific decision 
points at which governmental preferences were necessarily crucial. Agreements 
with third countries have to be concluded by the Member States in the Council 
(Article 300), while decisions about allocating funds from the EU budget also 
primarily rest with the Member States. To fully capture the dynamic nature of the 
policy process, institutional politics cannot be ignored. 
3. EU Institutions and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
The influence of the EU's institutions in policy-making is a matter for vigorous 
theoretical debate. Broadly speaking, intergovernmentalists see only marginal 
influence for the institutions, whose primary function is to act as guarantors for 
agreements between states. 55 Even in daily decision-making, the activities of the 
Commission, Parliament and the European Court of Justice are argued to 'stem 
primarily from the desire to lock-in credible national commitments. 56 
Institutionalists argue that institutions are political actors in their own right, 
capable of exercising supranational autonomy in policy-making and pursuing 
their own preferences. 57 This section explores the notion that 'institutions matter', 
assessing the parts played by the Commission, European Parliament and two of 
the Council's multiple institutions - the Presidency and Council Secretariat - in the 
EMP. 
The Commission 
The Commission was heavily involved in all aspects of the EMP, from the 
ideational stage right through to its implementation. In new institutionalist terms, 
it developed an 'endogenous institutional impetus for policy change that 
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58 exceed[ed] mere institutional mediation'. As the institutional memory bank of 
EU Mediterranean policy, it was in a strong position to push for policy change. 
As the EU's negotiator on the Euro-Mediterranean agreements, its creativity in 
finding mutually acceptable deals was essential. Its responsibility for coordinating 
the three chapters of the Barcelona Declaration made it the institutional engine of 
the Barcelona process. 
The Commission's agenda setting role in EU policy-making is now well- 
established in the literature, although studies tend to limit themselves to EU 
internal policies. 59 The institution has proved adept at maximising both its own 
competencies and those of the EU,, habitually pushing for 'more Europe. 60 Its 
formal right of initiation (Article 211), and the freedom it has to stimulate policy 
development in the EU's institutional structure, have made it an essential source 
of policy ideas and policy change. 
In the case of Mediterranean policy, DGlB had little difficulty getting the 
backing of the Member States for the partnership strategy. The Mediterranean was 
already high on the EU's foreign policy agenda, having been put there by the 
French, Italian and Spanish governments, and by the Union's own policy review 
process. What the Commission did was simply react to the already 'informed 
demand' for policy change. 61 The challenge facing the Commission was to 
convince the Member States that the status quo in Euro-Mediterranean economic 
relations was unacceptable and that existing financial resources for the region did 
not match the scale of the problems to be addressed. 
In previous generations of Mediterranean policy, the Commission 
had 
enjoyed only limited success in translating its proposals 
into action. Even where it 
possessed exclusive competence to negotiate for the 
Community on the 
Association Agreements, its room for manoeuvre on concessions had usually been 
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circumscribed by the stubborn defence of domestic producers' interests among the 
Member States. The EMP proposals showed that some of the lessons of the past 
had been learned. Its 1995 paper, for instance, excluded agricultural trade from 
the proposals for a free-trade area. 62 Although the Commission was fully 
cognisant of the economic significance of agricultural trade liberalisation to the 
Mediterranean partners, protecting EU farmers' markets and preserving the 
integrity of the CAP system were judged to be higher priorities. 63 Furthermore, 
rather than placing an emphasis on the need for new trade concessions from the 
Union, the partnership paper shifted the onus of responsibility for reform to the 
Mediterranean third countries themselves. In doing so, the Commission 
developed a strategy that could be sold to member governments of all ideological 
persuasions; there was something in it for everyone. Free-traders could point to 
the self-help elements, while the interventionists could point to the call for a more 
focused and comprehensive programme of assistance. 
What EU scholars have labelled 'conceptual innovation' and 'purposeful 
opportunism' were also evident in the Commission's proposals. 64 By reasoning 
that an integrated, 'multidimensional' strategy - encompassing 'linked actions in 
the economic, social and political spheres' - was required, the Commission 
changed the basis of EU Mediterranean policy from a simple framework for 
managing trade and channelling aid to a more comprehensive policy framework 
which offered a detailed programme identifying the areas in which cooperative 
projects should be established with the partner countries. 65 In doing so, it staked a 
strong claim to expand its own competencies. On everything from support for 
Private sector development to 'democratisation' projects, DG IB would be 
responsible for selecting projects, allocating funds and overseeing their 
iMplementation. 
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How, then, did the Commission fare in seeing through its proposals? Its 
most important task was to persuade the Member States to accept its proposal for 
a doubling of the aid budget for the Mediterranean. By preparing a thorough case 
for the increase based on its informational resources, it gave the member 
governments little cause to question the logic of its figures. A Commission 
official described the process thus: 
We did various calculations based on what countries had absorbed out of the 
financial Protocols, World Bank analyses of their needs for the future and 
comparison of US and World Bank aid .... also on how much headroom there 
was on chapter 4 of the [Edinburgh] financial perspective. 66 
Linking its plans to the activities of the multilateral financial institutions reassured 
the more sceptical Member States such as Germany and the UK that the Union 
would not simply be pouring money into an empty hole. 67 
That said, Commissioner Manuel Manfn had first to convince his 
counterparts in the Commission that the proposed level of funding was 
apPropriate. He initially requested 6.3 billion ECUs, but was faced down by 
Commissioners Hans Van den Broek, responsible for the CEECs, and Erkki 
Liikanen, responsible for the EU budget. 68 Even so, Man'n eventually 'got a lot 
more money than he expected and the Commission's political commitment to the 
partnership' when his colleagues unanimously approved a figure of 5.5 billion 
ECUs to be put to the CoUnCil. 69 This figure represented 70% of the ainount 
awarded to the CEECs, and would represent a considerable step towards the 
rebalancing of resources sought by the southern Member States and Marin. 
Yet despite the Commission's strong case, the member goverrunents still 
reduced the MEDA budget by 1.6 billion ECUs. Criticised as derisory by several 
of the Mediterranean partners, the Cannes deal called into question the seriousness 
of the Union's commitment to economic development in the region . 
70 Indeed, a 
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more substantial reduction might even have j eopardised the entire EMP project. 71 
Here, the limits on the power of the Commission to secure its preferences on 
redistributive issues was exposed. Even with the backing of France, Italy and 
Spain, the final outcome was beyond its control. 
Distributive issues proved equally vexatious for the Commission, with 
disputes over trade concessions regularly being taken out of its control and pushed 
up to the political level. The Euro-Mediterranean agreements saw the 
Commission's negotiating flexibility more restricted than ever by its mandates 
from the Council. A Commission negotiator summed up the problem thus: 
We had little margin for negotiation on agriculture because of the traditional 
flows line. By playing with the schedules, we sometimes can take more 
favourable years as the basis to calculate traditional flows. But the ministers 
don't see the concessions in a broader context. They ask for a free trade area 
as a precursor for south-south trade and then fail to conclude an agreement 
because no one can agree whether we should accept 18000 or 30000 
tonnes. 72 
Only where non-contentious issues, such as dismantling tariffs on industrial 
products, were at stake was the Commission able to conduct the negotiations as 
'technical' issues, consulting the Council only on an infonnal basis when it 
proposed concessions that exceeded traditional trade floWS. 
73 That all but the 
negotiations with Tunisia were stalled for long periods attested to the 
restraining effect of politicisation on the Commission's power to offer the 
partners significantly improved access to the EU's market. 
On the face of it, the constitutive aspects of the Barcelona process were 
more positive from the Commission's point of view. As coordinator of the 
Barcelona process, DG IB was guaranteed a major initiating role across the three 
chapters and defacto control of its implementation. Although it relied to a great 
extent on the 'Barcelona spirit' to keep the process moving, its status as the only 
EU representative on the two main steenng committees gave it a comparative 
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advantage over the Member States in setting the agenda and articulating the EU's 
interests. 
The MEDA Regulation also represented a qualified success for the 
Commission, since the region-wide, multi-annual basis of the instrument 
increased capacity to link the objectives of the Mediterranean strategy with the 
financial aid programme. 74 However, the Member States put in place a number of 
safeguards that kept the Commission on a fairly tight rein. In line with the general 
trend in comitology during the 1990s, Article II of the MEDA regulation made 
the Commission's proposals for projects subject to a 3A (regulatory committee) 
which requires a qualified majority vote in the Council for approval, rather than a 
2A (management committee) in the draft regulation, which requires the Council to 
muster a qualified majority to overturn Commission proposalS. 75 In the 
Commission's draft regulation, it had argued for the latter procedure to apply. 76 
This institutional configuration ensured that the national governments closely 
monitored both the technical side of the proposed projects and their political 
context. 
To summarise, most of the Commission's key demands on the EMP were 
met by the Member States at the formative stage with few questions raised about 
the objectives and content of the strategy. The Commission was assisted in this 
respect by the functional basis of its strategy and the absence of obviously high 
costs to the Member States, which helped keep politicisation to a minimum. 
Nevertheless, the nature of the EU policy process gives govenunents 'another bite 
at the cherry' when it comes to taking decisions on distributive and redistributive 
issues. The Commission's line agricultural trade concessions, on which it closely 
adhered to the Council's negotiating mandate, and its 'softly softly' approach to 
proposing measures in the Barcelona process, were indicative of its wariness about 
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pushing the Member States too hard. It is arguablY this continuous tension 
between the Commission and the States that limits the Union's CaPacity for truly 
forward-thinking, transfonnative strategic actions. 
The European Parliament 
It is difficult to point to any clear instance of the European Parliament directly 
influencing the development of Mediterranean policy during the 1990s. This 
unstartling finding simply reflects the continued weakness of the EP in policy 
initiation and its limited range of powers in foreign-policy making. Given its lack 
of influence in foreign policy, the Parliament could afford to back the 
Commission's call for more far- reaching policy reform, its resolutions 
emphasising the 'extension of regional cooperation' and the need for genuinely 
'binding decisions' in the fields of security, economic cooperation, human rights, 
democracy and social development. 77 
Still, the EP was able to make a mark on the EMP. Its input derived both 
P-- - from the powers ascribed to it in EU Treaties and its informal position in the EU's 
institutional framework. First, its power of assent on agreements concluded 
between the EU and third countries (Article 300) endowed it with a dejure veto. 
Second, its right to question the Commission and the Council enabled it to raise 
awkward questions about issues that it felt the EMP was failing to address. Third, 
as the democratic arm of the Union, the EP naturally gravitated towards the socio- 
cultural aspects of the Barcelona programme where it took the lead on a number of 
uutiatives. 
When entire agreements were not at stake, the EP exercised its power of 
assent much more freely, employing a combination of delayed votes and outright 
rejection to impose its preferences. Several times during the 1980s the Parliament 
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blocked financial protocols and protocols to association agreements with 
Mediterranean third countries. In 1987, it delayed its vote on an additional 
protocol to Turkey's association agreement for over a year in protests at the 
treatment of the state's treatment of its Kurdish population. In the same year it 
temporarily blocked three protocols to the EU-Israel association agreement over 
the obstruction of Palestinian exports from the occupied territories. Similarly 
defiant gestures were made in 1992, when the Parliament refused to approve the 
fourth financial protocols with Morocco and Syria over the human rights situation 
in the two countries. By the time the Barcelona process began, the EP had 
acquired a reputation among the Mediterranean partners for the politicisation of 
issues that they preferred to keep off the table in their negotiations with the EU. 
As a Turkish official lamented, 'if there's not Greece, there's the European 
Parliament. ' 78 
The EP has never withheld its assent to a full Association or Cooperation 
agreement with a Mediterranean third country. It has relied instead on the threat 
of non-ratification as a means to highlight its concerns and extract concessions 
P-- - from govemments. Even that tactic has been judiciously used. The Euro- 
Mediterranean agreements with Morocco, Tunisia, and the interim agreement with 
the Palestinian Authority, all safely passed through the EP, and it seems highly 
unlikely that ratification of agreements currently being negotiated with other the 
Mediterranean partners will be any more problematic. 79Non-ratification is a 
rather blunt instrument and the Parliament has judged it, in the EMP context, to be 
counter-productive. This statement on the agreement with Morocco illustrates the 
point: 
'Where improvements need to be made, experience shows that this better 
achieved through ffiendly dialogue than verbal assault. '80 
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Since the EU's strategy assumes that socio-cultural transformation, 
democratisation and improvements in the human rights situation in the region will 
follow economic development, blocking the measures intended to foster the latter 
was justifiably deemed to be self-defeating. 
However, there was one notable exception that demonstrates where the 
Parliament's strengths lie. During the ratification process of the Customs Union 
agreement with Turkey in 1995, the EP engaged in an extraordinarily high profile 
campaign to force action from the Turkish government on human rights, 
particularly over its treatment of the country's Kurdish population. In the nine 
months between the EU-Turkish Association Council's decision to go ahead with 
the Customs Union and the EP's vote, 20 per cent of the EP's members undertook 
missions to Turkey to secure guarantees from the Ciller government on a number 
81 
of human rights issues. Over the same period, parliamentarians were subjected 
to intense pressure from, among others, the USA, EU member governments, EU 
and Turkish businesses and the UN to give their assent. Pauline Green, leader of 
the Socialist group in the Parliament, complained of 'excessive and 
counterproductive pressure. ' 82 
The Parliament finally approved the agreement in December 1995 with a 
majority of 2: 1.83 Despite failing to carry through its threat to withhold its assent, 
it could legitimately claim to have achieved its ob ectives. The Turkish j 
government was forced to remove a series of 'anti-terrorist' clauses from the 
constitution and to release several political prisoners associated with the Kurdish 
cause. The whole episode served to establish the EP as the human rights 
watchdog of the EMP, a role certain to gain in significance as the Barcelona 
process developed. 
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The introduction of MEDA represented a retrogressive step as far as the 
Parliament's input into the aid dimension of Mediterranean policy was concerned. 
Whereas the bilateral financial protocols were subject to Article 300, requiring the 
EP to approve the budget for each individual partner country, the MEDA 
regulation entitled the Parliament only to be 'kept regularly informed' of the 
programme's implementation. 84 Out of 22 amendments to the Regulation tabled 
by the EP, the Commission accepted only 6 outright, and 5 with modifications. 85 
Amendments designed to increase the reporting requirements on allocations to 
individual projects, to increase the regularity with which the Commission had to 
report to the Parliament, and to give it the right to demand a suspension of aid in 
the event of human rights violations all failed to find their way into the 
Regulation. Its call for an inter-institutional agreement on the MEDA budget also 
went unheeded. 
Given no say in the individual projects to be funded by MEDA, the 
Parliament threatened to block future budgetary appropriations unless money was 
explicitly set aside for 'civil society' projects. 86 It received some nominal 
compensation when the Commission and Council met its demand for a separate 
budget line to promote the activities of non-governmental organisations in the 
region. 87 The new budget line - MEDA Democracy - was initially allocated just 
10 million ECUs, transferred out of the MEDA budget. 88 
The Parliament's powers of questioning and debate took on more 
significance than usual in view of the disappointing outcome on the constitutive 
elements of the EMP. According to procedural convention, the Par iament 
debates commercial agreements with the Commission and Council before 
negotiations commence, and is kept informed by both institutions of progress 
which includes the possibility of receiving confidential briefings about the 
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negotiating mandates. In practice, the application of this convention in the END 
meant that the EP's potential reaction had to be taken into account prior to the 
opening of negotiations on the Euro-Mediterranean agreements. Conscious of the 
potential difficulty of securing the EP's ratification of the Euro-Med agreement 
with Algeria, the Commission delayed the formal start of negotiations with 
Algeria until the election of Liamine Zeroual in 1995 gave the regime some 
semblance of democratic legitimacy, 
The Parliament's propensity for making life awkward for the Commission 
ensured that DG IB exceeded the formal requirement to keep the Parliament 
informed during the negotiations. In an appearance before MEPs during the 
ratification of the Moroccan accord, for instance, Commissioner Marm' promised 
to deliver an annual assessment of Morocco's action on human rights in the 
context of the agreement. 90 Similar undertakings were given for the agreements 
with the other Mediterranean partners. Through suasion rather than outright 
sanction, the Parliament thus ensured that its agenda was taken into account in the 
EMP. 91 
Another of the Parliament's functions in the EMP stemmed from its own 
entrepreneurial creativity. When the Union established new relationships with the 
CEECs in the early 1990s, the Parliament rapidly moved to reinforce its links with 
national parliaments in each country. The democratic void left in the Barcelona 
Declaration prompted it to launch its own initiatives to stimulate similar 
parliamentary participation in the EMP and to give some semblance of 
representative legitimacy to the third chapter, which was conspicuously failing to 
engage 'civil society' in the process. A civil servant in the Parliament's Division 
for relations with parliamentary assemblies was designated to establish contacts 
with parliaments in the partner states and organise a standing forum. 
92 
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Three years after Barcelona, though, the results of the niuitiative were 
modest. Several political groups within the EP, most notably the European 
People's Party, questioned the need for yet another forum when Parliamentary 
delegations already paid regular visits to the parliaments of the partner countries. 
The same groups expressed concern about funding such an initiative when the 
Parliament was under fire over its administrative expenditure. 93 The idea of an 
inter-parliamentary forum also ran into opposition from Germany and the Benelux 
countries, which were averse to the creation of an institution for which additional 
funding might be necessary. 94 Their priority lay in developing similar such 
relationships in the CEECs. The partner countries expected a well organised 
institution with its own secretariat and a measure of political influence over the 
EMP, and were inevitably disappointed with the outcome. 95 
In sum, there was little in the EMP to increase the EP's influence in EU 
Mediterranean policy. But as long as the Commission considered the views of 
the Parliament and provided it with a steady supply of detailed infonnation on 
which to base its resolutions, it stood a reasonable chance of having its concerns 
heard and addressed. Faced with a process dominated by 27 governments,, its 
most effective tactic was to raise the kind of awkward questions, especially on 
human rights, that the same governments deliberately avoided. 
The Council 
The Council's primary function in the EMP was as the venue for 
intergovenu-nental bargaining between the Member States. Meetings of the two 
Barcelona coordinating committees took place in the Council, while COREPER 
and the various Mediterranean-related Council working groups met regularly to 
discuss issues ranging from the Euro-Med agreements to the Middle East Peace 
161 
Process. 96 However, in their own right, both the Presidency and the Council 
Secretariat made significant contributions to the policy process and to the 
management of the Barcelona process. 
The Presidency 
It is no coincidence that 1995 was the EU's 'year of the Mediteffanean. ' The 
successive Council Presidencies of France, Spain and Italy from January 1995 to 
June 1996 were guaranteed to keep the EMP moving. As managers of the 
Council's business, it is standard practice, particularly for the bigger Member 
States, to 'impose a particular topic" on the EU during their terms in office. 97 The 
EMP was high on the Council's agenda throughout the period leading up to the 
Barcelona Conference. 
Perhaps the best illustration of the political importance of the Presidency 
arose in the debate over the Union's representation on the Barcelona coordinating 
committees. The Troika represented the Member States on both committees and 
enjoyed a defacto right of initiative alongside the Commission. Once it left the 
Troika at the start of 1996, France saw itself being marginalised in the follow-up 
process and sought to change the formula for the Union's representation on the 
Committees to allow all the Member States to participate in meetings. 98 
However, the Irish Presidency ruled out any revision of the procedures, fearing the 
setting of a precedent that might further complicate the Union's representation in 
international negotiations. " Instead, an infonnal practice was introduced that 
allowed Member States not represented on the troika to address meetings through 
the Presidency. ' 00 
The composition of the Troika was also a salient factor sustaining the 
momentum of the Barcelona process. French, German and Spanish officials all 
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expressed concern that the initial collective enthusiasm for the process might be 
lost as the Presidency passed to Italy, absorbed by another round of national 
elections during the first half of 1996, then to a succession of smaller, non- 
Mediterranean Member States with inevitably fewer civil servants dedicated to the 
task. 101 Initially, such fears proved groundless. Indeed, a Commission official 
complained that the Italians had organised 'too many meetings. ' 102 The 
Presidencies of Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands were also judged 
satisfactory. All three were keen to avoid accusations that they were any less 
capable of dealing with the EMP than the southern Member States. 103 
That said, as the German Presidency of 1999 approached, the 
Mediterranean lobby felt it necessary to step up its campaign to keep the Union 
focused on the region. French officials, for instance, met with British and German 
colleagues during 1997 to 'press for the Mediterranean' and worked closely with 
Italian officials to keep the issue of Turkey's status at the forefront. 104 The 
decision to hold 'Barcelona IIF during the German Presidency was welcomed, but 
was tempered by concern that the Union's next major review of its budget would 
take place in the same period. With Eastern. enlargement approaching, the 
southern Member States sought guarantees that the budget for the region would 
not be reduced. 
The apparent seamlessness of the transition to the implementation phase 
was a product of three primary factors. First, the follow-up phase benefited from 
the groundwork laid by the French and Spanish Presidencies which, along with the 
Commission carefully identified the priorities for implementation and drew up an 
indicative schedule of events. 105 The incoming presidencies - Italy, Ireland in the 
second half of 1996 and Luxembourg in the second half of 1997 - merely 
had to 
take the baton. Second, the Commission came into its own as both coordinator 
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and initiator, presenting the Member States with ideas for measures at the first 
meetings of the Euro-Mediterranean Committee and the Senior Officials 
Committee in March 1996. Third, the routine, technocratic nature of much of the 
follow-up programme left little room for any government to raise political 
objections to measures on the agenda. 
When the breakdown of the Middle East Peace Process caused the 
implementation of the Barcelona process to stall in mid- 1996, the Presidency 
found itself performing the role of political mediator between the partner 
countries. This role obliged the Presidency to resolve disputes and defuse 
diplomatic stand-offs among the participants. During its hectic six month tenure 
in 1997, the Dutch Presidency persuaded Arafat and Levy to sit down for bilateral 
talks at the Malta Conference and oversaw talks between the Greek and Turkish 
government over sovereignty in the Aegean. That it was left to the Presidency to 
perform this crucial function was indicative of the limits to the Commission's 
political role in the Barcelona process. Low politics and functional cooperation 
were left to DGIB. High politics remained the preserve of the governments. 
The Council Secretariat 
The Secretariat's primary task is to provide 'administrative backup' to the 
working groups, Coreper and the Council itself 106 However, it is actually more 
than just a facilitator of the Council's business, and frequently acts as a broker of 
compromise and agreement among the Member States. In the EMP, it played a 
key role in drafting the Barcelona Declaration and in preparing texts on the 
Union's position in follow-up meetings. The importance of the Working Groups 
and the Ministerial Committees in the implementation of Barcelona Declaration 
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made the Secretariat, as the coordinator of their activities, an indispensable part of 
the process. 
The Secretariat's main assets in the EMP were its expertise, its neutrality 
and the regularity of its contacts with the permanent representations and national 
officials. 107 The handful of staff assigned to the Mediterranean acted, like their 
counterparts in the Commission, as an institutional memory bank for the policy 
area. Having responsibility for keeping records of the Euro-Med Committee and 
Senior Officials Committee meetings - Secretariat officials sat on both - made 
these officials an essential source of information for member governments and 
particularly for the Council Presidencies when they took over. Their awareness of 
the political sensitivities of both the Member States and many of the partner 
countries also made equipped them to judge what the participants in the Barcelona 
process would be prepared to accept. Its neutrality made the Secretariat an 
important middleman between the participants and the Presidency. As a 
Secretariat official explained: 
We are approached by states who don't want to go to the Presidency 
directly. They want to filter through the Secretariat who subtly assesses 
their difficulties and tries to provide a solution. 108 
This practice allowed govenunents to test the water before putting an initiative to 
the Council or to the follow-up committees, an advantage in the exploratory 
atmosphere of the EMP. 
The degree of influence possessed by the Secretariat waxed and waned 
with changes in the Council Presidency. When smaller states - such as Ireland 
and Luxembourg - were in the chair, it tended to be more influential, a 
consequence of the considerable organisational and political resources demanded 
by the EMP. Preparing texts on issues such as the Middle East Peace Process and 
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Mediterranean security cooperation required a level of expertise and experience 
not always available to Member States with small foreign mi*m modest istries and 
diplomatic resources. During these periods, the Secretariat became an ally of the 
Presidency, helping smaller states 'prove that they can run [EU business] 
efficiently and well even in areas without strong interest. "09 Conversely, the 
drafting of texts and the planning of Council activity tended to be concentrated 
more in national capitals when the larger Member States held the Presidency. 
The role of the Council in the EMP should be seen as both complementary 
and supplementary to that of the Commission. Individual Member States used the 
Presidency to keep Mediterranean policy at the top of the EU's foreign policy 
agenda during 1995. Emphasis then shifted to the Presidency as co-coordinator 
alongside the Commission, with the former arranging schedules of follow-up 
meetings and the latter undertaking the technical leg work. When political 
problems arose, Presidential mediation came into its own. The Council 
Secretariat essentially provided continuity between Presidencies and assistance to 
the smaller Member States. Neither body in any sense gained new competencies 
ýe_ - trom the EMP, but both were an integral part of its institutional architecture. 
Conclusions 
Only when the EMP is set alongside a core policy such as eastern enlargement 
does its comparatively low political salience become apparent. The Union's 
Mediterranean strategy was chiefly concerned with improving the management of 4-1.1 
existing relationships with the partner countries over the longer term rather than 
embarking on the kind of grand renegotiation and reformation demanded by 
accession. As a result, the politics of agreeing the strategy were never likely to 
provoke the in-fighting among the EU's institutions and Member States that 
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frequently accompanies the Union's 'histOrY-making' decisions. Problem solving, 
as opposed to bargaining, characterised the passage of the EMP from proposed 
strategy to concrete policy. 
Conceptualising the EMP along the lines of Lowi's taxonomy suggests that 
this low level of politicisation was also a feature of decision-making on the 
individual policy components of the EMP. Only the distributive decisions to 
which clearly identifiable costs were attached - the MEDA budget and import 
quota concessions - became significantly politicised. Even then, politicisation was 
infrequent, partly as a consequence of the restrictions imposed on the Union by its 
limited financial resources, and partly as a consequence of the 'path dependency' 
of Mediterranean policy instruments which left little scope for flexibility on the 
Union's part. 
Intergovernmental politics clearly mattered at key stages in the negotiation 
of the EMP. A central claim of intergovemmentalist theories - that domestic 
interests determine governmental preferences and the behaviour of goverranents in 
international negotiations - was certainly borne out by the hard bargaining over 
trade concessions. Furthermore, differing preferences among the Member States 
on issues such as trade-aid and the uneasy peace on the east versus south debate 
were never far from the surface, evidenced by the deal struck in Cannes. 
But the EMP cannot be explained by intergovernmentalist theory alone. 
First, the undoubted importance of geo-politics and security as underlying 
rationales for the Union's Mediterranean strategy are not easily accounted for by 
theories that are predicated on the rational calculation of economic self-interest by 
governments. Converging perceptions among the Member States that 
Mediterranean security presented a challenge to the whole of Western Europe 
demonstrated a collective impetus for increased policy responsibilities to be 
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delegated to the EU and for the EU to be utilised as the linchpin of a multilateral 
framework for Euro-Mediterranean relations. 
The institutional politics of the EMP provide a good indication of how far 
Mediteffanean policy has been 'Europeanised'. Policy change was led by the 
Commission which both defined the Union's strategic objectives and prescribed 
solutions. Its persuasive case for the partnership strategy went largely unopposed, 
and many of its preferences, at least on the appropriate framework for policy, were 
willingly accepted by the Member States. When governmental preferences 
reasserted themselves over substantive distributive, redistributive and constituent 
political issues, the limits of the Commission's autonomy became clear. The 
Parliament remains a bit player in EU foreign policy, denied any meaningful role 
in the design of strategic actions, and caught between its power to obstruct the 
conclusion of agreements and the danger of damaging the Union's relations with 
third countries. The Council remains at the sharp end of the policy process, with 
its multiple institutions empowered to determine the Union's foreign policy 
priorities and to dictate policy outcomes. 
It is testament to the EU's maturing as an international political actor that a 
comprehensive foreign policy strategy like the EMP is formulated at the 
supranational level, producing action based on 'the institutional assets and 
international. agency of the EC. '110 Mediterranean policy is no longer merely a 
disparate collection of external relationships. The Union has defined a coherent 
set of objectives in response to identifiable European interests, some clearly 
collective, others reflecting the specific preferences of the Mediterranean Member 
States. However, implementation of strategic action, and therefore its 
effectiveness, still tends to be subjected to the perennial tension between the 
Commission's broader, long-term objectives and the short term political interests 
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of the Member States. That the collective interest is habitually overridden by 
strong national interests shows how far the EU has to go as a foreign policy actor. 
169 
Notes 
1 Lowi, T. (197 1) 'Four Systems Of Policy, Politics and Choice', Public 
Administration Review, Vol. 32, No. 4, pp. 298-3 10. 
2 Lowi, T. (1964) 'American Business, Public Policy,, Case Studies and Political 
Theory', World Politics, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 677-715; Wallace, W. (1983) 'Less 
than a Federation, More than A Regime: The Community as a Political System' in 
H. Wallace, W. Wallace and C. Webb (eds) Policy Making in the European 
Community, 2nd Edition, Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, pp. 403-436; Pollack, 
M. (1994) 'Creeping Competence: The Expanding Agenda of the European 
Community', Journal ofPublic Policy, Vol. 14, No. 2, p. 95. 
3 Webb, C. (1983) 'Theoretical Perspectives and Problems' in H. Wallace, W. 
Wallace and C. Webb (eds), Ibid., esp. pp 1-41. A version of this approach is 
applied in an external policy context to the EU's relationship with the CEECs in 
Friis, L. (1997) nen Europe Negotiates: From Europe Agreements to Eastern 
Enlargement, Copenhagen: Institute of Political Science, esp. p. 6. 
4 Moravcsik, A. (199 1) 'Preferences and power in the European Community: A 
Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 
3 1, No. 4, pp 473-524; Moravcsik, A. (1997) 'Taking Preferences Seriously: A 
Liberal Theory of International Politics' International Organization, Vol. 5 1, 
Autumn, pp. 513-553. 
5 March, J. and Olsen, J. P. (1989) Rediscovering Institutions, New York: Free 
Press, p. 5. 
6 Friis, L. (1997) op. cit., p. 48. 
7 Pierson, P. (1998) 'The Path to European Integration: A Historical- 
Institutionalist Analysis' in W. Sandholtz and A. Stone Sweet (eds) European 
Integration and Supranational Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 
46-7. 
8 Krasner, S. (1984) 'Approaches to the State', Comparative Politics, Vol. 16, 
No. 2, p. 225. Guy Peters, B. (1998) 'The New Institutionalism and 
Administrative Reform: Examining Alternative Models', Estudios Working 
Papers 1998/113, Madrid: Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones, p. 
19; Peterson, J. and Bomberg, E. (1999) Decision-making in the European Union, 
Basingstoke: Macmillan, p. 19. 
9 For accounts of how the Union initially dealt with the CEECs as an external 
policy issue, see Bideleux, R. (1996) 'Bringing the East Back In' in R. Bideleux 
and R. Taylor (eds) European Integration and Disintegration, London: Routledge, 
pp. 225-252; Kramer, H. (1993) 'The European Community's Response to the 
"New Eastern Europe", Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 3 1, No. 2, pp. 
213-44. 
10 Friis, L. (1997) op. cit., p. 52. 
'1 When asked to define their national interests in the Mediterranean, most 
interviewees from the EU Member States identified immigration, the impact of 
political instability on Moslem communities, energy supplies and the need to 
safeguard the Union's vulnerable southern and south-eastern flanks if hostile 
regimes were to emerge in the region. 
170 
12 This apparent consensus over the Euro-Mediterranean agreements and the 
Barcelona process as the main tools of the Union's Mediterranean strategy 
contrasts with the relative lack of consensus over how to deal with the CEECs 
post 1989. See Sedelmeier, U. and Wallace,, H. (1996) 'Policies towards Central 
and Eastern Europe' in H. Wallace and W. Wallace (eds) Policy-Making in the 
European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 3 66; Friis, L. (1998) "The 
End of the Beginning' of Eastern Enlargement - Luxembourg Summit and 
Agenda-setting', European Integration online Papers (E76P) Vol. 2, No. 7, 
((http: //eiop. or. at/eiop/texte/1998-007a. htm>>, p. 2. 
13 For discussion of how the Mediterranean and CEECs competed for position on 
the EU1s political agenda, see Barbe, E. (1998) 'Balancing Europe's Eastern and 
Southern Dimensions' in R. Zielonka (ed. ) Paradoxes ofEuropean Foreign 
Policy, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, p 117-129. For an institutionalist 
analysis of agenda setting in the EU, see Guy Peters, G. (1996) 'Agenda-setting in 
the European Union' in J. J. Richardson (ed. ) European Union: Power and 
Policy-making, London: Routledge, pp. 61-76. 
14 Scharpf, F. (1988) 'The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism 
and European Integration', Public Administration, Vol. 66, No. 3, pp. 239-278. 
The drawback with applying Scharpf s dichotomy is that it is grounded in rational 
choice theory, seeking to explain how the negotiation of policy in the EU has 
been hostage to the 'joint decision trap': sub-optimal outcomes produced by inter- 
governmental bargaining. This assumption relies on establishing what is sub- 
optimal in a given case. Since the EMP is designed to achieve objectives over the 
long term, it is impossible to accurately assess its optimality. 15 Ibid, pp. 258-9. 
16 For empirical and theoretical analyses of regional institution building in the 
Mediterranean, see De Vasconcelos, A. (1993) 'Disintegration and Integration in 
the Mediterranean', The International Spectator, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 67-78; 
Chatelus, M. (1996) 'Economic cooperation among southern Mediterranean 
countries' in R. Aliboni, G. Joffd and T. Niblock (eds) Security Challenges in the 
Mediterranean, London: Frank Cass, pp. 83-113; Chatelus, M. and Petit, P. 
(I 997b) 'Le partenariat euro-mediterraneen: Un prej et r6gional en quete de 
cohdrence% Monde Arabe: Maghreb Machrek; Special Issue, December, pp. 3-7. 
17 Flaesch-Mougin, C. (1990) 'Competing Frameworks: The Dialogue and its 
Legal Bases' in G. Edwards and E. Regelsberger (eds) Europe's Global Links: 
The European Community and Inter-regional Cooperation, London: Pinter, p. 3 7. 
18 See BBC News Online Network, 'World Europe: Italy and Libya Sign Pact', 
((http: //news. bbc. co. uk/hi/english/world/europe/ýewsidý/ý5FI29000/129464. stm>>. 
The accord included an apology for Italy's colonial past in Libya and an agreement 
to establish a joint company to deal with a number of related issues, such as mine 
clearing and the search for deportees of both states. In a press conference, Italian 
Deputy Foreign Minister Rino Serri described the two countries' 'strong common 
interests on the level of trade, the economy, tourism, energy, oil and gas' and their 
6 prospects for security and development', an agenda strikingly similar to the 
Priorities of the Barcelona process. 
171 
19 A good measure of the comparative importance of the bilateral and EU levels 
is given by the total financial aid channelled through national development 
assistance programmes and trade credit packages which exceeds the total 
multilateral financial aid provided by the EU. French overseas development 
assistance to the Middle East and North Africa, for instance, averages around 450 
million ECUs per annum, while the cumulated total for all the EU Member States 
stands at around I billion ECUs per annum. OECD (1997) (Development 
Assistance Committee) Development Cooperation, Paris: OECD, p. A67-8. 20 Friis, L. (1997) op. cit., p. 78. (Italics in original). 
21 This taxonomy is based on Lowi, T. (1964) op. cit.; See also Lowi, T. (1971) 
op. cit. Lowi tentatively employs the same taxonomy in a study of non-crisis 
foreign policy-making in Lowi, T. (1967) 'Making Democracy Safe for the World: 
National Politics and Foreign Policy' in J. Rosenau (ed. ) Domestic Sources of 
Foreign Policy, New York: The Free Press, pp. 295-33 1. For analysis of its 
application to the EU see Wallace, W. (1983) op. cit.; Pollack, M. (1994) 
'Creeping Competence: The Expanding Agenda of the European Community', 
Journal ofPublic Policy, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 95-145; Wallace, W. (1996) 
'Government without statehood: The unstable equilibrium' in H. Wallace and W. 
Wallace (eds) Policy-Making in the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, esp. pp. 446-450; Friis, L. (1997), op. cit., esp. pp. 69-88. 
22 Lowi, T. (1971) op. cit., p. 299. 
23 Lowi's work does not deal at length with the definition of 'actors' in the policy 
process, though the inference is that the actors are governments. For a thorough, 
game theoretic, discussion of the definition of actors in policy-making, see 
Scharpf, F. W. (1997) Games Real, 4 ctors Play: 4ctor-Centred Institutionalism in 
Policy Research, Boulder (CO): Westview, esp. pp. 43-96. 
24 This approach to policy research confronts one of the most fundamental 
questions of politics: the allocation of scarce resources. See Lasswell, H. D. 
(195 0) Politics: no Gets nat, nen, How?, New York: Peter Smith, p. 2. 
25 Wallace, W. (1983) op. cit., p. 415. 
26 Friis, L. (1997), op. cit., pp. 33-5. 
27 Pollack, M. (1994) op. cit., p. 113; Armstrong, K. and Bulmer, S. (1998) The 
Governance ofthe Single European Market, Manchester: Manchester University 
Press. 
28 Some measures were 'co-sponsored' by an EU Member State and a partner 
country, but the majority emanated from the Commission and from the Council 
President. 
29 It should be added here that the legislation associated with the free-trade area 
could not contravene WTO rules. 
30 Wallace, W. (1983), op. cit., p. 415. 
31 Putnam, R. D. (1988) 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics', International 
Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 427-61. 
32 Moravcsik, A. (199 1) 'Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests 
and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community', International 
Organization, Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 19-56; Moravcsik, A. (1993), op. cit., pp 473- 
524; Moravcsik, A. (1998) The Choicefor Europe: Social Purpose and State 
Powerftom Messina to Maastricht, London: UCL Press. 
33 Moravcsik, A. (1998), op. cit., PP. 18-24. 
172 
34 This distillation of Moravcsik's arguments hardly does justice to the 
sophistication of his analysis. However, it does apply the basic logic of liberal 
intergovernmentalism. 
35 Moravcsik, A. (1998) op. cit., p. 39.. 
36 Wallace, H. (1996), op. cit., p. 25. 
37 Interview 7. 
38 Ibid., p. 477. Moravcsik concedes that 'major changes in geopolitical situation 
should trigger shifts in European policy. ' (p. 34) (Emphasis added). 39 Ibid., p. 474. 
40 Shlaim, A. (1976) 'The Community and the Mediterranean Basin' in K. 
Twitchett (ed. ) Europe and the World. - The External Relations ofthe Common 
Market, London: Europa Publications, p. 19; Peterson, J. and Bomberg, E. (1999) 
Decision Making in the European Union, London: Macmillan, pp. 104-5. 41 Interview 6. 
42 Interview 5 1. 
43 Peterson, J. and Bomberg, E. (1999), op. cit., chapter 4. 
44 Moravcsik, A. (1998), op. cit., p. 45 Interview 5. 
46 Interview 54. 
47 Aliboni, R. (1992) 'The Mediterranean Dimension' in W. Wallace (ed. ) The 
Dynamics ofEuropean Integration, London: Pinter, 2nd Edition, p. 164. 
48 Interviews 38 and 53. 
49 Interview 42. By early 1995, the proposed figure had been reduced to 5.16 
billion ECU, a consequence of Norway's 'no' vote on membership which reduced 
the Union's projected budgetary contributions. 
50 Interview 6. 
51 In a search for a compromise to the EDF problem, the prudent Waigel was 
eventually overruled by Chancellor Kohl who accepted in return a decrease in EU 
aid to both the CEECs and the Mediterranean. The German government may well 
have realised that it would be in a much stronger position to negotiate reductions 
in the budget during its Presidency in 1999, when the next financial perspective 
would be set. Le Monde, 26 May 1995, p. 2; Le Monde, 26 June 1995, p. 2. 
52 Interview 38. 
53 Barber, L. 'Euro-clouds on the Riviera', Financial Times, 29 June 1995, p. 15. 
54 Interviews 34 and 54. 
55 Moravcsik, A. (1998), op. cit., p. 73; Puchala, D. J. (1999) 'Institutionalism, 
Intergovernmentalism and European Integration', Journal of Common Market 
Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2, p. 319. 
56 Moravcsik, A. (1999) 'A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and 
International Cooperation', International Organization, Vol. 53, No. 2, p. 302. 
57 Hix, S. (1994) 'The Study of the European Community: The Challenge to 
Comparative Politics', West European Politics, Vol. 17, pp. 1-30; Pollack, M. 
(1998) 'The Engines of Integration? Supranational Autonomy and Influence in the 
European Union' in W. Sandholtz and A. Stone Sweet (eds) European Integration 
and Supranational Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 219. 
58 Bulmer, S. (1998) 'New Institutionalism and the Governance of the Single 
European Market', Journal ofEuropean Public Policy, Vol. 5, No. 3, p. 370. See 
also March, J. G. and Olsen J. P. (1989) op. cit.; Bulmer, S. (1994) 'The 
Governance of the European Union: A New Institutionalist Approach', Journal of 
Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 351-80. 
173 
59 Cram, L. (1994), 'The European Commission as a Multi-Organisation: Social 
Policy and IT Policy in the EU', Journal ofEuropean Public Policy, Vol. 2, No. I 
pp. 195-217; Guy Peters, B. (1994) 'Agenda Setting in the European 
Community". Journal ofEuropean Public Policy, Vol. 1, No. 19 pp. 9-26; Guy 
Peters, B. (1997) op. cit., p. 6 1; Nugent, N. (1995) 'The Leadership Capacity of 
the European Commission', Journal ofEuropean Public Policy, Vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 
603-23; Pollack, M. A. (1997) 'Delegation, Agency and Agenda Setting in the 
European Community', International Organization, Vol. 5 1, No. 1, pp. 99-134. 
60 Pollack, M. (1998), op. cit., p. 219. 
61 Smyrl, M. (1998) op. cit., p. 90. 
62 European Commission (1995) Strengthening the Mediterranean Policy ofthe 
European Union: Proposalsfor a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, COM (95) 
729 8 March. 
63 A European Ambassador in North Africa summed up the Union's position thus: 
'This is a problem whose only resolution can come from scrapping the common 
agricultural policy, and that's not going to happen. ' Quoted in Marks, J. 
'Looking for a new deal from the EU', Middle East Economic Digest, Vol. 39, no. 
20,19 May 1995, p. 3. (pp. 2-3). 
64 Cram, L. (1994), op. cit., p. 197. 
65 European Commission (1995), op. cit., p. 2. 
66 Interviews 52 and 57. 
67 The Commission's insistence that the distribution of MEDA funds would be 
tightly controlled should be seen in the context of its experience with the 'MED' 
programmes. The programmes, which began in 1992, provided funds for NGOs 
in the EU and the partner countries (universities, research bodies, regional 
authorities, media organisations) to setup joint projects. The programmes were 
suspended in 1995 after several instances of 'bad management' came to light. 
Committee of Independent Experts (1999) First Report on Allegations regarding 
Fraud, Mismanagement and Nepotism in the European Commission, Brussels, 15 
March, <<http: //www. europarl. eu. int/experts/en/3. htm>>. Interviews 6 and 25. 
68 European Report, No. 1983,12 October 1994, Sect. V, p. 7. 
69 Interview 52. 
70 In a debate in the European Parliament (3 March 1998), Ambassadors to the 
EU from several partner countries criticised both the level of MEDA funding 
available and the persistence of the donor/beneficiary structure in the EMP. 
European Parliament (1998) (Delegations for Cooperation with the Maghreb, 
Machrek and Gulf Countries), Hearing on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 
March. 
71 Interviews 18 and 57. 
72 Interview 15. 
73 Interview 28. 
74 Under the bilateral financial protocol system, the distribution of funds to each 
partner country was driven more by the short term needs of the individual 
governments and by the ad hoc allocation of financial support to specific projects 
than by any coherent strategy. 
75 European Commission (1995) Proposalfor a Council Regulation on Financial 
and Technical Measures to Support the Reform ofEconomic and Social Structures 
in Mediterranean Non-member Countries and Territories, COM (95) 204, 
Brussels, July. 
76 Ibid., p. 5. Interview 12. 
174 
77 K6hler, M. (1994) 'Towards a comprehensive Policy framework for relations 
between the European Union and the Mediterranean basin', Working Paper W-1 0, 
Directorate General for Research (DGIV), European Parliament, Brussels, 
November, p. 20. 
78 Interview 56. 
79 In Morocco's case, the EP's Foreign Affairs committee professed itself 
satisfied that the agreement contained a sufficiently strong human rights 
dimension. Recital 3 states 'Considering the importance which the Parties attach 
to the Principles of the United Nations Charter, particularly the observance of 
human rights, democratic principles and economic freedom, which form the very 
basis of the Association. ' However, several MEPs on the Committee expressed 
reservations about the Western Sahara conflict and the general human rights 
situation in the country. European Parliament (1996) (Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Security and Defence Policy) Report on the Conclusion ofa Euro- 
Mediterranean Agreement, A4-0173/96, Brussels. 
80 Ibid., p. 6. 81 Interview 4 1. 
82 Financial Times, 13 December 1995, p. 2. 
83 European Parliament (1995) EC-Turkey Relations - Human Rights in Turkey, 
Doc. No. PE195.288, Brussels, December. 
84 European Commission (1995), op. cit. 
85 Data obtained by comparison of European Parliament report and Council 
Regulation. European Parliament (1996) Report on the Proposalfor a Council 
Regulation on Financial and Technical Cooperation Measures to Accompany the 
Reform ofEconomic and Social Structures in the Framework ofthe Euro- 
Mediterranean Partnership (MEDA), A4-0198/96, Brussels; Council Regulation 
(EC) Financial and Technical Measures to Accompany (MEDA) the reform of 
economic and social structures in theframework ofthe Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership, No. 1488/96. Official Journal OJ L 189, Brussels, 30 July 1996. 
86 This was suggested to me by Dr Annette Junnemans of the Universitat 
Gesamhochschule, Kassel, Germany, during a Summer School in Catania, July 
1998. Dr Junnemans had been involved in a number of civil society projects 
linked to the Barcelona process. 
87 European Parliament (1995) Report on the Mediterranean Policy of the 
European Union with a View to the Barcelona Conference, A4-232/95, Brussels, 
3 October, p. 20. 
88 In an interview with the Desk Officer for MEDA Democracy in the European 
Commission, the official made the point that the small budget had to be stretched 
among 12 partner countries and a vast number of eligible organisations. (Interview 
1). 
89 This convention is known as the Luns-Westerterp procedure, named after the 
two Dutch foreign ministers that established it during the 1970s. For an 
explanation, see Corbett, R., Jacobs, F. and Shackleton, M. (1995) The European 
Parliament, 3 rd edition, London: Cartermill, pp. 214-5. 
90 European Report, No. 213 8,8 June 1996, Sect. V., p. 14. 
91 Whether or not the Parliament could claim responsibility for the inclusion of 
human rights clauses in the agreements themselves is a moot point. The practice 
of including a human rights clause in the preambles of agreements with third 
countries was established well before the Euro-Mediterranean accords. 92 Interview 4 1. 
175 
93 Cmmert, T. (1998) 'The EMP's Institutional aspects and its Parliamentary 
Dimension% Address to Summer School, The Mediterranean and the New 
International Order, University of Catania, 5-12 July. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Early in 1998, agreement was reached to hold an inaugural meeting of a 
Parliamentary forum in Brussels later in the year. Some 145 parliamentary 
representatives attend the forum, including 43 MEPs, 6 MPS from each of 
partners' Parliaments partners and 2 MPs from each of the national parliaments of 
the EU 15. Whether or not the forum becomes anything more than a symbolic 
meeting place remains to be seen. 
96 The three principal working groups involved were the Maghreb/Machrek 
working group, the South East Europe working group, the Middle East Peace 
Process working group and the Gulf working group. Many of the national 
officials interviewed during the research period sat on one or more of these 
F7 OUPS* 
Hayes-Renshaw, F. and Wallace, H. (1997) The Council ofMinisters, 
Basingstoke: Macmillan, p. 140. 
98 Interviews 2 and 3 8. 
99 Interview 37. 
100 Interview 6. 
10, Interviews 6,14 and 42. 
102 Interview 40. 
103 Interview 36. 
104 Agence Europe, 23 September 1997, p. 5. 
105 Khader, B. (1997) Le Partenariat Euro-Miditerraneen apres la confirence de 
Barcelone, Paris: L'Harmattan, p. 140. 
106 Hayes Renshaw, F. and Wallace, H. (1997), op. cit., p. 148. 
107 Interview 46. 
108 Interview 38. 
109 Interview 38. 
110 Smith, M. (1998) 'Does the Flag Follow Trade? "Politicisation" and the 
Emergence of a European Foreign Policy' in I Peterson and H. Sjursen (eds) A 
Common Foreign Policyfor Europe? Competing Visions of the CESP, London: 
Routledge, p. 92. 
176 
Chapter 6 
INFLUENCE WITHOUT POWER: THE EU AND THE MIDDLE EAST 
PEACE PROCESS 
'The Europeans will be unable to achieve anything in the Middle East in a million 
years'. Hemy Kissinger (1974)1 
'The US has power but Europe has influence'. Miguel Moratinos (1997)2 
The EU's role in the Arab-Israeli conflict has long been a benchmark of its status 
as an international political actor. Yet in an area of vital strategic interest to the 
Union, it has often struggled to make its impact felt. A combination of a lack of 
cohesion among the Member States on the issue and the more general weakness of 
EU foreign policy have left it playing second and third fiddle to the US and other 
mediators. Over time, though, the kind of scepticism exemplified by Kissinger's 
dismissal of European ambitions has gradually given way to grudging acceptance 
that the Union has an important contribution to make to Arab-Israeli bridge- 
building. The EU has carved out distinct roles for itself as the major financial 
underwriter of the Peace Process and as an 'honest broker' in diplomatic efforts to 
bring the protagonists together. This chapter attempts to explain how and why the 
Union's input into the Peace Process has changed, and assesses the utility of the 
Euro-Mediterranean partnership in strengthening its position in the region. 
Section I begins with an historical overview of EU policy on the Arab- 
Israeli conflict, charting the Union's attempts to establish a credible position, 
independent from that of the USA. The second section briefly examines 
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European reactions to the remarkable series of events precipitated by the 1990 
Gulf War and the subsequent US-sponsored Madrid conference between Israel and 
the Palestinians. At that juncture, the EU missed, or was denied, an opportunity to 
assume a central role in the Peace Process. Section 3 focuses on the period after 
the introduction of the CFSP and the realisation on the part of the EU that its 
strength lay in low-profile diplomacy rather than high-profile political initiatives. 
Section 4 shows how the fortunes of the Barcelona process ebbed and flowed with 
developments in the Middle East, and goes on to examine how the Euro- 
Mediterranean agreements gave the Union new political leverage in the Peace 
Process. 
1. Bifurcation and Fragmentation: EPC and the Arab-Israeli Conflict 
The Six-Day war (1967) was an inauspicious start in the context of the foreign 
policy ambitions of the European Community. The six EC member governments 
found themselves torn between their loyalties to either the Arab or Israeli side, and 
were pressured to come up with a collective political response. 3 Such was the 
polarisation of attitudes, however, that the crisis was barely discussed at the Rome 
Summit on the eve of the war. The aftermath of the conflict saw the individual 
European governments go their separate ways. France, under De Gaulle, 
maintained its traditionally pro-Arab stance. Germany assumed a neutral position 
but in fact backed the Israelis. Italian opinion was somewhat divided, although a 
majority of its political elite backed Israel. The Netherlands took the strongest 
pro-Israeli position, condemning the belligerence of the Arab states and the 
support of the USSR for the Arab countries. Belgium and Luxembourg sought a 
solution through the UN and NATO. Admittedly, all the Member States endorsed 
UN Resolution 242, though this later proved to be a poisoned chalice since it 
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associated the Community with the lack of recognition of Palestinlian aspirations 
for statehood. 4 Not until the 1969 Hague Summit and the launch of European 
Political Cooperation (EPC) did the Community begin to develop the institutional 
machinery for collective diplomacy. The Arab-Israeli conflict was to become one 
of the first preoccupations of the Community's new foreign policy mechanism. 
On the face of it, the introduction of the EPC mechanism exerted a positive 
influence on the Community's ability to project a common front on the Middle 
East. The early 1970s witnessed the gradual convergence of the Member States' 
foreign policies towards a common position. Under strong pressure from 
Pompidou's government, the other five Member States were persuaded to align 
themselves with the French line on the conflict, which, itself was sympathetic to 
the Arab cause. A joint paper - the Schumann document - was approved by 
Community foreign ministers in May 197 1. The paper adhered to Resolution 242 
and therefore did little to distinguish the Community's policy on the situation in 
the Middle East. But as Greilsammer and Weiler argue, 'their purpose at that 
stage was not to formulate an active or reactive foreign policy goal but rather to 
flex their [the EC's] new muscles in the EPC framework. 95 That said, the 
Schumann document had one notable external consequence. It sent a signal to the 
Israeli government that previously staunch European allies, most notably the 
Dutch, were prepared, albeit reluctantly, to harden their line in order to promote 
Community policy. As a consequence, Israel would henceforth adopt an 
increasingly hostile stance towards independent European initiatives. 
These early experiments with EPC set a pattern that prevailed throughout 
the following two decades of European initiatives on the Middle East: periods of 
lowest common denominator concertation were followed by fragmentation as 
national foreign policies diverged from the agreed line. The Community's 
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reaction to the 1973 Yom Kippur war was a case in point. Internal wrangling in 
the immediate aftermath of the war ruled Out any immediate response. It took 
OPEC's fourfold hike in oil prices, a direct threat to a vital European interest 
(supplies of cheap oil), to spur the Member States into action. In particular, the 
UK, which had previously adopted a strongly pro-Israeli posture, saw the 
commercial imperative of a more pro-Arab line and fell into line with the loose 
consensus in EPC. The result - the joint declaration of 6 November 1973 - was 
significant in two respects. First, it referred to the 'legitimate rights of the 
Palestinians', a phrase absent in Resolution 242 and a formulation favoured by the 
Arab states. Second, it called for external guarantees of any settlement of the 
conflict, a measure strongly opposed by the Israelis. The Declaration was well 
received by the Arab side, which in turn allowed the Community to establish the 
Euro-Arab political dialogue, designed to placate Arab oil producers and remove 
future threats to oil supplies. 
The Community's involvement in the Peace Process had little obvious 
effect on its growing network of relationships with the Mediterranean non- 
member countries. Despite the souring of the Community's political relations 
with Israel, a free-trade, financial and technical cooperation agreement was signed 
in 1975. Similarly, the Community concluded agreements with most Arab- 
Mediterranean countries without any apparent linkage between the negotiation of 
the agreements and its position on the Arab-Israeli conflict. This decoupling was 
perhaps a logical outcome of the institutional and procedural distinction between 
the EC method and EPC. The use of foreign economic policy instruments to 
influence the Arabs and Israelis was to come later. 
After tentatively setting its stall on the question of Palestinian rights, the 
Community gradually made resolving the status of the Palestintian people the 
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central plank of its approach. Three factors motivated this shift. First, an 
increasingly anti-American French government was determined to set the 
Community apart from the USA. Second, given the Community's heavy 
dependence on Arab oil, an Arab-friendly policy was an astute political move. 
Tbird, a pro-Arab position was also seen as a way to sharpen the profile of EPC. 
Significantly, the Community allowed the PLO, regarded by the Israelis and the 
USA as a pariah organisation, to participate in the Euro-Arab dialogue as part of a 
joint Arab delegation. 6 By the time of the 1977 London European Council 
meeting, the positions of the Member States had sufficiently converged to permit a 
more substantive definition of Palestinian rights. The London Declaration stated 
that: 
the Nine have affirmed their belief that a solution to the conflict in the 
Middle East will be possible only if the legitimate right of the Palestinian 
people to give effective expression to its national identity is translated into 
fact, which would take into account the need for a homeland for the 
Palestinian people. 7 
Had the Camp David peace negotiations not started soon after the London 
Declaration, the Community's initiative might have had a bigger impact. In the 
event, the USA, Egypt and Israel pursued their own triangular diplomacy, at odds 
with European demands for a comprehensive settlement involving all the relevant 
parties. The Community welcomed Sadat's overtures to Israel, but reiterated its 
demand that a settlement should be all-inclusive. This insistence, coupled with 
what was perceived as an increasingly pro-Arab European line, relegated the 
Community to the status of a bit player in the Peace Process. 
French diplomacy played a key role in defining the Community's position. 
President Giscard d'Estaing enjoyed similar success to his predecessor Pompidou 
in translating the French preference for independent 'European' initiatives into 
8 
action in EPC. Tliat successive French governments were able to take a lead on 
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the Middle East was both a reflection of a traditional desire for greater 
Community independence from the USA, and their propensity to view France as a 
global diplomatic power. What brought the pro-Israeli Member States, primarily 
Germany and the Netherlands, on board was less clear. Dominique MoYsi, for 
instance, argues that a combination of a lack of attention on the part of the Carter 
administration to the Palestinian problem, and the ability of EPC to paper over 
cracks among the Member States was crucial in encouraging the Community to 
launch its own initiative. 9 In addition, pro-Israeli Member governments were 
forced to reconsider their foreign policy orientations in order to protect their 
commercial interests in the Arab countries. In short, both internal and external 
circumstances created the right environment for the Community to plough its own 
furrow. 
The 1980 Venice European Council was hailed as the crowning glory of 
EPC's engagement in the Middle East Peace Process. Any lingering ambiguity 
. 
r-- - 
from the 1977 Declaration was removed as the Community unequivocally aligned 
itself with the Palestinian cause. The Venice Declaration stated the Community's 
belief that the Palestinian problem was 'not simply one of refugees' and that the 
Palestinian people should be pennitted to 'exercise fully their right to self- 
detennination. "O Although it stopped short of officially recognising the PLO, at 
France's insistence the text also called for Arafat's organisation to be 'associated 
with the negotiations'. ' 1 As far as implementing this new 'policy' was concerned, 
the Declaration provided for consultation with 'all the parties concerned'. 
12 
Predictably, the Venice Declaration enraged Menachem Begin's hardline 
Likud government, which described it as 'totalitarian blackmail' and likened it to 
a 'Munich surrender'. 13 The attitude of the Carter administration was more 
moderate, a testament both to the conciliatory diplomacy of the I ian oreign 
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Minister and Council President Emilio Colombo, who travelled to Washington 
prior to the Venice Meeting. 14 The extent to which the Community was prepared 
to distance itself from the US was tempered by reluctance to offend its main 
supplier of security. Promises were therefore made in advance of the Venice 
summit that the Camp David negotiations would not be prejudiced by the 
Declaration. 
At the time, EPC appeared to have secured the assent of the Member 
States to a common decision of international magnitude. For example, the British 
Prime Minister Thatcher claimed that the Declaration 'showed that they [the 
15 Member States] had a part to play on the international scene'. What exactly this 
part was to be was more problematic. Clearly, the Community had neither the 
credibility with the protagonists (the PLO rejected the Venice Declaration as 
insufficient), nor the diplomatic power to become an alternative mediator. If it set 
out to amend Resolution 242, it risked further alienating Israel and a possible veto 
from the USA in the UN Security Council. The Community's self-styled 'role', if 
any, seemed simply to be to bring together the most important parties in the 
conflict - the Israelis and Palestinians - for direct talks. 
For a while, the implementation of the Venice initiative proceeded 
according to plan, helped by the absence of new US initiatives during the 1980 
election campaign. Commission President Gaston Thom was despatched to the 
Middle East to establish contacts with both sides and gauge reactions to the 
Declaration. While Thom failed to win over the Israelis, the European 
mtervention received support from many of the Arab states. In the UN, the voti g 
behaviour of the Member States showed a strong adherence to the principles of the 
Declaration and to the agreed Community line. Addressing the General 
Assembly, Thom drew on the support of the Arab governments in claiming that 
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6only a comprehensive settlement [one directly involving the Palestinians] can 
bring about a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. 
However, as external events evolved and internal dissent resurfaced, the 
EC's solidarity began to crumble. No agreement could be reached in EPC on a 
series of position papers prepared by national foreign ministries on different 
aspects of the Peace Process, and they were referred to only obliquely at the 1980 
Luxembourg European Council. Four target areas were eventually identified - the 
withdrawal of occupying forces, self-determination, general security in the Middle 
East and the status of Jerusalem. The Dutch Council Presidency (January-June 
198 1), charged with the task of exploring the Community's new ideas with the 
Arabs and Israelis, maintained a low profile on the Middle East. 16 The Dutch 
government, still sensitive to Israeli concerns, carried out consultations with 
governments in the Middle East, but made little attempt to promote the 
Community's approach. 
The inter-governmental nature of EPC decision-making, which carried no 
legal obligations, made deviation from the Community line a relatively 
straightforward political option. Following Reagan's 1980 election victory, the 
British government called into question any immediate European follow-up action 
on the Peace Process. It did so partly to appease the new Republican 
administration, but also out of concern that the Community was ill-prepared for 
the political repercussions of its initiative. 17 The coming to power of the strongly 
pro-Palestinian Papandreou government marked the start of a hardline Greek 
foreign policy that rejected any Community association with Camp David and led 
to confrontations with its EC counterparts-' 
8 Externally, Begin's re-election in 
Israel and the growing opposition of the Reagan administration to European 
interference in the Peace Process deterred fixther EPC action. 
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The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon was a golden OPPortunity for the 
Community to re-assert itself in the Middle East. The Community had come 
under increased criticism for its lack of collective condemnation of the expansion 
of Israeli settlements and repression of Palestinians in the occupied territories. 
When an EPC statement was finally made, it was again dismissed by the Begin 
government. However, Israel's incursion into Lebanon drew an angry and rapid 
response from Europe. A veiled threat was made in the EPC statement (9 June 
1982) warning of 'future action' if Israeli troops were not withdrawn. 
This period was notable for the use of Community policy instruments (aid, 
financial protocols, trade rules) to make a political point (condemnation of Israel's 
action in Lebanon). The first concrete action was an embargo on arms sales to 
Israel. 19 The embargo was followed by the European Parliament's decision to 
withhold for several months its approval of the second EEC-Israel financial 
protocol in protest at Begin's actions. At the same time, the Community provided 
funds for the international humanitarian aid effort in Lebanon, and began a short 
time later to channel aid to the Palestinian territories. 
What conclusions can be drawn about the early phase of the EC's 
involvement in the Middle East Peace Process? First, the Community never 
received much more than lukewarm responses to its initiatives from the key 
players in the conflict. From the inception of EPC, it failed to assert a sufficiently 
distant position from the US to win the full confidence of the Arab side, and 
crucially of the PLO. Relations with Israel only deteriorated after EPC was 
created. Even if Begin's evocation of World War Two was harsh, both the Israelis 
and the Arabs had suffered the pernicious effects of colonial European politics, 
most damagingly in the artificial and discriminatory division of territories. 
perceptions of European diplomacy were inevitably coloured by the past. 
20 
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Second, although EPC undoubtedly helped foster foreign policy concertation, the 
mechanism was better suited to 'the coordination of national actions rather than 
the expression of a common position'. 21 There was a considerable gap between the 
strong tone of EPC Declarations and their half-hearted implementation. 
2. A Second Chance? The Gulf War and the Resurrection of the Peace 
Process 
The 1990 Gulf War altered the political landscape in the Middle East and brought 
a renewed sense of urgency to the search for a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
European calls for a comprehensive solution to the conflict assumed new 
resonance in view of the involvement of so many of the region's states in the Gulf 
22 
crisis. Yet the Union emerged from the Gulf War with a tarnished reputation 
among the Arab countries. The obvious divisions among the Member States over 
their contributions to the military operation had again exposed the Union's 
weaknesses as an international power and reinforced the sense of its dependence 
on the USA in international crises. For the Arab states, the Union's involvement 
in what was perceived as an American war confirmed its unreliability as a 
counterweight to the US. 23 In particular, France's role in the coalition was viewed 
as tantamount to treason by its sizeable population of Arab immigrants, provoking 
mass demonstrations in Paris. 
24 
However, the EU still had grounds to expect that its growing economic and 
political weight, further enhanced by moves towards the completion of the Single 
Market, would enable it to stake a credible claim for a more significant role in the 
Peace Process. As Leon Hadar suggests, 'the Gulf crisis showed President Bush 
that the US needed European support and, perhaps more importantly, European 
money'. 25 Moreover, with the Cold War over, balancing independent EU foreign 
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policy action against harmonious relations with the USA became less imperative. 
Inside the Community, renewed interest in political integration, inspired by the 
Delors Commission and the Franco-German alliance, generated political 
momentum behind the creation of a more coherent and cohesive common foreign 
policy. 
The extent of the EU's marginalisation in the Middle East became clear 
when it was confined to the role of observer as the USA and Russia co-sponsored 
the launch of the bilateral track (Israeli-Palestinian) of the Peace Process in 
Madrid in November 1991.26 The bilateral negotiations covered the vital political 
issues in the Peace Process: territorial control, sovereignty, borders, security 
arrangements and the rights of the Palestinians. European leaders played down the 
Union's exclusion from the toP table. French Foreign Office Minister Roland 
Dumas, for instance, claimed that his government had actively contributed to the 
preparation of the Madrid conference, and that US leadership was essential to 
keep Israel at the negotiating table. 27 
Nevertheless, it was evident that Israel and the USA had little appetite for 
the EU to play a significant political role in the Peace Process. What they 
required was its money. Faced with a huge budget deficit and deep economic 
recession, the USA's aid budget in the early 1990s came under severe pressure in 
Congress. Since there was no question of reducing its fmancial assistance to Israel 
and Egypt, an alternative source of funds had to be found for the Palestinians, and 
that source was the European Union. 
Instead, the Union had to settle for a leading role in the Multilateral 
Working Groups set up to channel international financial aid to the region and 
coordinate projects in the economic, infrastructural, social and environmental 
spheres . 
28 The EU acted as co-organiser of the Environment, Refugee and Water 
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working groups. 29 More significantly, it was made 'gavel holder' of the Regional 
Economic Development Working Group (REDWG), which allowed it to direct 
30 international financial assistance to the Palestinian territories. Work in the 
REDWG was divided into 10 areas, with 'shepherd' states responsible for 
coordinating projects in each area: 
Figure 6.1 EU Member States' Roles in the REDWG 
In addition to its responsibilities for individual project areas, the Community also 
provided crucial logistical support. A secretariat and executive secretary for the 
monitoring committee set up to oversee the projects were funded by the Union. 
The Union also became an active contributor to the Arms Control and 
Regional Security working group (ACRS), another rolling multilateral forum 
established by the Madrid conference. Again, Community Member States were 
entrusted with leading discussions in certain areas. The Netherlands, for instance, 
chaired talks on a regional crisis communication network. As far as a specific EU 
6role' was concerned, its participation in the ACRS was significant in two 
respects. First, it allowed a Community input into the negotiation of issues such 
as arms control and non-proliferation, confidence-building measures and regional 
security structures. It was thus a 'back door' into the politico-security aspects of 
the Peace Process. Second, it gave the Community first hand experience of the 
security problems that would arise as the Washington agreement was 
implemented. This experience proved valuable in the Barcelona process, and 
influenced the wording of the Barcelona Declaration. 
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As Peters argues,, the multilateral track was based on a 'functionalist- 
liberalist conception of cooperation" where the enmeshing of the region's states 
through multi-sectoral cooperation would enable them to set aside their political 
differenceS. 31 The initiation of this functionalist-inspired multilateral track was 
ideally suited to the Union external policy strengths, and to its own experience 
with regional economic and political integration. With the Union's failure to 
substantially improve its capacity for politico-security policy-making at 
Maastricht, pillar one assumed even greater significance. However, the 
circumstances in which the Union found itself were clearly favourable. The 
multilateral working groups provided a mutually reinforcing institutional link 
between its emergent Mediterranean partnership strategy and the Peace Process. 
The Commission was quick to recognise the opportunity, arguing that: 
On the economic front the time is now right for the EC, together with the 
international community and especially the Gulf countries, to embark on an 
ambitious cooperation programme which would embrace the economic 
development of the West Bank and Gaza, bearing in mind the need also for 
international efforts in favour of the region as a whole. 32 
The economic development of the occupied territories, and support for the 
economic integration between the Arab countries, became the guiding principles 
of the EU's contribution to the Peace Process. 
3. Between Banker and Broker: How Influence Was Won 
The signature of the Oslo Declaration of Principles and Washington Agreements 
in September and October 1993 was a major breakthrough in the Peace Process, 
and injected new dynamism into the flagging Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. 
Even the USA had proved powerless to bring the dovish Rabin government and 
Arafat's beleaguered and conciliatory PLO together. It was left to Norway, not an 
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EU member, to act as a secret intermediary and restart the talks. Between March 
and September 1993, a series of discussions, initially between academics and 
researchers, led to the historic mutual recognition agreement by the Palestinian 
and Israeli authorities and set a clear timetable for the withdrawal of Israeli forces 
from the West Bank and Gaza. 
Immediately after the Washington meeting, the REDWG was convened in 
order to discuss a World Bank report, co-financed by the EC,, US and Norway, 
about economic rebuilding in the region. As one commentary put it, 'the Israel- 
PLO agreement will only survive if it results in a quick and sustainable 
hnprovement in the standard of living of the people of the occupied territories. 33 
At the Washington Donors' Conference (I October 1993), the EU heads of 
government pledged 500 million ECUs from the Community budget to be 
channelled to the region from 1994-98 through the Commission (50 million ECUs 
per annum in grants) and the European Investment Bank (250 million ECUs per 
annum in loans), the largest single pledge. 34 A new body - the Ad Hoc Liaison 
Committee (AHLC) - chaired by Norway, was mandated to coordinate and 
promote aid from individual donors to the Palestinian people. Much of the real 
work of this group was done in advance of informal meetings of the major 
participants, with the EU, United States and World Bank (as well as the 
Palestinian Authority and Israel) taking the key decisions among themselves. 
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Table 6.1 Donor Pledges October 1993- November 1996 (Million ECUs) 
Donor Grants Loans Total 
European Union 
(Budget+EIB) 
250 250 500 
USA 315 105 420 
Japan 215 0 215 
Saudi Arabia 168 0 168 
Norway 126 - 0 126 
Netherlands 101 0 101 
Germany 78 0 78 
Italy 67 0 67 
Sweden 58 0 58 
France 54 0 54 
Deru-nark 43 0 43 
Spain 43 0 43 
Canada 28 0 28 
World 
Bank/IDA 
0 176 176 
Israel 21 42 63 
Other donors 297 239 537 
Total 1864 858 2667 
Source: Data extrapolated from various sources. 
By 1996, the EU had firmly established itself as the biggest contributor to 
the Palestinian state-in-waiting, a fact that not only made it indispensable to the 
economic track of the Peace Process, but provided the Union, and the West, with 
an instrument capable of influencing the behaviour of the both the Arabs and the 
Israelis. 35 As the MEDA financial package for the Mediterranean came on stream, 
the Union had an impressive array of financial incentives at its disposal. That 
said, political influence was not a logical corollary of aid. That depended on the 
multiplier effect of aid, including anticipated dividends such as increased inward 
investment, the stabilisation of the business environment and the normalisation of 
relations at both the governmental and societal levels. 
36 
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For many inside the Union, though, this improved economic leverage did 
not go far enough. In an exchange with the Belgian Council Presidency, one MEP 
complained that: 
you have not explained what the European Community or European Union 
specifically intends to do to encourage the .... I have the impression that Norway has done a great deal more in real terms that the European Union 
and I am rather sad about that. 37 
In a similar vein, a French official argued that: 
the Community should have a position reflecting its economic dynamism. 
It should not just serve as a cash register for policies decided elsewhere. 38 
Just as the Middle East had been a priority for EPC, so it seemed that its 
successor, the CFSP,, would devote an equally large percentage of the EU's 
diplomatic resources to the region. At the Brussels European Council of 
December 1993, the first after the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, a list of 
possible initiatives was set out by the Heads of Govenunent identifying priority 
areas for EU initiatives. The principal themes of the framework were as follows: 
Figure 6.2 Proposed EU Initiatives in the Peace Process 
1) Participation in international supporting arrangements. 
2) Strengthening the democratic process through, inter alia, assisting with the 
ion and monitoring of elections in the Palestinian territories. 
) Building regional cooperation, chiefly through participation in the REDWG 
Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group. 
1) Support for Palestinian institution building through the mobilisation and 
mplementation of EU aid progranunes for the occupied territories. 
Providing bilateral aid to other parties to the bilateral negotiations. 
Assuring follow-up to action underway on confidence-building measures 
bmitted to the regional parties. 
Using the EU's influence to encourage ftill support on all sides for the . 
39 
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The Commission was instructed to prepared the grounds for joint actions, 
an indication that the Member governments' action in pillar one was the key 
element in the Union" s long-term contribution to the Peace Process. A 
Commission Communication had already set out the broad parameters for EU 
policy post-Washington. Consistent with Europe's call for a global settlement, the 
Communication emphasised the Union's specific role in promoting regional 
cooperation and stressed the need to involve Israel in 'a balanced triangular 
relationship' with Europe and the Mashreq countries. 40 
Implementation of the Oslo process soon reached an impasse, ostensibly 
over the speed and scale of the hand-over of the occupied territories. However, 
the stalemate was symptomatic of a more serious problem: the irreconcilable 
Israeli policies of withdrawing troops while simultaneously expanding Jewish 
settlements. The massacre in January 1994 of dozens of Palestinians in a Mosque 
in Hebron by an Israeli settler exposed the fragility of the process and called into 
question the ability of the two sides to guarantee the security of their resPective 
populations. The EU's reaction to events in Hebron was confined to a short 
statement by the Council condemning the massacre, and calling for 'the authorities 
[Israeli] to take full responsibility for protecting the inhabitants of the occupied 
territories 9.41 
Eventually, the CFSP was used for positive action by the Union. A joint 
action (94/276) on the Peace Process, based on Article J3 of the Maastricht Treaty, 
was adopted by the Council on 19 April 1994. The political element of the joint 
action took the form of funding (10 million ECUs) for the establishment of the 
Palestinian police force, and a programme of assistance for elections in the 
occupied territories, including the provision of electoral observers. The precise 
details of the latter were left to the Council to decide. As Esther Barbe and 
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Fernando Izqueirdo argue, the ambit of the joint action confirmed the low key 
approach adopted by the Union. 42 A vague promise to issue dimarches to the 
Arab states over their economic boycott of Israel, and to the Israelis over their 
settlement policy was indicative of the EU's nervousness about making overtly 
political interventions. 
It was at this stage that divergencies among the Member States began to 
surface over how to respond to developments in the region. The election of 
Jacques Chirac as President in May 1995 heralded a new interventionism in 
French foreign policy. From the outset, Chirac demanded a greater say for 
Europe, and also for France, in the Peace Process commensurate with their 
respective financial contributions. France's status as the biggest individual donor 
to the Palestinian authority lent Chirac's vision some legitimacy. But the new 
President's European vocation masked an even stronger desire to reassert France's 
6special' status in the region. Chirac used the final days of the French Council 
Presidency to arrange a series of high profile meetings with Middle Eastern 
leaders, including Arafat. In a press interview following a diplomatic visit to 
Cairo, Foreign Minister Herve de Charette, asked about France's role in the 
Middle East, replied that 'the situation in the region requires that Europe in 
general, and France in particular, take account of their traditional links and 
historical interests', promising 'a bigger French presence'. 43 
French activism was taken a step further April when Foreign Minister 
Herve de Charette travelled in quick su-. 1cession to Beirut, Jerusalem and 
Damascus to negotiate a cease-fire after the Israeli shelling of Southern Lebanon. 
France's part in securing the ceasefire won it a seat as co-chair of the monitoring 
committee alongside the USA. In contrast to Chirac's diplomatic efforts, the 
collective response of the EU to the Lebanon crisis could best be described as 
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tardy. The Troika, led by Council President Susanna Agnelli, arrived in the region 
behind the French team. One of the major shortcomings of EU foreign policy - its 
inability to speak with one voice - and the obvious tension between the two 
European delegations attracted widespread media coverage. 
A more revealing indication of the CFSP's weakness was the Union's 
lengthy silence on the election of Benjamin Netanyahu's Likud coalition in May 
1996. Despite the obvious implications for the Peace Process and political 
relations with Israel, no statement was issued on what the Union expected from 
the new government vis-a-vis the Oslo process. 44 Only after a summer of violence 
precipitated by Israel's failure to adhere to the Oslo accords and the USA's 
reluctance to put pressure on Netanyahu did the EU finally grind into gear, 
launching a thinly veiled attack on Israel in a CFSP statement and despatching 
Irish Foreign Minister Dick Spring to the Middle East for talks with Netanyahu 
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and Arafat. In a sudden flurry of diplomatic activity, the Troika also held talks 
with Arafat and Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy, but were able to offer little 
more than consoling words to the Palestinians, and were rebuffed by the Israelis. 
The Union's efforts were met with an extraordinary warning from US Secretary of 
State Warren Christopher. In a letter to each of the 15 member governments, 
Christopher exhorted the Union to refrain from interfering in the Peace Process at 
such a 'delicate moment'. 
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The Union's tentative diplomacy, and the US warning was followed by a 
high profile diplomatic foray by Chirac who controversially grabbed centre stage 
with his own tour of the region. The Sharm al Shaykh (Egypt) anti-terrorism 
conference heard Chirac argue for more attention to be paid to the needs of Syria 
and Lebanon, a move calculated to win France greater influence among the Arab 
countries. 47 On a visit to Cairo, the French President argued that the EU deserved 
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to become a co-sponsor of the Peace Process, suggesting a series of principles on 
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which a European political initiative might be based . At a highly sensitive time 
in the peace negotiations, Chirac's renewed calls for the establishment of a 
Palestinian state and the withdrawal of Israeli occupying forces from the Golan 
Heights and Lebanon were guaranteed to raise hackles. Not surprisingly, the visit, 
and the rhetoric, were welcomed by Arab governments, particularly by the 
Lebanese government with which France was reestablishing a close working 
relationship. The President's standing was further boosted by a televised scuffle 
with Israeli security guards during a tour of Jerusalem. 
On the negative side, the visit was a serious set back for Euro-Israeli 
relations. The other 'leading European voice' in the Middle East - the UK - took a 
particularly dim view of Chirac's unilateral excursion. Foreign Secretary Malcom 
Rifkind undertook his own diplomatic offensive in the region, meeting both the 
Israeli and Palestinian sides to show that Britain took a more neutral view of the 
Peace Process. Rifldnd went on to argue for an Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in the Middle East, based on the OSCE,, a proposal that was an 
indirect swipe at Chirac. 
The outcome of the Union's experience during this tense period was the 
decision to appoint a special envoy, Miguel Moratinos, to represent the EU in the 
Peace Process. The appointment of Moratinos was a shrewd move by the EU. A 
former Spanish Ambassador to Israel, the special envoy had considerable inside 
49 
knowledge of regional politics, and the respect of the parties concerned . 
Furthermore, Moratinos had been instrumental in preparing the Barcelona 
Conference as part of Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez' diplomatic team, 
so was aware of the limits of EU diplomacy in a multilateral context . 
50 Another 
factor in Moratinos' favour was his nationality. Spanish governments had always 
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treated the Middle East and North Africa as a special concern, and the relative 
even-handedness of their policies contrasted with the high profile partisan 
approach of France. A Spanish foreign office official noted that 'we played our 
cards well on the Middle East, we are respected there .... we know our limits'. 
51 it 
is difficult to see how a diplomat from one of the big three Member States - 
France, Gennany and the UK - would have been tolerated by either side. 52 
Moratinos' appointment and mandate, the subject of a CFSP joint action, 
were confinned in only one hour by Foreign Ministers in October 1996 in an 
indication of the strength of support for the initiative among the Member States. 53 
Having scored a minor diplomatic success with Carl Bildt as EU special envoy to 
the Yugoslavian conflict, the lessons learned from that experience were applied to 
Moratinos' instructions. 54 His mandate contained the following objectives: 
Figure 6.3 Special Envoy's Mandate 
To establish and maintain contacts with all the parties involved. 
To observe the negotiations, offer the EU's advice and its 'good offices'. 
" Contribute to implementing international agreements and 'engage with them 
diplomatically' in the event of non-compliance. 
" To promote, by engaging with signatories, compliance with norms of human 
rights, democracy and the rule of law. 
" To report to Council bodies about the best way of pursuing EU initiatives and 
ongoing Peace Process-related business. 
To monitor actions which might affect permanent status negotiations (ie 55 
actions in the occupied territories) . 
Moratinos' remit appeared carefully judged and realistic: to project the political 
presence of the EU by offering its good offices rather than by attempting major 
diplomatic offensives. The fact that he was a civil servant rather than a politician 
also smoothed the way for his appointment. Those Member States who remained 
wary about a higher profile EU presence in the region could not have accepted a 
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political figure.: "' Similarly, the Israeli government would have been less likely to 
work with an obviously political figure. 
The early signs for the special envoy were good. Moratinos worked 
effectively behind the scenes as a facilitator for dialogue between the Israelis, 
Palestinians and other Arab countries. One of his most significant early 
achievements was to bring Arafat and Levy together in Brussels for a relaunch of 
the peace talks after the crisis over new Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem. He 
was also instrumental in brokering the deal over Hebron, securing the 
commitment of the Palestinians to the deal while the USA took care of Israel. 57 
Why should Moratinos have brought the EU greater credibility? A clue lies 
in his own perceptions about his role: 
My role is complementary to the US. It has to be so. My role is not about 
competing for influence but in striving to help the Middle East Peace 
Process. 58 
Moratinos' experience as Spanish ambassador in Israel also made him acutely 
aware of Israeli sensitivities. Any kind of direct European pressure on Netanyahu 
would have further weakened EU mediation. 59 At first, the Israeli government 
had been sceptical, with David Levy arguing that 'the [Israeli-Palestinian] 
negotiations must be direct and without any external pressure'. 60 But Moratinos 
patient, neutral approach gradually won him the approval of Netanyahu's 
government and the US administration. 
For the Palestinians, and the Arab side in general, the special envoy's role 
was less satisfactory. One Arab official lamented that: 
Moratinos would have been more effective if there was an effective 
mandate, an effective initiative. He needed something to offer in the 
framework of an initiative. It is a good thing for the Arabs to underline the 
importance attached to a European role, but Moratinos must have a clear 
position. He must be able to use all the resources at Europe's disposal. 
61 
Another Arab diplomat expressed similar sentiments, arguing that: 
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A clearer mandate is necessary. At the moment, his role is presenting the 
European Union's position and going back to Brussels. 62 
The point here is that Moratinos was more important to the Palestinians than the 
Israelis. The Arab states expected the special envoy to back the Palestinians in the 
same way that the US government backed Israel. 
By the latter half of 1997, Moratinos and the EU had accumulated 
sufficient political capital to enable them to present a 'code of conduct' to the 
Israelis and Palestinians. The document was presented by the special envoy to the 
two sides during October 1997.63 True to form, Moratinos went to great lengths 
to clear the code with both parties before its fonnal launch. The code incorporated 
a number of confidence building measures drawn in a large part from the 
Barcelona process. Its key principles were firstly, that the Israeli government 
should respect the commitments made by its predecessor. Secondly, the code 
called for the Palestinians to do more to combat terrorism. 64 Significantly, it 
received a cautious welcome by the Israeli government, who had praised the envoy 
'for establishing excellent relations with both sides'. 65 Moratinos thus became the 
conduit for a more substantive political input from the Union. 
However, regardless of Moratinos' presence, the Union could only stand 
by and watch as the situation in the Middle East deteriorated. The growing 
frustration of the Union was also expressed by the Member States in a terse attack 
on Israeli policy. Meeting on 24 November 1997, EU foreign ministers castigated 
Netanyahu, with Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jacques Poos stating: 
Our basic approach is that of land for peace. The policy of Prime Minister 
Netanyahu does not enjoy our support. It is a narrow minded policy. 
66 
In what amounted to an admission that it still lacked truly effective political 
influence, the Union quickly backtracked, accepting that the only realistic means 
to prod the two sides back to the negotiating table was for it to act in tandem with 
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the USA. At the EU-US summit on December 3, the Union unambiguously 
emphasised its support for US-led mediation. 67 
European diplomacy in the Peace Process took a new twist in March 1998 
with the visit of UK Foreign Minister and President of the Council, Robin Cook, 
to Egypt, Israel and Jordan. In advance of the trip, EU Foreign Ministers made it 
clear that Israeli settlement policy was their main concern. It was also a subject on 
which Cook had resolved to push Netanyahu as far possible, a task he 
spectacularly accomplished. Cook chose to ignore Israeli warnings and met 
Palestinians at the disputed Har Homa/Jabal Abu Ghneim settlement in East 
Jerusalem, a visit that provoked violent demonstrations by right wing Israeli 
settlers. 68 On the same visit, the Foreign Secretary used a meeting with Netanyahu 
to ask for an explanation of Israel's continued refusal to open the airport in Gaza, 
whose construction was funded by the Union. Cook's actions signalled the EU's 
displeasure with Netanyahu's policies and earned much needed political capital 
from Arab states. It also heightened the sense that the Union had become the key 
western ally of the Palestinians. 
The latitude enjoyed by the British Foreign Secretary bore testament to the 
growing cohesiveness of the Member States on the EU's involvement in the Peace 
Process. Before his trip, Cook was careful to draw attention to the backing he had 
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received from all the EU foreign ministers at an informal meeting in Edinburgh . 
As French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine commented: 
It is one of the things that has struck me since I took on this position. 
Coherence in the analysis, the diagnosis of the objectives is stronger and 
stronger within the European Union. 70 
That the Member States' nerve held bore testament to the Union's slow 
maturation as an international actor. 
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4. THE EMP AND THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS 
The Barcelona Process 
From the outset, the EU made a determined effort to keep clear blue water 
between the Barcelona process and the Middle East. In ajoint report on the 
implementation of the EMP, the Commission and Council presidency claimed 
that: 
strong efforts have been made .... to ensure respect for the principle that, 
while the Barcelona Process can exert a positive influence on the Middle 
East Peace Process, it should not replace other activities and initiatives 
undertaken in the interest of peace, stability and prosperity of the region. 71 
Officially, the primary function of the EMP was to provide the institutional basis 
for low-key, functional cooperation between Arabs and Israelis. The Barcelona 
process would 'step in' if and when peace finally broke out in the region. 72 
Admittedly, however, some within the EU also saw Barcelona as a response to its 
exclusion from the political track of the Peace Process. 73 According to Eberhard 
Rhein, a Commission Director General responsible for Mediterranean policy: 
the Euro-Med partnership should be seen as a catalytic factor helping to 
inter alia allow Israelis and Arabs to work together in a wider context, with 
Europe as a sort of "chaperone" between the two. 74 
But there was never any serious suggestion that the Barcelona process could or 
should emulate the Oslo process. 
When the Peace Process began to falter early in 1996, the Barcelona 
process initially appeared to withstand the rising tension between the Arab 
participants and Israel. The functional method appeared to be bearing fruit, 
particularly at the administrative level where diplomats involved in the two 
follow-up committees continued to attend meetings, while the programme of 
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sectoral conferences, meetings and seminars proceeded with little obvious 
disruption. Most notably, a meeting of the senior officials committee went ahead 
in July 1996 despite the Israeli shelling of southern Lebanon. Commissioner 
MarM' was not alone in proclaiming the durability of the process to be a major 
75 
achievement in its own right. Reflecting on the turmoil of 1996, a Swedish 
official stated: 
We should be happy that we still have the Barcelona process running after 
this year. Just being able to meet is a confidence building measure in its 
oWn right. 
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Behind the scenes, though, cracks were appearing in the fagade. First, the 
Israeli, Lebanese and Syrian representatives on the two steering committees 
refused to address each other directly at meetings, opting instead to read out 
prepared statements on the situation in the Middle East. 77 Meetings frequently 
started with condemnation of one side by the other and their productiveness was 
inevitably adversely affected. Second, at a meeting of the Arab League in 
September 1996, foreign ministers from the Arab partner countries discussed a 
proposal to withdraw from the Barcelona framework if the Israelis reneged on the 
Oslo agreements. " That they eventually decided not to owed more to the lack of 
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altematives than to any optimism about the prospects for the EMP. Third, 
progress in the political and security basket, effectively a barometer for the 
Barcelona process, virtually ground to a halt, with the senior officials committee 
able to make only minimal headway on the list of Confidence Building Measures, 
and the suspension of the stability pact initiative. 
Arguably the defining moment for the Barcelona process arrived with 
Israel's decision to go ahead with the construction of Israeli settlements in East 
Jerusalem, a decision which effectively halted the bilateral track of the Peace 
Process. 80 The ensuing row occurred only weeks before the second ministerial 
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conference in Malta, meant to in ect new momentum into the EMP. Dutch i 
Foreign Minister Hans Van Mierlo was forced to embark on an exhaustive tour of 
A- - Lne Middle East simply to persuade the Arab and Israeli foreign ministers to 
attend. " Work on a Conference Declaration had to be put to one side as Van 
Mierlo's team searched for a form of words acceptable to both sides. The Arab 
governments pressed for a passage condemning the settlements to be included in 
A. 1- - die final declaration, while the Israeli govemment flatly rejected any references to 
the issue and to the Middle East in general. 82 It took a meeting between Israeli 
Foreign Minister David Levy and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, brokered by 
Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van Mierlo, to prevent an acrimonious break-up of 
the gathering. 83 Nevertheless, the participants still left Malta without an 
agreement on where the Barcelona process was heading, and it required several 
more weeks of discussions to produce a sterile, mutually acceptable text which did 
little more than summarise progress and identify future priorities. 
The Malta debacle put an end to any pretence that the Barcelona process 
could be insulated from the Peace Process. As Commissioner Manuel Manin 
admitted: 
The fundamental aim of peace and stability in the Mediterranean cannot be 
achieved without a permanent and just solution to the Middle East conflict. 
Although the Peace Process and the Euro-Mediterranean partnership are two 
distinct and separate processes. Eventually the latter cannot fully succeed 
without the success of the former. 84 
For many of the participants, the very essence of the 'Barcelona spirit' was the 
novelty of having Israel, Lebanon and Syria engaged together in dialogue in a 
multilateral forum, something neither the multilateral track of the Peace Process 
nor the MENA summits had achieved. The health of the EMP was therefore 
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always bound to be inextricably linked to the state of the Peace Process. An Arab 
diplomat was unequivocal about this linkage: 
There is no way that this process will succeed without progress on the Peace 
Process .... How can we talk about economic cooperation while we have a 
government [in Israel] that is reneging on all its previous international 
commitments? 85 
The Arab partner countries perceived the Barcelona process as a means to draw 
the EU further into the Peace Process and as a potential counter-weight to US-led 
diplomacy. 86 Their enthusiasm was inevitably dampened when it became clear 
that the EU did not share the same vision of the process. 
From the outset, Israel's lukewarm attitude towards the Barcelona process 
reflected its traditional suspicion of European interference in the Middle East. 
Indeed, after the Likud coalition's election victory in May 1996, the Israelis 
became distinctly more critical of EU initiatives. Netanyahu's government 
continued to regard the USA as the only acceptable external mediator, perceiving 
the Union to be overtly supportive of Palestinian demands and generally 'pro- 
Arab. 47 An Israeli diplomat summed up his govemment"s position thus: 
The Barcelona process is not going to replace the Middle East Peace Process. 
Barcelona is for the future..... Strategically, the US is much more "present" than 
any of the European countries. 88 
Israel had another reason to play down the significance of Barcelona. The non- 
implementation of the Oslo accords and the economic blockade on the Palestinian 
territories could be argued to represent a violation of both the spirit and letter of 
the Barcelona Declaration . 
89 The Israeli government was therefore keen to 
prevent the process becoming another platform from which the Arab states could 
mount attacks on its policies. 
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By mid- 1997, the negative spillover from developments in the Middle East 
was penetrating throughout the Barcelona process. The Arab group began 
selectively refusing to meet Israeli representatives on Arab soil, effectively ending 
the diplomatically important practice of holding meetings in all the countries 
participating in the Barcelona process. 90 Under pressure from the other Arab 
governments, the Moroccan government decided to cancel a high profile 
Conference of Industry Ministers due to be held in Marrakesh, blaming Israel's 
'continued obstruction of the . '91 An ad-hoc foreign ministers' meeting, 
scheduled to be held in an Arab country in June 1998, had to be switched to 
Palermo by the UK Presidency. Ironically, the point of the meeting was for the 
participants to make a political statement about the necessity of keeping the 
Barcelona process separate from the Peace Process. 92 However, Syria's demands 
that the meeting specifically address Israel's policies threatened to turn Palermo 
into a repeat of Malta, an embarrassing outcome both the new UK government and 
the Italian hosts desperately wanted to avoid. 93 In the end,, the Palermo meeting 
did the minimum necessary to ensure the survival of the Barcelona process, 
avoiding further controversy over the Peace Process and focusing instead on the 
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commercial and financial priorities for the EMP. 
There are several conclusions to be drawn from the way the relationship 
between the Barcelona process and the Peace Process evolved. First, the 
multilateral strand of the EMP turned out to be contingent upon the situation in 
the Middle East rather than complementary to it. Incremental confidence building 
and functional economic cooperation had little more than symbolic value without 
forward movement in the Peace Process. 95 Second, the EU found itself unable to 
keep politics out the process. Part of the blarne lay at the Union's own feet, since 
it devoted too much attention to the first basket where the specific measures on the 
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table were clearly highly sensitive. But the problem also stemmed from the inter- 
governmental nature of the process, relying on agreements among parties with 
such demonstrably conflicting attitudes and interests. Third, the inseparability of 
the two arenas called into question the wisdom of the EUs decision to apply the 
partnership concept to the Mediterranean region as a whole. The all-pervasive 
influence of the Middle East meant conflict resolution and regional integration in 
other sub-regional strategic arenas (Cyprus, Greece-Turkey, the Maghreb) was 
neglected, prompting calls for regional sub-groups (Western Mediterranean, South 
East Europe) to be created within the Barcelona frainework. 96 It is difficult to 
avoid the conclusion that the Barcelona process was a creature of the uniquely 
favourable political conditions at the end of 1995. Once the Peace Process broke 
down, Barcelona was left floundering. 
The Euro-Mediterranean Agreements 
In contrast to the ailing Barcelona process, the bilateral strand of the EMP proved 
to be a quietly fruitful channel for EU to strengthen its role in the Middle East. 
The starting point was the conclusion of a Euro-Mediterranean agreement with the 
Palestinian Authority, a natural complement to the Union" s substantial financial 
investment in the nascent Palestinian state. Although the accord merely 
formalised existing trade concessions, containing none of the political and social 
provisions of the other Euro-Mediterranean agreements, it nevertheless 
represented another important step towards the recognition of Palestinian 
aspirations to statehood. A measure of the agreement's political significance came 
from Israel's reaction to it: Netanyahu's government described it as 'almost a 
barrier to the Peace Process'. 97 
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However, agreements signed in Brussels were one thing, following them 
through in the disputed territories was another. Increasingly frequent border 
closures and restrictions on the movement of Palestinian people and goods by the 
Israeli authorities nullified the trade creation potential of the accord, delayed the 
construction of donor-funded projects, and impeded the operation of completed 
projects. 98 Imports of EU-funded infrastructural equipment destined for Gaza were 
routinely held in Israeli depots for 'security reasons', after which the Palestinians 
were presented with large bills for storage costs. 99 Agricultural goods frequently 
sat rotting in customs warehouses for months, with Union representatives unable 
to intervene. ' 00 As an Arab League official put it, 'the EU ought to be asking ask 
how much it lose[s] in Palestine from the money it provided because of the Israeli 
blockade. "Ol 
The Commission's exasperation with the situation in the Palestinian 
territories was palpable. In a blunt statement to the European Parliament, the 
Desk Officer for Palestine argued that: 
Unless there is safe passage between the West Bank and Gaza, an open port 
and airport, customs controls and free movement .... we may as well not 
have 
signed the agreement. 102 
But the options open to the EU were limited, constrained both by the terms of the 
1994 Interim Agreement and its inability to put effective political pressure on the 
Israel to lift the physical barriers to the movement of goods and people. 
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It was undoubtedly this combination of frustration and impotence that 
prompted a shift in the Union's policy towards the end of 1997. The 'demand' 
for 
EU action was clearly expressed by Yasser Arafat: 
Seventy per cent of the economy of Israel is with European countries and 
this card has not been used until now. Why not? You only 
have to wave 
this economic card and they will listen to you directly. At least wave it. 
104 
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Seizing the opportunity presented by Moratinos' careful groundwork and the 
hardening of the Member States' attitudes towards the Netanyahu government, the 
Commission chose to raise the political stakes through the Euro-Mediterranean 
agreements. 105 The decision to focus on trade formed part of an EU strategy that 
targetted three specific issues: 
a) Improving Palestinian access to external markets. 
b) Unblocking the Israeli restrictions on free-movement, particularly access to the 
airport and port. 
106 c) Promoting and funding new projects such as border-based industrial zones. 
The pursuit of this strategy relied on a division of labour between Moratinos as the 
Union's political envoy to the Peace Process, and the Commission as coordinator 
of the Union's economic and financial input. It also represented 
acknowledgement on the Union's part that its political objectives for the Peace 
Process had to be more effectively harnessed to Community policy instruments. 
The first sign of the Union toughening its approach towards Israel came 
with a dispute over orange juice imports in October 1997.107 The dispute 
centred on claims that Israel had been re-exporting Brazilian orange juice to the 
Community under its own duty free quota. ' 08 Despite a blunt written warning 
from Commissioner Manuel Marin to Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy, the 
Israeli government failed to address many of the Commission's concerns. 109 
Consistent with standard procedures, it was eannarked by DG IB as a 
'technical' issue and passed to the Commission's trade policy and legal experts. 
The Israeli authorities were subsequently given an official admonishment 
detailing the nature of the complaint and threatening EU importers of the 
product with fines. ' 10 The dispute was resolved at a special meeting of the 
EU-Israel Cooperation Committee on November 28 when Israeli customs 
officials gave an undertaking to tighten controls on orange juice traders. "' 
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But the official warning provoked accusations from Israel that the Union was 
using the case to make a political point about the situation in Israel. 112 
Certainly, the dispute - ostensibly a technical-legal one - was politicised to an 
extent not previously seen in EU-Israeli trade relations. A Scandinavian 
official claimed that: 
this would have been repressed politically 15 years ago .... Israel is being dealt with as a nonnal state and political considerations will no longer 
disguise misbehaviour. Political rules now apply. ' 13 
The orange juice case was only the first in an increasingly bitter war of 
words over Israel's application of the rules of origin clauses in its Euro- 
Mediterranean Agreement with the EU. The Commission's patience with Israel 
was pushed to the limit as instances of products from the Occupied Territories 
being exported to the EU under the Israeli flag came to light. Finally, in May 
1998, the Commission officially notified Israel that the terms of the agreement 
were being violated, and that products originating from the occupied territories 
might be excluded from the EU-Israel free trade area, a threat backed by the 
Council! 14 Manin was defiant: 'We gave peace a chance. But now we are 
acting. " 15 Netanyahu's retort was equally confrontational: 
Be careful with the use of ultimatums and dictates of any kind. That is the 
one thing that doesn't go well in Israel and with me. 116 
It was a measure of the EU's new-found assertiveness that, in spite of 
Netanyahu's attempt to play the 'anti-Israel' card, Israeli officials were forced to 
sit down with the Commission discuss ways of lifting the restrictions on 
Palestinian trade. "' An economic policy had been used to send a firm political 
message: that it was unacceptable to regard the Palestinian territories as part of 
Israel. By the end of 1998, it accounted for 53 per cent of total fmancial assistance 
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to the Palestinians, and was on the point of pledging another 1.5 billion ECUs in 
aid. 118 The Union was not prepared to sit back and watch its massive investment 
in Palestine's future wasted. 
Conclusions 
It is evident that the EU has settled for modest influence in the Peace Process 
rather than outright power. Regardless of its more successful initiatives, the 
continued presence of the USA has made the Peace Process tick. It was difficult 
to conceive of jLny Israeli government turning to the EU for solutions. There is 
still an obvious, deep-seated mistrust of Europe arising from its history of 
mistreating its Jewish communities, and of its motives for seeking to increase its 
influence in the region. Suspicions on both the Arab and Israeli sides suggest that 
the Union views the region as an untapped market which it is in the best position 
to exploit. Whereas a US presence remains essential to progress in the Peace 
Process, the EU does not yet possess sufficient leverage with the Palestinians to be 
regarded as indispensable. 
What does it mean to be influential in the Peace Process? In practical 
terms, exerting influence on the peace talks has meant bringing the Israelis and 
Palestinians together to the same table. The importance of this seemingly modest 
achievement should not be underestimated since convincing Netanyahu's 
government to talk to the Palestinians has vexed everyone involved in the Peace 
Process. European diplomats of the 1970s and 1980s were unable to consistently 
play the role of broker, relying instead on exchanges with individual governments 
and painstakingly negotiated dimarches. Multilateral fonnns such as the Euro- 
Arab dialogue could hardly be described as effective substitutes. The Europeans 
of the 1990s, however, have manoeuvred themselves into a position where their 
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diplomacy has become a useful supplement and, at times, a foil, to that of the 
USA. 
The distinction between influence and power made above rests on the 
ability of the EU to effect changes in the behaviour of the Arabs and Israelis. 
Coercion, sanctions and threats are the traditional tools of power politics, options 
to which the EU still does not regularly turn. The EU has proved itself much 
better equipped to exercise 'soft power, using economic and financial instruments 
to ensure the viability of the nascent Palestinian economy and contribute to the 
stabilisation of the Palestinian Authority. That said, the recent disputes over trade 
with the Israelis suggest an increasing willingness on the Union's part to flex its 
economic muscles in order to send out strong political signals. 
A complex mix of external and internal factors determined the EU's 
capacity to take action. Comments about the major external factors - the attitudes 
of the influenced - have been made above. Internally, the defects of the CFSP in 
forcing the Member States to coalesce around a single position were clear and 
recognised as serious barriers to the Union's ability to project itself as a political 
force in the region. 119 As the Palestinian Delegate General to the EU put it: 
The EU's role is to balance the role of the USA which in our opinion is 
dictated by the powerful Israeli lobby. Until now, the American's have not 
put enough pressure on the Israelis who have not respected the Oslo accords. 
Unfortunately, an EU role is not yet possible, not just because the US and 
Israel don't want it, but because there is no CFSP. 120 
Joint actions to send electoral observers to the Occupied Territories and to support 
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the Palestinian police force did not amount to decisive political interventions. 
The appointment of a special envoy might have raised the Union's profile, but it 
was consistent with the propensity of the Member States to appoint representatives 
in the absence of agreement on collective strategies. 
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However, an alternative interpretation is that the joint actions at least 
showed an increased willingness to utilise pillar one Policy instruments to 
implement inter-governmental decisions, a trend that could only improve 
appearance of coherence and strategic consistency in EU external policies. 
Moreover, there was a strong strategic thread running through much of what the 
EU did in relation to the Middle East after the Madrid Conference. Building 
outwards from the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, the Union linked together its 
Mediterranean policy, its role as the key financial donor to the Peace Process and 
the new generation of association agreements to make itself economically 
indispensable to the long-term future of the Peace Process. 
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Chapter 7 
THE EU AND THE ALGERIAN CRISIS 
'We don't know what is going on and we're not sure the state even knows. It is 
not clear who is being targeted and why'. European Diplomat. ' 
'Whoeverfails to export stability to Algeria today will import instability in the 
form of big movements of refugees tomorrow. ' Klaus Kinkel, German Foreign 
Minister. 2 
The response of the EU and its Member States to the violent breakdown of order 
in Algeria during the 1990s might best be described as j anus faced. The Union 
failed to censure the military for halting the electoral process in 1992 and made 
little subsequent attempt to press for negotiations between the regime and the 
opposition parties. Moreover, the EU welcomed Algeria into the Barcelona 
process, despite the fact that the annulment of the Algerian elections in 1992 
violated fundamental principles of both the Barcelona Declaration and the EU's 
own treaties. The same period saw a substantial increase in European economic 
aid to Algeria. European companies, with financial backing from national 
governments and support from the EU budget, also significantly expanded their 
investments in Algeria's lucrative natural gas sector. Yet the deals were signed 
with a regime that stood accused of complicity in the murder of citizens it was 
supposed to be protecting. The EU's performance over the Algerian crisis was 
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both an indictment of its feeble collective diplomacy and another example of the 
political weaknesses of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. 
Franco-Algerian relations played a crucial part in detennining the EU's 
position on the Algerian crisis. As Zoubir and Bouandel argue: 
France has the most complex interests in the region; it also hosts the largest 
immigrant community from the Maghreb. Therefore, France's policy has to 
be studied separately. 3 
This claim is an analytically simplistic, as there is clearly a strong correlation 
between French and EU policy. Once part of Metropolitan France, Algeria is as 
much a domestic as a foreign policy issue for French governments. The presence 
of I million immigrants of Algerian origin, and over 3 million Muslims, on 
French soil, coupled with the intertwined recent histories of the two states, set 
France apart from its partners in the Union. 4 Respect among the other Member 
States for the notion that Algeria remains a French chasse gardie has certainly 
constrained, and perhaps even defined EU-Algerian relations during the 1990s. 
In short, as Roberts contends, in detennining EU policy, 'power lies with 
France. ' 5 
The first section of this chapter analyses the origin of the Algerian crisis 
and the Community's irresolute response to it. Section two considers the EU's 
collective reaction, and the reaction of individual member governments, to the 
cancellation of the Algerian national elections, an action that triggered the civil 
war. Section three examines EU action as the situation in Algeria degenerated 
into a defacto civil war, one which spilled over onto European soil. The fourth 
section looks at Algeria's negotiation of a Euro-Mediterranean agreement with 
the EU and its participation in the Barcelona process. 
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1. Algeria's Breakdown and the EU1s Initial Response 
The breakdown of order in Algeria began with the mass demonstrations and riots 
6 
of 1988. A series of strikes orchestrated by the Union Generale de Travailleurs 
Algeriens (UGTA), a banned socialist party and left wing elements of the ruling 
FLN, marked the limit of the patience of the Algerian people with President 
Benjedid Chadli's programme of accelerated economic liberalisation. 7 In 
September 1988, the state became almost bankrupt after several years of 
declining oil revenues following the 1985/6 price crash. Debt servicing to 
foreign creditors accounted for 97% of export earnings, while 80% of state 
owned companies, Algeria's biggest employers, were in the red. 8 Rising 
unemployment, swingeing cuts in welfare spending and a sudden hike in the price 
of basic foodstuff sparked violent demonstrations in October 1988.9 As many as 
500 people were killed as the army and police brutally crushed the protests, 
effectively forcing the army to withdraw from the front line of Algerian politics. ' 0 
The riots released years of pent-up frustration with one-party domination by the 
FLN and with a socio-economic structure in which, according to the Islamic 
opposition group, 5 per cent of the population earned 45 per cent of Algeria's 
national income. " Significantly, the aftermath of 'Black October' also saw the 
emergence of the Front Islamique A Salut as a political force. 
12 
The European Community's reaction to the 1988 riots was low key. No 
statement was issued by the Member States in EPC- Speaking for the Member 
States, the Spanish Council Presidency told MEPs that: 
The Twelve have been following closely the recent developments in 
Algeria. Individual partners have expressed their opinion publicly or to the 
Algerian authorities. ' 3 
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Existing EC-Algeria cooperation programmes - attached to the Cooperation 
Agreement and financial protocols - continued uninterrupted. Moreover, the 
Commission granted the Algerian government emergency economic assistance in 
the form of food aid worth 10.7 million ECUs. 14 Overall, though, the 
Community was content to sit back and watch the situation develop. The 
announcement by President Chadli of an ambitious range of constitutional 
changes, further economic reforms and moves towards political pluralism soon 
after the riots seemed to vindicate this 'wait and see' approach. It was left to the 
European Parliament to act as the democratic conscience of the Union. It 
condemned the Algerian government's repression of the protesters, although it 
too commended Chadli's proposals for reform. 15 
The Member States' individual political responses were similarly low- 
key, but there were substantial increases in bilateral financial assistance to 
Algeria, particularly from the Mediterranean group. Jean-Jacques Queyranne, 
spokesman of the French Parti Socialiste, argued that any solution should come 
'from within the Algerian government'. 16 At the same time, the PS pushed for 
extra economic aid to the Algerian government. Chadli's refonns, which 
responded to the increased use of political conditionality by the French 
government, were welcomed by President Mitterrand. By November 1988, the 
French government had agreed to boost the annual level of financial credits to 
Algeria from 231 million ECUs to 960 million ECUs. 
17 In January 1989, 
Spain's Ministry of Trade announced a mixed trade credit package worth of 970 
million ECUs to boost trade and allow the purchase of much needed industrial 
and capital goods by the Algerian government. Similarly, Italy offered 
Algeria a 
3 year export credit and aid package worth 196 million ECUs. 
The point is that 
the level of assistance granted by the Member States dwarfed 
direct aid from the 
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Community. Bilateral (Member State-Algeria) relations were to remain the 
dominant level at which Europe dealt with the regime throughout the 1990s. 
There were powerful ulterior motives for the Community to throw its 
weight behind Chadli: fear of the Islarnisation of Algeria and its impact on 
immigration to Europe. As a leading article in Le Monde argued: 
To help Algeria on the road to democracy and prosperity (which in the 
long term will hardly mean more than providing enough food, at least for 
the masses) will be expensive. To let the Algerians sink into chaos and 
fundamentalism will cost more. 18 
Islam rose to prominence after the 1988 riots as the voice of disaffected youth 
and the poorest segment of Algerian society. 19 The harsh climate of economic 
austerity provided fertile ground for a movement whose greatest appeal was to 
the country's burgeoning population of young, unemployed people. Leaders of 
the Islamic movement accused Chadli's government of trying to pacify the 
population by trying to fill shelves in shops rather than addressing Algeria's deep 
social cleavages. 20 But financial aid from Western Europe, usually targeted at 
the energy sector and other big businesses, did not attack at the roots of the 
problems. Indeed, Algeria's external debt continued to rise, pushing the 
government inexorably towards a potentially unpopular rescheduling agreement 
with the IMF. 
21 
The Algerian economy was highly dependent on trade with the 
Community, with the latter absorbing around 70 per cent of Algeria's exports and 
supplying around 63 per cent of its imports. Access to European markets was 
essential for Algerian exporters and to the government's attempt to diversify 
away from the hydrocarbon sector. Table 7.1 (below) shows the evolution of 
trade between Algeria and the Conununity during the 1980s. Algeria was the 
only country in the southern and eastern Mediterranean with which the 
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Community ran a trade deficit. However, when account is taken of the fact that 
oil and natural gas provided 95% per cent of Algeria's Community-derived 
export revenues, the asymmetry of the commercial relationship becomes 
apparent. 22 Moreover, Algeria accounted for only 0.3 per cent of the 
Community's external trade, making it relatively unimportant in the overall 
commercial context (outside the hydrocarbon sector). 
Table 7.1 Trade between the EC and Algeria (Million ECUs) 
1980 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Imports 4028 8246 7732 9309 10289 6875 5383 4793 
Exports_ 4754 5334 6147 7032 7145 5257 3884 3693* 
Balance 726 -2912 -1585 -2277 -3144 -1618 -1499 -1100-... 
* The dramatic fall in EC exports to Algeria after 1985 was one outcome of the government's 
decision to curb imports as part of its strategy to deal with the deepening economic crisis. 
Source: European Commission (1989) 'EEC-Algeria Cooperation Council', Rapid Database, 
Memo 89/33, <<http: //europa. eu. int/rapid)). 
When the dominance of the energy sector is taken into account, it 
becomes clear that the Community's quiet response to Black October was also 
laced with a heavy dose of economic self-interest. Algerian gas was taking a 
rapidly growing portion of the European market, especially in France, Italy and 
Spain. 23 At the end of the 1980s, it accounted for nearly a third of the French 
market and was projected to capture over 50 per cent of the Italian market and 70 
per cent of the Spanish market by the mid 1990s. Much of it was to be supplied 
through a trarisnational pipeline running from Algeria through Morocco into 
Spain. 24 Given the vulnerability of the pipeline and past experiences with the 
renationalisation of western energy companies operating in Algeria, political 
stability was seen as an essential prerequisite of guaranteed supplies. 
25 Revenues 
had sharply contracted after 1986 as world market prices fell and the 
dollar's 
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value appreciated, driving Sonatrach to seek new partners and new markets. 26 
As Chadli's economic liberalisation project subsumed Sonatrach, new gas supply 
contracts were signed with European, Japanese and US companies, and existing 
contracts were renegotiated and upgraded. The political significance of these 
deals was clear. The French government, for instance, linked its credit package 
to the resolution of a long-standing dispute over prices for the supply of gas. 27 
Similarly, both Spain and Italy negotiated new price and supply deals with 
Sonatrach shortly after concluding their new financial agreements with Algeria. 28 
The Community had another motive for treating Algiers with kid gloves, 
one related to its Mediterranean strategy. In 1989, the Arab Maghreb Union 
regional integration project was launched with much fanfare, a development that 
the EC saw as a means to underpin economic and political stability in North 
Africa. The idea was to transform intra-regional political and economic relations 
by creating a regional trading bloc modelled on the Community. Intra-Maghreb 
trade would be made easier if the AMU achieved its objectives of hannonising 
trade regulations and introducing free movement of goods and services between 
the five signatories. Chadli's rapprochement with the Moroccan government was 
essential to the success of the AMU. 
Chadli's 'fast track to democracy' gathered momentum with the 
introduction of a new constitution in November 198 9.29 In contrast to the more 
cautious reforins underway in the other Maghreb countries, the new pluralist 
constitution promised to open up politics to the full spectrum of parties and 
ideologies, including the nascent Islamic movement. By way of encouragement, 
Community and national leaders made a number of official visits to Algeria 
during 1989. Commenting on a visit by President Franýois Mitterrand, a leading 
article in Le Monde claimed that: 
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The French authorities believe that Chadli is the best placed to be able to 
change Algerian society and that he has the best chance of attaining it if he 
is able to steer through political reforms and relaunch the economy. " 
The European Commission shared this view, sending Commissioner Matutes to 
Algeria to agree a schedule for the distribution of Community aid. Four 
agreements were subsequently signed under the third financial protocol, giving 
Algeria 26 million ECUs for food management, energy and management training 
proj ects. 
Ultimately, however, the reform process could not mask continuing 
discontent with the pace and direction of reforms. For many of the new 
opposition parties, the reforms did not go far enough. The separation of the 
presidential from the executive and legislative branch of government gave Chadli 
- who had been reelected in December 1988 - nominal neutrality, but he used his 
role as 'arbiter' to try and ensure the survival of the FLN regime. With the floor 
open for opposition politicians to exploit the govenu-nent's poor performance, the 
old order quickly came under sustained attack over its record on corruption, 
public morality, secularism and the continued influence of France in Algeria. 31 
The big winner in this febrile political environment was the Islamic movement 
which proved highly adept at mobilising popular support, particularly by offering 
itself as an altemative provider of social services and a radical alternative to the 
FLN-state. As Hugh Roberts argues, Thadli actually facilitated the development 
of the FIS', the party whose electoral appeal was to prove his undoing. 32 
2. Europe's Silence: The End of the Democratic Experiment 
Chadli's grip on power in Algeria continued to loosen during 1990 and 1991 as 
the FIS and other opposition movements capitalised on continuing discontent 
with the country's socio-economic situation and the opportunity to publicly 
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criticise the FLN. Notice was served of the FIS'electoral strength in the 
communal elections of June 1990 when the FIS secured a 54 per cent share of the 
vote. Despite changes to the electoral system, postponements of polls and 
widespread gerrymandering, Chadli's government was unable to counter the 
momentum building behind the FIS as national elections approached. 33 In the 
first round (December 199 1), the FIS won 47.3 per cent of the vote and 43.7 per 
cent of the parliamentary seats. 34 Overall, Islamic parties took a 55 per cent 
share and secured a resounding endorsement for their anti-establishment 
platforms. 
35 
In France, the results were greeted by a mixture of alarm and quiet 
resignation. Many politicians took an apocalyptic view of the crisis, warning of 
the potential for mass immigration if Algerians sought to escape the 
fundamentalist state that was expected to replace the old order. 36 But former 
Foreign Minister Roland Dumas appeared less perturbed, arguing that there was 
6no more to fear now than before or in future', and that Islam was 'a reality' in 
the region. The official line was that the choice of the Algerian people should be 
respected. Behind the scenes, though, France and the rest of the EU had 
misjudged the strength of the FIS at national level and Chadli's ability to bargain 
with its leaders. 37 This uncertainty was exemplified by the taciturn attitudes of 
Mitterrand and the French Foreign Ministry in the run up to the second ballot. 38 
The situation took a dramatic and decisive turn when, in January 1992, 
the army removed Chadli and cancelled the elections . 
39 Chadli had offered to 
share power in secret negotiations with the FIS, but hard-line elements in the 
army were totally opposed to any concessions to the Islamists. 
40 In effect, a 
military coup ended the democratic experiment and left a politically unstable 
state facing the EU across the Mediterranean. Again, opinion in France wavered 
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between the hawkish pronouncements of the right and the pragmatism of the left. 
The Gaullist Charles Pasqua, argued that French cooperation with Algeria should 
be reviewed and even abrogated. A number of Socialists, including President 
Mitterrand, expressed disquiet at the cessation of the democratic process and 
urged its resumption. 41 
It was at this stage that the EU settled on what amounted to a 'non- 
decision' on Algeria. The EU Member States made a vaguely worded call for a 
return to 'nonnal institutional life' and 'dialogue' between the regime and 
opposition, but avoided aligning the Union with either CaMp. 42 The notion of a 
4non-decision' does not imply that the crisis was ignored. Rather, as Michael 
Clarke argues, 'it describes a failure to confront a choice, or even to recognise 
that one exists. ' 43 That the Union initially decided to do nothing owed much to 
France's 'relational' power over its European partners vis-a-vis Algeria. 44 From 
the outset, the French government, like the regime itself, ruled out external 
intervention by the Union. In the words of a French official: 'We just didn't see 
the possibility for the EU to enter with credibility. 45 Unwilling (or unable) to 
challenge this position, the other member governments were forced to follow the 
French lead. As a UK diplomat put it: 'French policy was effectively endorsed 
by the rest of the EU. No thought was given to this decision. 46 
However, by February 1992, the Union's position had subtly shifted, 
though it still stopped short of a political decision on the coup. A statement, 
issued in the EPC framework put the ball in the regime's court: 
The Community and its Member States strongly urge the Algerian 
authorities to pursue their publicly announced commitments, namely, the 
social and economic reforms, the restructuring of public administration and 
the protection of fundamental freedoms ..... 
The Community and its Member 
States are willing to cooperate with the Algerian authorities in the economic 
recovery of their country, bearing in mind that compliance with the 
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aforementioned principles will be important in the context of bilateral 
relations. 47 
Essentially, the Union gave the regime time to bed itself in by promising that 
48 financial aid to Algeria would not be disrupted. This non-decision (not to 
consider suspending aid) was not without logic. The Islamists' campaign of 
violence alienated the FIS from many of its supporters, greatly reducing the 
likelihood that a re-run of the elections would produce a similar result. 49 
Yet the Union made little effort to justify its silence on Algeria. Nor did 
it give the regime a time limit for the resumption of the democratic process. In 
evading firm decisions, the Union may have missed the best opportunity to set a 
precedent for international peace-making initiatives. As Barbara Smith argues: 
There were still some possible courses of action outsiders could recommend 
to the Algerian govenu-nent. And, at the time, the regime was so divided 
over what policy to adopt toward dissident Islamic political groups that it is 
at least possible that some of Algeria's leaders could have been persuaded to 
listen. 50 
It is easy to criticise the EU's inaction as the crisis unfolded. It is rather 
more difficult, even with the benefit of hindsight, to suggest what policy options 
were available and credible. Three factors mitigated against external 
involvement. First, the political situation was extremely fluid. It was neither 
clear what form of government the FIS intended to purse, nor whether the 
Algerian public would accept the imposition of Islamic order. As Claire Spencer 
argues: 
At no stage had a clear and unequivocal statement been made by the FIS 
leadership that it would respect the form of democracy laid down in the 
1989 Constitution'. A victory for the FIS would possibly have created an 
Islamic state governed by some variant of the Charia code on the 
Community's doorstep, a development it was anxious to prevent. 
51 
Second, the Haut Comitj dEtat, installed by the military as a quasi 
civilian government after the coup, was quick to ward off external 
interference in 
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what it viewed as an purely internal problem. Indeed, it drew attention to the fact 
that the FIS leadership itself had approved of France's choice not to intervene. 
Given the reservations about a FIS victory, this message gave the Union a 
convenient excuse to stand back. Third, European investments in the gas sector 
may well have been j eopardised if the FIS had come to power. While the FIS 
would have found it hard to maintain high levels of public spending without 
hydrocarbon revenues, the investment climate for foreign capital would certainly 
have been judged to be less stable. Abdelkader Hachani, provisional leader of 
the FIS, described the regime's new legislation on foreign investments in the 
sector 'a transaction of shame. ' 
52 
Given the constraints outlined above, the Union's 'non-decision' was not 
surprising. Yet the Union's political impotence markedly contrasted with the 
apparent regularity of decisions being taken on the economic front. In line with 
the overall increase in financial resources for the Mediterranean non-member 
states, Algeria had seen its allocation of financial aid rise under the fourth 
financial protocol. 
Table 7.2 EC-Algeria Financial Protocols (Million ECUs) 
Financial 
Protocol 
Duration EIB Loans Budget Total 
01 1976-1981 70 44 114 
02 1981-1986 107 44 151 
03 1986-1991 183 56 239 
*04 1992-1996 280 **70 350 
* Among the 8 Mediterranean non-member countries benefiting from the fourth financial 
protocol, Algeria's share of resources amounted to 17 per cent. 
** Amount includes 18 million ECUs in venture capital. 
No direct connection was made by the Community between the disbursement of 
resources and the annulment of the elections. Indeed, the Commission reportedly 
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expressed surprise at rumours that financial aid might be frozen. 53 In 1991, the 
Member States had agreed to set aside 300 million ECUs to support structural 
adjustment programmes in the Mediterranean non-member countries, including 
Algeria. As a supplement to this programme of macro-economic aid, the 
Community had also offered Chadli's government a medium-term loan of 400 
million ECUs prior to the cancellation of the elections. Even after the events of 
January 1992, the only new conditions attached to the loan related to the 
negotiation of a reform programme between Algeria and the IMF, not to the 
resumption of the democratisation process. 54 
This decoupling of the Community's economic relations with Algeria 
from the political crisis reveals much about EU external policy-making. First, it 
lends further weight to the argument that pillar I is what really matters in EU 
foreign policy. A collective political initiative from the EU might have been 
desirable in the context of its foreign policy ambitions, but would have had little 
effect on a regime that had already warned off the international community from 
attempting to intervene in the Algerian crisis. However, there can be no doubt 
about the highly politicised nature of EU and bilateral aid from the Member 
States and its importance to the regime's survival. With an external debt of 24 
billion ECUs in 1992, the goodwill of western creditors and their willingness to 
underpin the regime's faltering macro-economic reform programme was crucial 
to the financial liquidity of the Algerian state. 55 
Second, an approach centred on economic support and technical 
cooperation was in line with the Union's strategy of dealing with functional 
issues rather than the big political questions. Cooperation in the energy field was 
a particularly salient example. As Janne Haaland Matlary argues, 'energy is a 
prime instrument for such linkage politics. ' 
56 After talks between 
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Commissioners Abel Matutes (DGI), Carlos Cardoso e Cunha (DG17 energy) 
and the Algerian energy minister in March 1992, the Union agreed to look at 
Algeria's proposals in the context of the budgetary allocation for regional 
cooperation in the Mediterranean. 57 Of even greater financial significance were 
the new contracts being signed by Sonatrach with multinational oil companies. 
The Community's assistance was sought in establishing a conducive climate for 
investment, but the rest was left to private capital. 
Third, the Union's decision to offer economic support without political 
interference represented another instance of a position defined by the lowest 
common denominator. The French government's assumption that 'Islam would 
be "soluble" in the face of economic progress' effectively became the Union's 
strategy. 58 As a 'mediator' between Algeria and the Community, the French 
goverranent clearly exerted pressure on its partners within the EU institutions to 
meet the regime's financial needs. 59 The decision to provide increased balance of 
payments assistance at the Luxembourg European Council in 199 1, for instance, 
was a French initiative. 60 As a Dutch diplomat put it: 
They [the French] are quite pushy in the case of Algeria, but they have 
reasons for that. It's always a question if you can stop Moslems by pumping 
in money, because where the money goes we don't know, but you can't deny 
the French for trying. 61 
Only as the crisis worsened did divisions within the EU begin to surface and its 
political position come under fire. 
3. The Descent into Violence and the EU's First Initiative 
The assassination of President Mohamed Boudiaf in June 1992 seemed to harden 
the resolve of the EU to take an 'arms length approach. ' Commission 
President 
Jacques Delors stated that: 
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The Commission is sure that the Algerian people and the nation's leaders 
will survive this new crisis with reason and determination. In these tragic 
hours, it plans to remind them of its solidarity and expresses the hope that 
Algeria will return to a period of peace in which democratic freedoms and 
pluralism are respected. 62 
President Mitterrand expressed the hope that 'Algeria [would] be able to 
overcome this severe test', and pledged that the Algerian people could 'count on 
the friendship of France'. 63 The resort to violence by armed elements of the 
Islamic opposition, principally the Groupe Islarnique Arme (GIA), may have 
made it easier for the EU to exonerate its position, as an identifiable 'enemy' of 
the state and ordinary people was emerging. Furthermore, the decision by the 
regime (May 1993) to break diplomatic relations with Iran signalled the 
military's desire to be at the forefront of the struggle against radical Islam, 
underlining its self-proclaimed status as a bulwark against fundamentalism. As it 
became ever more difficult to identify the perpetrators of violence, an 'arms 
length' approach increasingly appeared to be the safest option. 
The civil war entered a new and more dangerous phase late in 1993, when 
armed Islamic groups began to target foreign residents in Algeria. In September, 
two French surveyors were kidnapped and murdered by Islamists, the first such 
attack on foreigners inside Algeria. Until then, the safety of European citizens 
working in Algeria had not given undue cause for concern. In October, the 
audacious kidnapping of three employees of the French Consulat General in 
Algiers galvanised. the EU into another EPC statement urging the Algerian 
authorities to 'take every possible measure for a rapid return to a climate that will 
ensure their safety. ' 64 
French citizens working in Algeria were inevitably prime targets 
for the 
armed Islamists. 65 When the kidnappers eventually released the French consulate 
staff, they issued a warning giving French expatriates one month to 
leave Algeria. 
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Other foreign nationals were also warned to leave. Foreign minister Alain Juppe 
responded by offering his government's assistance to the regime in the fight 
against the FIS and fundamentalism in general. 66 Nevertheless by the end of 
1994, only 2000 French citizens were left in the country. 67 Other Member States 
paid more heed to the warnings, however, and advised their citizens not to travel 
to Algeria unless for exceptional reasons. 
The deliberate targetting of French citizens in Algeria stiffened the new 
Balladur government's resolve and temporarily put the hawks in the ascendancy. 
Alain Juppe, questioned about how France intended to help Algeria combat 
fundamentalism, set out three objectives: 
1) To halt 'terrorist activities' on French soil. 
2) To prevent the production of 'hostile' literature, essentially pro-FISIGIA 
literature. 
3) To increase France's bilateral financial aid to Algeria to around 960 million 
ECUs, a level that has been sustained ever since. 68 
Implementation of this harder line was swift. In a sweeping police operation, 88 
Islamic activists were arrested and Islamic propaganda seized. This action drew 
an angry response from both sides in Algeria. Prime Minister Rheda Malek 
insisted that the rights of Algerians living on European soil be respected . 
69 Raba 
Kebir, a leading figure in the FIS, demanded the release of those arrested and 
called on France to cease its backing for 'lepouvoir'. 70 
A key player in defining the Balladur administration's policy on Algeria 
was Interior Minister Charles Pasqua. As Spencer observes, 'in contrast to the 
policies of its less engaged neighbours, France's reactions to events in Algeria 
[were] led as much by the Interior as the Foreign and Defence Ministries. ' 
71 
Pasqua's name appeared atop a restrictive and much criticised 1993 law on 
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immigration, and it was largely his decision to clamp down on the activities of 
Islamists within France. Relations with the Algerian/Moslem communities in 
France were seriously damaged by the new measures. 72 Part of the rationale for 
the so-called loi Pasqua was an emotive appeal for the 'preservation of the 
essential values of French society', a thinly veiled reference to a perceived 
Islamic threat to the secular basis of the French state . 
73 Algeria's generals 
formed an unspoken alliance with Pasqua, who became associated with the 
eradicateur faction in the regime. 74 The GIA viewed France's actions as a 
declaration of war, and responded by stepping up their campaign of violence. 75 
Positive action by the Balladur goverment took the fonn of pressure on the 
London and Paris international creditors club to obtain a debt rescheduling 
agreement for Algeria. It successfully secured increased aid from the World 
Bank and western governments, though the Algerian regime continued to reject 
another debt rescheduling agreement with the IMF. 
While many of France's EU partners shared its concern about an Islamic 
'domino effect' in North Africa, they were averse to restricting the activities of 
the exiled Algerian opposition on their own territories. The presence and 
freedom of speech of opposition activists was regarded as a civil liberties matter 
on which the host states were reluctant to compromise. Germany and the UK, for 
instance, both came in for criticism from the Algerian and French governments 
for allowing FIS leaders to operate on their territory. Both governments also kept 
S76 an open mind about dialogue with the FI, . Divisions among the member 
governments undoubtedly prolonged the tendency for 'non-decisions'. Since no 
consensus could be reached on a political line, the subject of Algeria was rarely 
broached. 
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The hijacking of an Air France airbus in Algiers during Christmas 1994 
brought the Algerian crisis onto French soil, into the media spotlight and 
subsequently into the Presidential election campaign. The hijackers - who 
described themselves as FIS representatives rather than GIA activists - timed their 
action and chose their target to achieve the maximum effect. Air France aircraft 
were among the last symbols of France's presence in Algeria. Despite a much 
lauded rescue operation by France's Groupe dIntervention de la Gendarmerie 
Nationale, the episode highlighted the vulnerability of French citizens both in 
Algeria and in France, leading Balladur and Pasqua to clamp down even harder 
on the activities of Islamic groups. The hijacking also opened a rift between the 
French government and the regime, which was criticised by Balladur for having 
delayed giving permission for the aircraft to leave Algiers. 77 
In the absence of governmental action, it was left to NGOs to maintain a 
critical watch on the deteriorating human rights situation in Algeria. Human 
rights organisations, particularly Amnesty International, continually reproached 
the regime and armed Islamic groups, and berated the international community 
for failing to deal with the crisis. The most promising peace-making initiative 
stemmed was brokered by a small, Christian NGO based in Rome, the 
Sant'Egido Community. In the so-called 'Rome platform' of early 1995, the vast 
majority of Algeria's opposition parties, including the FIS, agreed on a set of 
principles and mutual guarantees designed to allow the democratic process to be 
resumed. Critcally, though, neither Zeroual's representatives nor representatives 
of the GIA attended. Moreover, the document explicitly ruled out external 
intervention, stating that the parties were 'opposed to any interference in the 
internal affairs of Algeria'. 78 As Dominque Moisi argued, 'if the army doesn't 
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feel the need to compromise, then what happened in Rome will be just talk. 179 
The regime immediately rejected the Rome Platform 
Italy was the first Member State to publicly break rank over EU policy on 
the Algerian crisis. 80 As Rich and Joseph argue, 'the Italian government [was] 
torn between its need to safeguard hydrocarbon imports and concern over the 
potential security risks posed by further deterioration of the conflict. 81 In January 
1997, an under-secretary in the Italian Foreign Ministry, Pierre Fassino, hinted 
that Italy was about to launch a peace initiative, calling for the EU's backing. 
Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini quickly disavowed Fassino's proposal, ruling 
out any independent mediating role for Italy. 82 But he too called for the EU to 
pursue a negotiated settlement, arguing that the Union should 'emerge from a 
condition of passivity and lack of interest and help Algeria, though without 
interfering, to overcome the current crisis. ' 83 However, in a trilateral meeting 
with the French and Spanish governments shortly after, the Italians were 
persuaded by France to put their proposal on ice. 84 
At the end of 1997, the EU finally started to take a tougher line with the 
regime. When Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf came to Luxembourg in November 
and accused Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the UK of harbouring terrorists 
and of giving them logistical support on the pretext of their being asylum seekers, 
he received a rebuke from Luxembourg's Foreign Minister Jacques Poos. Poos 
defended the Union's right to consider exiled members of the Islamic opposition 
as asylum seekers and warned the Algerian government that it should not just 
treat the crisis as an issue of terrorism, but should do more to protect its own 
citizens. 85 At the same time, Poos called for greater openness on the part of the 
regime about the conflict in Algeria and for restrictions on the media to be lifted. 
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In the end, the Europeans were forced to act by the sheer scale of the 
violence. An upsurge in violence during the winter of 1997-8 to unprecedented 
levels - 1500 deaths during Ramadan alone - received sustained coverage in the 
West European press. A new EU initiative, launched by UK Foreign Minister 
Robin Cook after strong pressure from German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, 
was a first test for the Labour government's new 'ethical' foreign PoliCY. 86 A 
succession of extended press reports in the UK and a direct appeal to the 
European Parliament by the FIS convinced the Foreign Office that something had 
to be done. 87 After discussing an initiative with its partners in Brussels, the UK 
announced that the EU would send a team to Algeria. 
Initially, a delegation comprising of regional directors from the foreign 
ministries of the UK, Luxembourg and Austria was rejected by Foreign Minister 
Attaf as 'inappropriate. ' 88 The fact that the EU had to concede on both the 
composition of the delegation and the subjects it would be permitted to discuss 
was indicative of both the regime's sensitivity on external intervention and of the 
EU's own failure to define the purpose of its mission. Attaf argued that the 
delegation should primarily focus on the fight against terrorism. The EU, 
however, aimed to raise the issue of human rights with the regime, calling for a 
UN rapporteur to be allowed to investigate the situation. It was another example 
of a superficially activist, but reliably hesitant EU passing the buck. 
Following prickly negotiations with the regime, the EU was forced to 
upgrade the status of its delegation to junior ministerial level. Meetings were 
held with both Ministers and representatives of the opposition and press, and 
were a limited success for the Union in raising its diplomatic profile. But in 
substantive terms the mission merely underlined the regime's intransigence in the 
face of extemal pressure. Attaf was persuaded to accept the idea of an ad hoc 
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political 'dialogue' with the EU, but it in practice meant nothing more than 
periodic meetings where the Union could maintain the impression that it was 
taking action. It was, as the UK Minister involved put it, 'a tactical fig leaf in 
the short term. 89 The mission failed to make much headway on the subject of 
mediation, although an invitation was extended to Attaf to meet with Robin Cook 
in London at the end of the year. 90 The regime refused outright a request to allow 
the UN to conduct an inquiry into human rights in the country. A fatal bus bomb 
in Algiers while the meetings were taking place was a tragically poignant 
counterpoint to the mission. 
The reaction of the FIS leadership to the Troika's visit revealed a shift 
away from outright rejection of external intervention. In a letter to Robin Cook, 
Anwar Haddam, President of the exiled FIS members, made a number of 
demands of the EU: 
It is our hope, at a time where there is a lack of political freedom in Algeria, 
to see the European Union, under the leadership of the government of Her 
Majesty, open the doors of its countries to FIS representatives to freely 
express the suffering and the aspirations of the Algerian people. It is our 
deep hope and strong request to the European countries to immediately put 
an end to the activities of those who had claimed responsibility for these 
horrible massacres and crimes committed against civilians in Algeria, and to 
bring them to justice. It is also our hope to see the EU monitor different 
Algerian embassies and their suspicious activities. Finally, we hope to see an 
end to any military or financial aid to the regime in place. 
91 
For his part, Attaf defended the regime's refusal to allow an international 
committee of inquiry on a number of grounds. First, he made an emotive defence 
of Algerian independence. He claimed, with some justification, that all the 
political parties in Algeria would reject outside intervention. His claim that the 
Algerian people cared deeply about their independence was less easy to 
justify. 
Second, and far less convincingly, Attaf questioned the focus of the nquiry 
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which he believed would be overly sympathetic to the opposition and bring to 
light the covert activities of the military. 
In a partial volteface, however, the Algerian's finally agreed to allow a 
UN team into the country in July to undertake an 'information gathering' 
mission. 92 The so-called 'eminent persons' committee, led by Fon-ner Portuguese 
President Mario Soares, was requested not to meet the FIS, and was only allowed 
entry on condition that their report would not produce binding conclusions on the 
UN. 93 Its report balanced encouragement for political liberalisation with 
criticism of both sides for a campaign of violence which had claimed an 
estimated 120,000 lives by 1999.94 However, the committee was short on 
recommendations for the international community. It made only vague calls for 
the west to offer 'cooperation and support' for political, economic and social 
reforms, and the fight against terrorism. 95 In the final analysis, simply keeping 
diplomatic channels to the regime open was all the outside world could 
realistically achieve. 
4. Algeria and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
The linking of the EU's economic policy instruments to its political objectives, 
employed with some success in the Middle East Peace Process, was conspicuous 
by its absence when it came to Algeria. Neither of the two main conduits of the 
Union's Mediterranean strategy - the Euro-Mediterranean Agreements and the 
Barcelona Process - were utilised to try and bring the regime and the opposition 
forces to the negotiating table. Any attempt to attach strong political conditions 
to the opening of negotiations on a Euro-Mediterranean agreement may well 
have 
been futile given the low-level of non-hydrocarbon trade between the EU and 
Algeria. The regime did not 'need' a trade liberalisation agreement to anywhere 
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near the same extent as other Mediterranean partner countries. Agricultural trade 
with the EU presented 'no special difficulties' for Algerian producers, accounting 
for only I per cent of export revenues, while oil and gas products were totally 
excluded from the agreement. 96 The Barcelona process deliberately kept clear of 
domestic politics and human rights issues, such was their sensitivity for most of 
the partner countries. Despite the near civil war going on in the country, Algeria 
was a 6normal' participant in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. 
One of the major problems for the EU was the withdrawal of all but a 
handful of its diplomats from Algeria during 1995 and 1996. Many EU-financed 
projects had to be cancelled or frozen as consultants and the Commission's 
representative staff in Algiers left the country. 97 Responsibility for analysing the 
economic situation in Algeria and for overseeing the structural adjustment 
programme was effectively handed to the World Bank, although the Commission 
did maintain close contact with World Bank personnel through frequent meetings 
in Brussels. An unintended effect of this delegation of responsibility to the 
World Bank was to reinforce the sense that the EU was simply following the 
IMF/World Bank neo-liberal orthodoxy in its policy on Algeria. 
Exploratory discussions on Algeria's Euro -Mediterranean agreement 
began in began in March 1997, several years behind schedule. The delay was a 
deliberate move by the Commission, which chose to wait until the election of 
President Liamine Zeroual in 1995 and parliamentary elections in 1997 had 
taken place in order to give some semblance of legitmacy to its negotiations with 
the regime. The Commission was also concerned that securing the passage of the 
agreement through the European Parliament might be difficult before the 
Algerian people had been given a chance to pass judgement on the regime. 
98 
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When the polls were approved, with some reservations, by international 
observers, the Commission began to negotiate. 
The Troika mission to Algeria clearly complicated the Commission's task 
by hardening the regime's resolve in its negotiations with the Union. Issues 
already flagged by Algerian negotiators prior to the EU mission - the negative 
impact of free trade on the industrial and agricultural sectors, and the question of 
provisions on the free movement of people - became major sticking points. 
99 The 
Algerian government argued that the dismantling of tariff barriers and the 
removal of duties on the scale required by the EU would cause substantial 
damage to an economy that heavily relied on subsidies and other forms of 
protection from the state. 100 The Algerians also argued that the idea of 
4partnership' was meaningless without allowing for the free movement of people 
and better protection for Algerian immigrants in EU countries. Visa restrictions 
in particular were making it difficult for Algerian citizens to enter Western 
Europe. However, as a British diplomat put it, 'there isn't anyone in the EU who 
supports the idea that Algeria has genuine problems with the agreement. ' 101 The 
Member States viewed Algeria's insistence on a stronger 'third pillar' component 
in the agreement as a thinly disguised attempt to improve cooperation on counter- 
terrorism. 
It remains to be seen what will happen when the final Agreement is put 
before national parliaments of the EU Members. Member States which 
traditionally emphasise human rights, such as Sweden and Finland, might call 
into question elements of the agreement and its lack of conditionality upon the 
demands made by the EU. 102 On balance, however, it seems more 
likely that 
ratification will proceed without difficulty. Given that national parliaments and 
the EP were so circumspect about withholding ratification of the 
EU-Israel 
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agreement when the latter was in clear violation of UN resolutions and the Oslo 
agreements, it seems unlikely that they will be any more decisive about what is 
an extremely complex domestic political crisis. Furthermore, concern about 
Europe's commercial interests in Algeria means that Member States continue to 
be reluctant to push the regime too far. 
The Barcelona process has deliberately steered clear of the Algerian 
question, despite attempts by the regime to influence the agenda. Foreign 
Minister Ahmed Attaf, for instance, criticised the refusal of the EU to put 
terrorism on the agenda of meetings of the senior officials dealing with political 
and security questions. 103 Later, the Algerians presented their own version of a 
Mediterranean stability pact, again with a heavy emphasis on counter- 
terrorism. 104 Algeria even emerged as the defacto leader of the Arab group 
within the Barcelona process. ' 05 Working alongside British diplomats in the run- 
up to the Palermo Foreign Ministers' meeting, Algerian diplomats were 
instrumental in persuading the Lebanese and Syrian governments to attend. 
The basic problem was that the Algerians and the EU defined the crisis in 
different ways. Attaf drew on references in the Barcelona Declaration to the 
terrorism and argued that the Mediterranean partners should assist in the fight 
against it, a thinly veiled way of criticising those EU Member States that played 
host to the exiled opposition. The EU, by contrast, always insisted that the 
Barcelona process was not intended to interfere in domestic politics. Yet the 
Algerian regime has undoubtedly violated several of the human rights and 
democratic clauses of the Barcelona text. A potentially dangerous precedent 
has 
been set in which governments under fire over their human rights record can 
continue to participate in a multilateral process that is supposed to 
improve the 
lives of ordinary people around the Mediterranean. 
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Conclusions 
The civil war in Algeria has thrown the limitations of the EU as a political actor 
into sharp relief. Faced with a highly unstable neighbour and a civil conflict 
which clearly has a negative impact on the Europe, the EU's neglect of Algeria is 
a serious threat to the credibility of its Mediterranean policy. Instead of leading 
by example, the Union has stood by and watched human rights abuses occur on a 
breathtaking scale. When European governments did finally launch a diplomatic 
initiative, the mission manifestly lacked purpose. It is difficult to avoid 
concluding that the Union is simply not suited to dealing with the kind of 
complex civil conflict that has beset Algeria. 
Three problems in particular stand out. First, the EU's relations with 
Algeria during the 1990s have continued to be determined by French policy. 
Indeed, it is France's analysis of the source of the conflict (Islam versus 
democracy) and the most appropriate means to resolve it (to back the regime, 
with qualified support for elections and a return to a tenuous form of political 
pluralism) that has prevailed in Brussels. As an Algerian human rights lawyer 
argues: 
The EU has failed by giving a free rein to France in leading EU policy on 
Algeria. The flagrant failure of the French approach and that of the regime 
which they support has been amply demonstrated over the last three years. It 
does EU credibility in North Africa and the Arab world no good for the EU 
to continue to allow the French a virtual monopoly in EU foreign policy on 
this matter. 106 
This capture of a policy issue by a single Member State exemplifies the weakness 
of the Union's foreign policy-making process. Where intergovernmentalism 
prevails, the interests, perceptions and positions of one state can define the EU's 
position or exclude the possibility of a political position altogether. Since the 
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CFSP operates on the basis of unanimity, it was inevitable that no common 
position or joint action on Algeria was ever adopted by the Union. 
Second, the opposition of the regime and Algerian political parties to 
external interference in the conflict provided the Union with a convenient, but 
poor, excuse for its non-decision. 107 The 1990s have seen the Union devote an 
increasing amount of resources to so-called 'good governance' - respect for 
universal human rights, fundamental freedoms and the democratic process. 
Justifying its silence on the grounds that the conflict is Algeria's problem calls 
into question the Union's commitment to stick to these principles. Similarly, the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which was also intended to encourage 'good 
governance' in all the Mediterranean partner countries, has proved impotent 
when conflicts have arisen either between or within partner countries. 
Third, pillar I policy instruments have proved equally ineffective as a 
means to influence the behaviour of the Algerian regime. The Euro- 
Mediterranean Agreement has little economic value to Algeria, the key to using 
trade policy as a tool of suasion. Nor have serious questions yet been raised 
nl-ý about the continued provision of financial assistance from the 
MEDA budget 
which, in any case, is greatly exceeded by bilateral aid and trade credits from the 
Member States. Indeed, almost the reverse applies, with the regime seeking to 
use the Agreement for its own ends. 
Yet the Union cannot continue to take 'non-decisions' on Algeria. The 
'election' of regime representatives is certainly no substitute for genuinely 
competitive elections. As population growth continues to outstrip the capacity of 
the Algerian economy to provide a sufficient number of new jobs, the 
likelihood 
of a social explosion increases. The most optimistic 
forecasts predict annual 
GDP growth of 4 per cent into the early part of the next millennium. 
World Bank 
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estimates suggest 5 per cent growth outside the hydrocarbon sector would be 
needed simply to keep up with the flow of young people entering the job 
market. 108 Trade credits, macro-economic restructuring and IMF austerity 
programmes mean little to the burgeoning number of jobless, disenfranchised 
people of Algeria. As Pierre Sane, Secretary General of Amnesty International 
argues: 
The international community has turned its back on the Algerian human 
rights tragedy. Such indifference in the face of so much horror is an 
abdication of their responsibility towards the Algerian people. ' 09 
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The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership represented the first credible attempt at 
strategic action by the EU in the Mediterranean. The EU developed a strong sense 
of purpose in the its relationships with Mediterranean non-member countries, and 
projected an impression of coherence between the Union's stated policy objectives 
and the measures associated with them. However, a positive assessment of the 
strategy must be tempered by a rather more negative assessment of the EMP's 
actual record to date. A gap quickly appeared between rhetoric and reality as the 
Union's protective external trade regime and the chronic problem of Arab-Israeli 
relations seriously impeded the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean 
strategy. More significantly, perhaps, analysts are increasingly calling into 
question the degree to which the EMP can actually change the underlying structure 
of what is in many respects an exercise in managing North-South relations is 
certainly questionable. I 
This chapter moves towards a final analysis of the current genesis of EU 
Mediterranean policy, both in terms of the EMP strategy and its wider 
implications for the EU as an global actor. The first section considers what the 
development of the EMP tells us about the kind of strategic action that the EU 
produces and how the pillar I is used as the basis for this strategic action. Section 
two assesses how far the EMP has bridged the divide between pillar I- the 
Union's foreign economic policy - and pillar 11 - the CFSP. This blurring 
between the two pillars was not deliberately and systematically pursued by the 
Union, but was driven by the nature of a strategy which demanded a more 
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effective harnessing of foreign economic policy instruments to political objectives. 
The third section revisits the 'civilian power5 concept which attracted renewed 
attention at the start of the 1990s as a potential role for the Union to play in the 
post-Cold War world. The EMP incorporates many of the basic tenets of the 
civilian power concept. The final section employs Christopher Hill's seminal 
'capabilities-expectations gap' thesis as an analytical tool to assess whether the 
EMP has changed the EU's status as an international actor. 2 
Strategic Action: The EU as Framework, EC as Agent 
The word 'strategy' appears throughout the policy documents that set out the 
Union's proposals for a new Mediterranean policy. The Commission clearly saw 
a need to sell its ideas to the Member States and the partner countries as a long- 
tenn action plan, justifying the allocation of additional financial resources to the 
region and trade concessions on the grounds that the Mediterranean region would 
be made more secure. In that sense, strategic action also served a legitimating 
function for the further Europeanisation of national Mediterranean policies. 
However, the Union's claim that the EMP is a 'strategy ' does not make it one, 
nor can we assess its effectiveness without considering precisely what constitutes 
a4 strategy'. 
The notion of EU strategic action assumes both an autonomous capacity to 
pursue policy strategies that are distinctly 'European' and some form of 'effective 
international agency'. 3 Taking the assumption that the EU can act strategically 
first, the EMP arose out of the political commitment of the Member States to task 
the Union with the formulation of a new Mediterranean policy. Perceptions 
converged around the view that European states had to carry a bigger share of the 
burden of post-Cold War security in the Mediterranean, and the Union was 
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eventually earmarked as the most appropriate 'framework' to put in place the 
prescribed policy measures after experimentation with the CSCE, 5+5 dialogue 
and other sub-regional forums. Previous incarnations of Mediterranean policy 
had lacked a well-defined set of objectives. The label 'policy' was merely a 
convenient disguise for a disparate collection of agreements with Mediterranean 
third countries, which were more a product of the 'logic of externalisation' than 
the result of any coherent, long-tenn planning. 4 By contrast, the purposes of the 
EMP were thoroughly examined and debated from the end of the 1980s onwards 
in the context of the wider debate about 'new' or 'soft' security. A considerable 
volume of analysis and research pointed to the need for policy change. 
So the 1990s saw the EU lay down the foundations for purposeful strategic 
action in the Mediterranean. What were its principal objectives, and how 
'European' were they? The fundamental aim of the EMP project was to foster 
'security and stability' in the Mediterranean by increasing the prosperity of the 
partner states and by enhancing cooperation at the governmental and societal 
levels. There was a strong sense of unity among the Member States and EU 
institutions about the importance of Mediterranean security to European security. 
Northern Member States were persuaded that the negative impact of instability in 
the Mediterranean region could spread throughout Western Europe in the fonn of 
dramatically increased immigration, deleterious consequences for Europe's 
Islamic communities and threats to European economic interests in the partner 
countries. Meanwhile, the southern Member States had manifestly vital economic 
and political interests in a stable Mediterranean region and increasingly took the 
view that the challenge could best be met by shifting national bilateral policies to 
the EU level. The Commission's proposals for the EMP therefore found a 
receptive audience, giving the project a strong European flavour 
from the outset. 
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The logic behind the EMP strategy is worth reflecting upon. In line with 
the 'securitisation' of the discourse surrounding Western Europe's relationships 
with its Mediterranean neighbours at the end of the 1980s, the Commission's 
proposals were based on a series of inter-connected arguments. Together, they 
added up to a compelling case for the practical application of 'soft security' to EU 
Mediterranean policy. Their ideological grounding combined the classic 
functionalist approach to cooperative international relations with orthodox neo- 
liberal economic thinking. A clear link was identified between economic 
development, political and social stability and regional security. By extension, as 
the major trading partner of all the partner countries and the biggest provider of 
financial aid, the EU and its Member States had a special responsibility to take the 
lead in building a new, socio-economically oriented framework for regional 
security. 
Behind this 'logic of assistance', however, was a less progressive agenda, 
one centred on the domestic interests of the Member States. For the Southern 
Member States in particular, the possibility of destabilised states and Islamic 
regimes in North Africa raised the spectre of mass immigration, the spread of 
terrorism and even the possibility of military challenges. The Barcelona 
Declaration contains references to combating terrorism and organised crime in 
both the first and third chapters. Crudely speaking, one of the priorities of the new 
Mediterranean policy for the Member States was to 'combat fundamentalism' 
which in practice meant preserving the political status quo in many partner 
countries. The EU's 'non-decisions' on Algeria clearly revealed this unspoken 
rationale for the EMP. While the Union carefully avoided associating 
the EMP 
with a 'threat' from the south, fears of an Islamic 'domino effect' were widely 
expressed in European capitals. 
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An 'economic interest' argument is rather harder to sustain, but cannot be 
overlooked in an explanation of the EMP. Despite the comparatively low volume 
of trade between the EU and the Mediterranean partner countries (when compared 
to the EU's trade with other states and regional groupings), there were sectors in 
which the Union had a fundamental interest in safeguarding its external economic 
interests. The hydrocarbon sector -a highly strategic sector in its own right - was 
excluded from the Euro-Mediterranean agreements, but occupied a prominent 
position in the follow-up programme of the Barcelona process. Moreover, the 
European private sector was always going to be biggest beneficiary of 
liberalisation within the partner countries. The EMP contained both financial 
incentives and the promise of significant improvements in the partner countries' 
investment regimes, leaving European businesses in a powerful position to exploit 
their overwhelming comparative advantages in terms of capital, distribution 
infrastructures, production capacities and technology. 5 The point here is that the 
EU will be a net economic beneficiary of the EMP for a long time to come. 6 
While the propose strategy was original and far sighted, the early stages 
of the implementation phase highlighted its shortcomings. First, the scope of the 
task that the EU set itself - economic 'transition' in the Mediterranean - was not 
backed by a commensurate level of financial assistance. Even allowing for the 
substantial increase in EU aid for the region provided by MEDA, the partner 
countries still lagged far behind the Central and Eastern European countries. In 
1997 EU aid to the Mediterranean partners amounted to just over 3 ECU per 
capita, while the Central and Eastern European countries received around II ECU 
per capita. 7 The Union was faced by the familiar problem of demand 
for its 
limited budgetary resources outstripping SUPPlY. 
8 This resource problem was 
highly political, pitting the northern 'Calvinist' liberalising tendency in the EU 
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against the southern Member States which stood firm on the need for something 
approximating parity in the division of EU funds between the East and South. 
The final financial agreement - like many EU package deals - left neither side 
satisfied. 9 
Second, the free-trade objective obliged the EU to open up its markets in 
the very sectors that were internally the most highly politicised: Mediterranean 
agricultural products and textiles. 10 For Michael Smith, politicisation is the 
driving force behind the development of the core of EU foreign policy in pillar 
I. " What the EMP surely shows is that politicisation often limits the ability of the 
EU to undertake strategic action, since the projected long-term benefits of such 
action are invariably set aside for short term political expediency. In EU 
Mediterranean policy, political expediency demanded the protection of domestic 
producers by member governments, calling into question the credibility of the 
Union's commitment to free-trade. As Peter Petri argues, 'by themselves, free 
trade agreements with Europe will yield limited results, since no major market 
access concessions seem to be on the table. ' 12 Recent World Bank statistics 
suggest that the Middle East suffered the biggest decline in exports of any region 
during 1998, and underline both the weakness of exporters in the partner countries 
and the need for the Union to soften the blow of liberalisation. 
13 But all the EU 
can offer is a transitional period of 12-15 years, modest financial aid and its 
technical expertise. The rest is left to market forces. The perception of the 
partner countries is that the EU remains stubbornly protectionist on many of the 
products that matter most to them. 
14 As an Egyptian diplomat put it, 'It is out of 
self-interest that Europe exploits the Mediterranean. The 
EU has to realise there is 
always a price to pay. 
" 5 
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Third, the Union still lacks the political power to keep the EMP on the 
rails when the breakdown of the Middle East Peace Process widens the diplomatic 
gulf between the Arab and Israeli participants. Face-saving diplomacy at the 
Malta and Palen-no conferences could not hide the fact that, by 1999, the wind had 
gone out of Barcelona's sails. The stalling of the Barcelona process raised 
questions about the wisdom of investing so much political capital in a multilateral 
forum with such a broad, diverse and frankly antagonistic membership. With sub- 
regional options available (Euro-Maghreb, Euro-Mashreq), expanding the 
partnership concept to the whole Mediterranean region may ultimately prove to 
have been a serious strategic miscalculation. 
Turning now to the agency argument, Michael Smith's contention that the 
EC is the primary agent for EU strategic action is clearly borne out by the content 
and institutional form of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. ' 6 The free-trade 
area is almost entirely dependent on the results of the Community's negotiations 
with individual partner countries, led by the Commission as chief negotiator. The 
MEDA aid package is also exclusively a Community instrument, administered by 
the Commission under the watchful eye of the Member States, the European 
Parliament and the EU's Court of Auditors. In more general terms, the functional, 
integrative dimension of the EMP has built on the Community's own internal 
integration process. Cooperative programmes launched by the Barcelona process, 
in sectors such as energy, the environment, industry, small businesses and 
telecommunications, have all been based on the Community's organisational 
resources and experience in these policy areas. 
However, the EMP also exposes the inherent limitations of EC agency, 
some of which arise from the unique complexity of the EU policy process, others 
which result from the inter-govenimental basis of the Barcelona process. The 
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Commission proposes policy measures, negotiates the terms of the Euro- 
Mediterranean agreements and administers the Community's budget for the 
Mediterranean. But the Member States retain the final say over decisive issues, 
and are heavily influenced by domestic political interests. The repeated blockages 
over agricultural trade concessions in the Council are the best illustration of the 
Member States' capacity to restrict the scope for substantive policy change. The 
results of negotiations, more often than not, are trade deals that barely exceed the 
status quo. ' 7 
Governmental prerogative dominates the Barcelona process to an even 
greater extent. Measures can only be adopted with the approval of all 27 
participating governments. The direction, pace and progress of the follow-up 
process are dictated by inter-governmental diplomacy. When governments refuse 
to meet, there is little the EU can do about it. Here, pillar I is merely a tool for 
implementing measures adopted by governments, providing funding for the 
various sectoral and expert networks. The Commission might enjoy a powerful 
role as coordinator of the process, but it cannot propose measures that will not 
receive the unanimous endorsement of the twenty seven. The result has been a 
cautious, low key approach to the follow-up process, with ideas being tentatively 
mooted rather than vigorously pursued. As a senior Commission official 
observed, 'We are unlikely to be in a situation where we would want to go against 
the wishes of the states. ' 
18 
What kind of picture is emerging as the EMP strategy begins to take 
effect? The most obvious point is that the EU has clearly reinforced its 
'leadership' role in the region, extending its reach deeper into the economies, 
political systems and societies of the partner countries. 
In Central and Eastern 
Europe, the EU was 'catapulted into leadership' after 1989, and was forced to find 
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rapid solutions to the challenge of bringing the former Soviet bloc countries into 
the fold. 19 In the Mediterranean, by contrast, the EU progressively built on its 
already dominant economic position to the point where formal agreements with it 
became an essential element of third countries' foreign policies. There are no 
signs that the partners' dependence on exports to the EU - between 60 and 70 per 
cent of their total exports - will contract in future. In short, by the 1990s the EU 
had made itself indispensable to the partner countries, if not politically, then 
certainly economically. 
The EMP also accelerated the unidirectional process of extending selected 
parts of the EU's order to the Mediterranean partner countries. Again, the 
principa conduits for this process were pillar I policy instruments. The 
Commission was unequivocal about this facet of the EMP: the partners were 
expected to implement a watered down version of the Union's own single market 
programme. 20 Signatories of the Euro-Mediterranean agreements would be 
obliged to bring their customs, tariff and taxation regimes into line with those of 
the EU. Stricter enforcement of the Union's rules of origin, alignment of public 
procurement procedures and the adoption of EU product standards meant that 
governments would be forced to adapt their administrative and regulatory systems 
to the EU model, requirements that in most cases had significant financial 
implications. 21 If the Commission, and organisations such as the OECD, IMF and 
World Bank are to be believed, the spin off for the partners will be a steady 
increase in trade amongst themselves, integration into the global economic order 
and higher economic growth. Most partner governments have bought this 
argument, having no realistic alternatives. 
However, there are good reasons to question both the manner in which the 
Union is imposing an order on the Mediterranean partners, and the 
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appropriateness of the programme of harmonisation for states with comparatively 
underdeveloped economies, bureaucracies and political systems. The EMP falls 
short of the all-embracing governance framework currently being extended to the 
Central and Eastern European accession candidates. Upon their accession, the 
CEECs stand to benefit from substantial compensation for the negative socio- 
economic effects of compliance with and integration into the EU order. The 
Mediterranean non-member countries, by contrast, continue to rely heavily on 
outside financial and technical assistance both to carry out the prescribed reforms 
and alleviate the negative effects of austerity. Much depends on the ability of the 
partners to attract significantly higher levels of inward investment and on the 
development of an as yet nascent private sector. The EMP may well help 
establish the conditions for a flourishing private sector, but the onus is on self- 
reliance and the unpredictable behaviour of Private capital. 
The EMP has institutional architecture for the EU's long-term 
Mediterranean strategy is now in largely in place. 22 At the multilateral level, the 
Barcelona process is spawning networks of sectoral cooperation involving 
governments, businesses and other non-governmental actors coordinated by 
national ministers and the European Commission. In a sense, though, it is a 
structure-in-waiting, since it will become fully activated only if all the Arab 
partner states and the Israelis can normalise their diplomatic relations. 
Many analysts of EU foreign policy, as well as practitioners, remain 
sceptical about its capacity for strategic action in the continued absence of a 
Common Foreign and Security Policy that equips the Union with a 'hard security' 
capability. 23 The argument is that its strategies will always 
be somehow complete 
without the option of military action. Pro-active CFSP actions, such as the 
EU's 
funding of the Palestinian elections, are still the exception rather than the rule. 
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Pillar I might be the locus for pro-active external policy-making, but without the 
'hard security' capability to back it up, the Union cannot become a self-reliant 
foreign policy actor. 24 As Helene Sjursen argues, 'by the late 1990s it looked 
likely that the emergence of a security and defence policy for the EU was 
politically and practically unrealistic although legally possible and permissible. )25 
NATO has reasserted its claim to be the only institution capable of dealing with a 
direct military challenge from the southern shore. Confidence building measures, 
dialogue on politico-security issues and stability pacts/charters are undeniably 
laudable and useful starting points, but are unlikely to be of much utility if the 
pessimistic predictions of mass immigration, regime collapse and weapons 
proliferation are realised. 
2. Bridging the Divide: The Pillarisation Problem 
The problem of consistency between pillars I and II(and, increasingly, pillar III) 
remains largely unresolved. Wrangling between the Member States, Commission 
and European Parliament over competencies has become a stock feature of the 
EU's foreign policy-making process. Such disputes are symptomatic of the 
continuing sensitivity of national governments to what might be termed 
supranational. creep in the foreign policy sphere. The EMP did not entirely escape 
the competency problem, as exemplified by the marginalisation of the 
Commission in the negotiation of the Barcelona Declaration, by stalemate in the 
Council over British objections to the use of qualified majority voting on the 
suspension of MEDA aid, and by the different institutional formulae used for EU 
representation in the two Barcelona coordination committees. However, the 
pillarisation issue had only a peripheral effect on the actual functioning of the 
EMP. Although the three chapters of the Barcelona Declaration resembled the 
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EU's own three pillar structure, no clear link was established between the two. 
Barcelona was explicitly designed to have its own dynamic, outside the direct 
control of the EU. 
The sui generis nature of the Barcelona process mitigated against the 
categorisation of issues pillar I/pillar 11 issues. Uncertainty about the how the 
provisions of the Declaration would be classified was exacerbated by the text 
itself For instance, issues with a strong cultural dimension - including religious 
freedoms, freedom of expression and anti-racism - were all included in the 
political and security partnership rather than in the third chapter. In the initial 
stages of the follow-up process, there were several arguments among the 
participants over the appropriate chapter for confidence building measures. 26 
Where intenneshing of pillars one and two is occurring, it is driven by the 
nature of the strategy, by ad hoc procedural creativity, and, as a Commission 
official put it, 'for the sake of convenience. ' 27 No formal decision was ever taken 
in the EMP to actively and systematically bridge the divide between the EC pillar 
and the CFSP, despite calls from the European Parliament to generate CFSP joint 
actions for security measures adopted in the Barcelona process. However, the 
inclusion of the political/security chapter and the social, cultural and human 
chapter in the Barcelona Declaration made coherence essential, since all three 
chapters were directed at the broader goal of enhancing regional security. When 
internal divisions within the Union did surface - as was the case over the Stability 
Pact/Charter - the partner countries clearly viewed it as a sign of weakness. 
28 
The EMP put the Commission, which was entrusted with the overall 
coordination of the Barcelona process, in a strong position as far as bridging the 
pillar 1-11 gap was concerned. As the common institutional link between the three 
chapters, the Commission was in a good position to put a pillar 
I label on the work 
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undertaken in the follow-up process. Its key asset in this respect was its power to 
propose measures funded by the Community budget, which it was quick to exploit 
in the first chapter. The possibility of military involvement in a disaster relief 
mechanism funded by EC money illustrated how practical considerations could 
override the kind of governmental sensitivity that would ordinarily subject such a 
proposal to lengthy, dogmatic debates in the Council. Paradoxically, the 
Commission's task was made easier by the weakness of the CFSP, since measures 
could only be funded from the CFSP budget if formal joint actions were agreed, a 
possibility apparently ruled out before the Barcelona process began. 
That said, the significance of this use of the EC budget to fund politico- 
security measures should not be overstated. The approval of the Member States 
owed more to practicality and downright common sense than to any deliberate 
transfer of power to the Commission. The measures on the table, such as 
financing for a network of defence institutes, were part of the low profile 
confidence building programme and therefore lacked the kind of overtly political 
content that might have drawn objections from the less communitarian Member 
29 States. In some cases, it was unclear under which chapter a measure should fall 
under. 30 That the Barcelona Declaration was a political rather than a legal 
document also contributed to the de-sensitisation of the measures. It remains to be 
seen whether more politically sensitive measures, in particular the Stability 
Charter,, will be subject to similarly expeditious decisions, or whether the CFSP 
will eventually have to be activated as the basis for the EU's decisions about 
Mediterranean security. 
One of the more interesting outcomes of the EMP, and of the EU's 
activities in the mediterranean in general, is the increased deployment of 
economic policy instruments to achieve manifestly political objectives. 
The most 
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obvious case is the Middle East Peace Process where EU adopted a decidedly 
more combative stance in its quest for political relevance. As well as becoming 
paymaster of the post-Madrid Palestinian territories, it showed a growing 
willingness to rattle its commercial sabre over the Israeli government's failure to 
adhere to the Oslo principles. The signs are that the Union's economic weight is 
beginning to pay dividends in terms both of its profile in the region and its status 
as an 4ally' of the Palestinians. 
In a less high profile way, the EMP also saw the introduction of stronger 
political conditionality attached to the MEDA budget and to the Euro- 
Mediterranean agreements. Both instruments included clauses for suspension, 
based on a Commission proposal, in the event of human rights abuses, provisions 
which promised to subject the partner governments to closer scrutiny of their 
behaviour at home. The power of the European Parliament (and national 
parliaments) to withhold its assent to the agreements and to refuse to authorise the 
MEDA budget line added to the potential for these economic instruments to be 
used as political weapons. Although Turkey was the only partner country to have 
its MEDA funding blocked, for reasons related as much to its relationshiP with 
Greece as to human rights concerns, the Union's willingness to flex its muscles 
was nevertheless established early on in the EMP. 
It appears that this type of ad hoc linkage between economic policy 
instruments and political objectives will continue to be the norm. It reflects the 
general trend in EU foreign policy for finding pragmatic solutions when existing 
procedures fail to generate effective collective action, as is routinely the case. The 
practice of nominating Special Envoys, for instance, initially a product of the 
Union's inability to agree on how to deal with the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, 
has become a firmly established feature of the Union's diplomatic repertoire. 
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Given the current fragility of the Barcelona process, the Union can ill-afford to 
jeopardise the already dwindling output of measures by engaging protracted 
debates about the proper legal bases for action. With eastern enlargement 
impending, flexibility may be essential to the credibility of EU foreign policy. 
3. Revisiting the Civilian Power Concept 
Both literally and normatively, the 'civilian power' concept is deeply embedded in 
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. 31 By definition, 'soft security' demands a 
shift of emphasis in away from traditional power politics and politico-military 
security towards a more idealistic, visionary approach to international relations. 
Along with the 'economics first' approach, a whole chapter of the Barcelona 
process was devoted to 'civilian' issues spanning culture, religion and the 
controversial idea of encouraging the development and participation of 'civil 
society'. The inclusion of a human face to the EMP was in keeping with the 
Union's use of what Hill calls 'moral suasion' as a policy instrument. 32 The 
implication was that Western Europe's approach to democracy, human rights and 
governmental-societal relations should be the standard for members of the Euro- 
Mediterranean Partnership. 
But the civilian power concept also implies passivity on traditional 
politico-security issues, something that does not square with the agenda of the 
EMP. The first chapter of the Barcelona Declaration makes direct references to, 
inter alia, sovereignty, weapons proliferation and even the need to refrain from 
developing military capacities beyond legitimate defence requirements. Reading 
between the lines, the first chapter anticipates future political crises in the region, 
whether domestic or international. France's push for a stability pact/charter, 
despite the attempt to sell it as a 'political statement, is evidence of an active 
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effort on the EU's part to have in place politico-security safeguards if the 'soft 
security' strategy fails. 
The real relevance of civilian power Europe in the EMP context is to be 
found in the perceptions and expectations of the partner countries. With most 
Mediterranean states having been dragged into the superpowers' battle for 
dominance, the European Union always (symbolically) represented a less 
threatening presence in the international system. In the power vacuum left by the 
end of Cold War, Mediterranean non-member countries were centripetally 
attracted to the EU by the 'magnetic force of economics. ' 33 They joined a growing 
queue of third countries knocking on the EU's door for membership, upgraded 
association agreements and increased economic support. Among the 
Mediterranean partners, Cyprus and Malta stand on the verge of accession, Turkey 
sits in a seemingly perpetual waiting room and Morocco has had formal and 
informal applications for membership rejected. All the partners expect the EU to 
meet its obligations as a benevolent dispenser of resources from north to south and 
as the keyholder of access to the lucrative single European market. In that sense, 
the civilian power concept has a tangible product to offer. Whether or not it is 
34 
enough for the EU to replace the state is another matter. 
There is also demand for Europe as a civilian political power. For the 
Arab Mediterranean group in particular, the EU's presence is sought after as an 
effective counterweight to the USA in the Middle East Peace Process. Indeed, 
Arab governments reproached the Union for being insufficiently forceful with the 
Benjamin Netanyahu's government, and for appointing a diplomat - Miguel 
Moratinos - rather than a politician as 
its special envoy to the peace process. 35 
More generally, the EU is widely regarded a model for peaceful 
international relations between states with a history of bloody conflict. The 
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creation of the Arab Maghreb Union and (shelved) proposals for a regional 
organisation to capitalise on peace in the Middle East both foresaw political 
integration along the lines of the European integration experience. 
However, mistrust persists about the EU's motives for devoting what is 
seen as excessive attention to the political and security dimension of the 
Barcelona process. To illustrate the point, at the same time that the Union was 
talking about peace, prosperity and stability in the region, its southern Member 
States were discussing, among other things, the creation of EuroMarFor, 
Euroforce by France, Italy and Spain. 36 Not surprisingly, these initiatives were 
regarded with deep suspicion by the Maghreb states. 37 As a Moroccan diplomat 
argued: 
The security issue is a very real and deep one, and we do understand the 
concerns in Europe, some of which are genuine. But some are the result of 
scaremongering, some are a result of stereotypes and prejudices which we 
don't like. As far as we are concerned, there hasn't been, at any time, any 
need for Europe to have any military concerns. 38 
The Union has had to be ultra-cautious on following up the democratisation and 
human rights elements of the EMP. It is perhaps no coincidence that uptake of the 
MEDA Democracy budget, which was set up to promote the activities of non- 
goverm-nental organisations in the partner countries, was initially slow. 
39 There is 
a fine line between nudging the partners in its preferred direction and outright 
political interference. 
The question remains: can the EU's Mediterranean strategy succeed 
without an independent hard security dimension? Although 
it is still hardly 
transformative, the EMP at least aims to tackle the root socio-economic causes of 
instability, with the Union acting as a bridge between the rich North and poor 
South. Given time,, and the benefit of several years of closer cooperation between 
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the northern and southern shores, the idea of a regional soft security community 
appears to be a realistic prospect. In this respect, a militarily empowered EU 
implementing its own defence policy in the Mediterranean might prove to be 
counter-productive. As Karen Smith argues: 
The end of the civilian power image would entail giving up far too much 
for far too little. An EU intervention capability could be seen by outsiders 
as a step towards the creation of a superpower that uses military instruments 
to pursue its own interests. 40 
Alternatively, the increasing international trend towards using military means 
for selective humanitarian interventions may well see pressure grow on the EU 
to equip itself with a genuine politico-security capability .41 The crisis in 
Kosovo during 1999 once again exposed the EU's powerlessness to intervene 
even where it has a strong interest in doing so. Civilian power Europe, 
however laudable, may be redundant. 
4. Closing the Cap abilities-Expectation s Gap? 
In important respects, the EMP has clearly narrowed the capabilities expectations 
gap in EU Mediterranean policy. On the capabilities side, the EMP delivered two 
main improvements. First, the Union displayed a significant (and arguably 
surprising) degree of internal cohesiveness over the new Mediterranean strategy. 
The Commission's proposals passed through the Council largely unscathed, a 
measure of the convergence among the Member States on the need for policy 
change. Critically, the southern Member States secured the endorsement of the 
northern group to the MEDA budget. The exception was the Euro -Mediterranean 
agreements where the liberalising ambitions of the northern group were repeatedly 
frustrated by the defensive attitude of the southern group. 42 
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The Member States' relative cohesion on the EMP contrasted with their 
disunity on the Union's eastern enlargement strategy. Internal disputes over the 
candidates, the timing of enlargement and how the costs of widening were to be 
distributed have left an air of uncertainty hanging over EU-CEEC relations. 43 
Accession, unlike the EMP, is a high risk, high cost game requiring both reform of 
the Union's own internal order and a massive re-distribution of resources to the 
east. 
Moreover, the EMP equipped the Union with an array of new and 
modified policy instruments that have significantly expanded the policy choices 
available to it. The coupling of the Euro-Mediterranean agreements to MEDA and 
the Barcelona process has brought new-found coherence to EU Mediterranean 
policy. Arguably the most significant development is the multi I ateralisation of 
policy which offers a clear pathway to regional integration. If the Union is to 
exercise decisive influence over future development in the Mediterranean and 
benefit from the extension of its own sphere of influence in the region, then the 
Barcelona process is undoubtedly a step in the right direction. 
Such is the economic and political diversity of the partner countries that it 
is difficult to generalise about their expectations of the EU as a whole. There are 
clearly realistic expectations about what the EU can achieve as a political actor, 
and the limitations of the CFSP are widely acknowledged. The Arab partner 
countries certainly look to the EU to take a lead on their behalf in the Middle East 
Peace Process and act as a far more effective counterweight to the close 
relationship between the USA and Israel. In this respect, the Barcelona process 
has so far failed to live up to their expectations, with the EU more concerned to 
keep all the Participants satisfied than to use the process as a means to influence 
Israel's policy on the Palestinian territories. The Union's brief trade skirmish with 
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Israel in 1998 was welcomed as a sign that the Europeans are no longer as 
prepared to tolerate Israel's stranglehold on the nascent Palestinian state. 
On the economic front, the highest possible level of financial assistance 
and the maximum level of market access are priorities for all. Here, the 
Mediterranean partners join a long line of developing countries looking to deepen 
their links to an altruistic EU, which is still regarded as a 'bridge' between rich 
and poor. Yet the 1990s have seen warning signs that the EU may be 'losing 
interest' in development policy, appearing preoccupied with its own budgetary 
problems and the massive transfer of resources that will accompany eastern 
enlargement. Few of the partner countries can hope to accede to the Union, and 
failure to achieve the kind of economic growth required to provide employment 
for rapidly expanding populations is likely to leave them largely helpless if the 
most apocalyptic forecasts of social explosions are borne out 
The Euro-Mediterranean agreements have unequivocally failed to meet the 
partners' expectations, however optimistic they may have been. Having 
experienced three decades of largely unfulfilled promises on access to the EU's 
agricultural markets, they reasonably expected a considerable improvement in the 
terms of trade in this sector. Once again, however, negotiators came up against 
the inherent conservatism of the CAP and the protectionist instincts of the 
Member States. As Likke Friis concludes in a study of EU-CEEC relations, the 
EU is "highly efficient in defending its own 'domestic interest" in external 
negotiations, but more inefficient in playing a truly constructive role for its 
surroundings. ' 44 The comparative importance of agricultural trade to the EU and 
the partner countries throws the EU's miserliness in this sector into even sharper 
relief. As is the case with financial resources, however, there appears to 
be little 
prospect of improvement in the prevailing terms of trade. 
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The EMP balance sheet shows a boost for the Union's capacity to control 
its relationships with the Mediterranean partner countries, but a persistent, 
substantive failure to meet their expectations. The bottom line is that the EU may 
be spreading itself too thinly in the external relations sphere, creating expectations 
that it simply cannot meet either economically or politically. Progressive force in 
the international order or not, the EU's first priority is to serve European interests, 
a fact inevitably reflected in the structure of its relationships with third countries. 
Strategic actions like the EMP are undeniably a sign of progress in 
European integration, and of a European Union that is gradually acquiring the 
capacity to order the world around it in a more systematic and coherent way. But 
the acid test of successful strategic action is surely the attainment of long-term 
objectives and a genuinely transformative impact. In a region whose fragile 
stability will become increasingly vital to the EU, partnership is unlikely to be 
enough. 
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APPENDIX 1 
EU FINANCIAL AID TO THE MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERS 
First Second Third Fourth 
Partner Protocol Protocol Protocol Protocol 
Country 1978-81 1981-6 1986-91 1991-6 
Algeria 44 44 56 70 EC Budget Grants 
70 107 183 280 EIB loans 
114 151 239 350 Total 
Cyprus 10 16 18 24 
20 28 44 50 
30 44 62 74 
Egypt 77 126 200 258 
93 150 249 310 
170 276 449 568 
Israel - - - 
30 40 63 82 
30 40 63 82 
Jordan 22 26 37 46 
18 37 63 80 
40 63 100 126 
Lebanon 10 16 20 24 
20 34 53 45 
30 50 73 69 
Morocco 74 109 173 218 
56 90 151 220 
130 199 324 438 
Syria 26 33 36 43 
34 64 110 115 
60 97 146 158 
Tunisia 54 61 93 116 
71 78 131 168 
95 139 224 224 




Sources: European Commission (1994) The European Union's Relations with the Mediterranen, 
MEMO (94) 74, Rapid Database, <(http: //europa. eu. int/rapid/cgi>). 
European Commission (1996) Commission Report on the Implementation offinancial and Technical 
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Much of the primary research for this thesis was interview-driven. The chief 
purpose of the interviews was to obtain knowledge of diplomatic activity 'behind 
the scenes'. Interviewees were encouraged to offer assessments and opinions on 
all aspects of EU Mediterranean policy. Given the general low profile of the 
Barcelona process, there has been relatively little in-depth debate or analysis of 
EU Mediterranean policy in either the media or the academic literature. Although 
the chapters on Algeria and the Middle East Peace Process deal with higher profile 
issues, interviews were also necessary to elaborate upon and verify infonnation 
obtained from secondary sources. 
A total of 62 interviews were conducted between April 1996 and October 
1998 (see accompanying list). Five research trips were made to Brussels and to 
national capitals, including London, Madrid, Paris and Valletta. The majority 
were diplomats responsible for Mediterranean policy based in national 
representations and embassies in Brussels. In all, representatives of 23 
governments were interviewed. Interviews with a Minister of State at the Foreign 
Office in London, a Deputy Political Director in Madrid, and a former Maltese 
Foreign Minister proved especially valuable. A wide range of interviews were 
also carried out in the main EU institutions - the Commission, Council and 
European Parliament - with Heads of Unit, Desk Officers and other officials. 
Towards the end of the research period, interviews were conducted with 
representatives of management consultants involved in implementing MEDA 
projects and members of a parliamentary lobby group. 
The selection of interviewees was driven by the need to speak to as broad a 
range of representatives as possible. Once a first meeting had taking place, most 
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interviewees were approached for a second and third time in order to take 
advantage of familiarity with the research and its objectives. One official in the 
Council Secretariat and the Commission's desk officer for the Barcelona process 
proved to be good 'gatekeepers', suggesting potential interviewees and even 
affanging meetings themselves. 
Rather disappointingly, despite numerous approaches, it proved impossible 
to meet with Members of the European Parliament involved in a variety of 
Mediterranean-related Committees. Many failed to respond to letters, while 
others contacted during visits to Brussels were unable to find space for a meeting 
in their schedules. Similarly, it proved impossible to arrange meetings with Irish, 
Lebanese, Luxembourgeois or Tunisian diplomats. In the case of the Ireland and 
Luxembourg, visits to Brussels coincided with their respective Presidencies of the 
Council. Attempts to meet with the Ambassadors 'parachuted' in by Council 
Presidents to coordinate their preparations for the Barcelona process were also 
problematic. IA French Ambassador died shortly after the Barcelona process 
began, while most returned to their postings after the end of their government's 
tenure of the Council Presidency. 
For the most part, visits were timed to take place either just before or 
immediately after important meetings, though the uncertain atmosphere 
surrounding the Barcelona process, and the sheer volume of meetings, made 
scheduling something of a lottery. Arranging meetings in advance of research 
trips proved to be problematic, as interviewees often re-scheduled at the last 
minute. On several occasions, particularly at the Commission, officials terminated 
the interview in order to attend meetings elsewhere. 
1 It was common practice for the Member States to bring in an Ambassador, 
frequently based in 
one of the Mediterranean partner countries, to organise the numerous meetings that took place 
during each Council Presidency. 
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All interviews were conducted in person, and contact was maintained with 
a number of interviewees via telephone and email when further clarification was 
required about specific points. Initially, interviews were conducted using a 
dictaphone, from which material was then transcribed. It became clear early on 
that interviewees were sensitive to the presence of the dictaphone. Some objected 
to its use altogether, while others would only 'open up' when the machine was 
turned off. The decision to cease using the dictaphone led to some difficulties 
minor with transcription. However, the advantages more than outweighed the 
disadvantages. This move encouraged open and often frank discussion of the 
subject, and often allowed the interview to proceed in an informal, conversational 
style. 
In the ideal, extensive preparation was made for each interview, including 
research into national positions on specific issues and the state of play in 
negotiations. Interviews were based on the semi-structured method, with each 
interviewee being asked a number of identical questions in addition to specific 
questions relating to their government's position or role in the policy process. 
Lists of questions, or at least a guide to the issues to be covered, were initially 
provided wherever possible in advance of interviews. However, in the case of 
hastily arranged meetings, interviewees were unaware and therefore unprepared 
for questions beforehand. On the plus side, this approach also allowed interviews 
to freely flow. 
The problem of attribution was solved by making it clear at the outset that 
comments would not be directly attributed to the interviewee in the text. Several 
interviewees expressly requested that they should not be named anywhere in the 
thesis. Others, though, stated that they had no objections to being quoted 
verbatim. 
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Between February I and April 30 1997, research was also carried out 
during a stage at in the European Parliament's Directorate for Research (DGIV) in 
Brussels. The main benefit of this extended stay came from my access to the EP's 
Foreign Affairs and External Economic Relations Committees, to the numerous 
meetings of the EP's various Delegations, and to my attendance at EP plenary 
sessions. Committee meetings were frequently attended by Commissioners, by 
Commission officials and by Ambassadors of the partner countries. In particular, 
meetings of the EP's Delegations for Relations with Israel and the Palestinian 
Territories, which usually met on the same afternoon, offered lively, provocative 
debate and brought home to this researcher the seriousness of the breakdown in 
the Middle East Peace Process. 
The downside of the stage was that my work for the EP's External 
Economic Relations, which entailed preparing a series of 'Country Reports' on the 
economic situation in associates of the EU, only indirectly covered the Euro- 
Mediterranean Partnership. Material was often obtained in the course of work on 
other issues and during periods of free time. The heavy workload of the EP's 
Research Directorate limited the amount of time available to carry out interviews. 
Research was also hijacked by problems surrounding the Malta Conference in 
April 1996. Most officials were unavailable through the whole of April as they 
worked overtime to produce a Declaration. 
The manner in which the interviews were conducted presented a number of 
problems when it came to processing the data. Text from the first set of 
interviews was inputted into QSR-NUD*IST4. This qualitative research tool is 
designed for the management and analysis of unstructured data, a high tech form 
of discourse analysis. By coding and indexing textual material, the researcher 
is 
able to systematically search out common themes, test theories about 
data and 
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generate statistical or graphical representations of the data. A small sample - five 
interviews - were coded initially using 15 categories and an eclectic range of sub- 
categories. These included the role of the interviewee, nationalities and the 
specific issue about which the interview spoke ( Euro-Mediterranean Agreements, 
Barcelona Conference etc). 
Even during the coding process, it was clear that the variation between the 
texts was too great to allow searches on a sufficiently extensive range of themes. 
Furthermore, the fact that some interviews were not transcribed verbatim made it 
impossible, even with the flexibility of the package, to put issues in their proper 
context. Given that the text rarely exceeded five pages, further use of QSR- 
NUD*IST 4 was limited to searching for text in individual cases. 
Official documents on both the Euro-Mediterranean agreements and the 
Barcelona process were rather thin on the ground. Naturally enough, the 
Commission, Member States and the partner countries were reluctant to release 
details of the figures on the table in the negotiations before deals were concluded. 
Despite numerous requests, none of the Commission's negotiating mandates for 
the Euro-Mediterranean Agreements were made available, and the information 
included in the body of the thesis was supplied by interviewees. Two contacts - 
one in the Commission, one in the Council Secretariat - did supply a handftil of 
internal briefing papers on the preparation of the Barcelona Declaration, though 
these had to be matched to official reports to discover how and why the text was 
modified during the course of 1995. Again, interviews proved a far more effective 
source of infortnation. 
Obtaining other secondary sources - newspapers and periodicals - was a 
reminder how far Glasgow is from the Mediterranean. A very limited range of 
relevant material was accessible in Scotland, and frequent trips to London and 
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further afield were necessary to find specialised periodicals and foreign 
newspapers. Visits to the libraries of the ULB in Brussels, Louvain-la-Neuve 
University and the Institut du Monde Arabe in Paris were especially helpful 
though costly. A list of the periodicals and newspapers consulted follows. 
Actualites Frangaises 




Bulletin of the European Union 
Cahiers de I'Orient 
Defense Nationale 





International Herald Tribune 
Jeune Afrique 
Le Canard Enchaine 
Le Monde 
Le Monde Diplornatique 
Le Soir 
La Vie Econornique 
Marches Tropicaux et Mediterraneens 
Middle East Business Weekly 
Middle East Economic Digest 
Monde Arabe: Maghreb/Machrek 




The Jerusalem Post 
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